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My dissertation studies information production and price discovery in the 
syndicated loan market. Over the past twenty years, collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) 
and the market-flex model have changed the landscape of the loan market. In the first essay, 
I document that CLOs make up more than 60% of the investments in syndicated loans in 
recent years. A syndicated loan is in the portfolios of dozens of CLOs and they often 
disagree on the value of the loan. I examine how the disagreement affects the trading 
behavior of CLOs and the loan illiquidity in the secondary market. I find that such 
disagreement makes CLOs trade strategically by increasing trading frequency and 
decreasing trading amount. Dealers cannot differentiate the private signals in the market, 
which leads to the adverse selection concern and reduces the liquidity of a loan. 
Information possessed by dealers reduces the monopolistic power of diversely informed 
CLOs and attenuates the adverse selection concern. In the second essay, we focus on the 
market-flex model and examine how lending relationship affects the pricing adjustments 
in the primary market of syndicated loans. Using a new dataset on loan pricing adjustments, 
we find that the lead bank makes fewer adjustments to the initial pricing terms of a 
syndicated loan and shortens syndication time when it has a stronger relationship with the 
borrower. A stronger relationship also reduces loan underpricing. A relationship lead bank 
relies less on information from syndicate members. Exogenous shocks to relationships 
caused by bank mergers and closures confirm our findings. We contribute to the literature 
vi 
by showing that relationship lending improves loan pricing efficiency. In the third essay, 
we examine how the peer information benefits syndicate loan lending. We find that firms 
borrowing from and switching to their competitors’ banks pay lower loan spreads. The 
impact is stronger when the expected monitoring gains are higher and the expected costs 
are lower. A loan originated by a competitor’s bank has a lower share from the lead and 
experiences more frequent amendments. Our findings suggest that firms choose 
strategically to borrow from their competitors’ banks to reduce bonding costs. 
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This dissertation studies information production and price discovery in both the 
primary and the secondary syndicated loan markets. Chapter 2 reviews the literature. In 
Chapter 3, I examine how the diverse and private information known by different CLOs 
affects the illiquidity in the secondary loan market. In Chapter 4, I investigate how lending 
relationships between the borrowers and the lead lenders, which represent the private 
information known by the relationship lenders, affect the pricing adjustments in the 
primary market of syndicated loans. In Chapter 5, I study why firms borrow from their 
competitors’ banks given the threat of information leakage and show that firms borrow 






In the financial markets, information on the value of an asset is diverse in nature. 
Different investors usually acquire information from different sources, especially when the 
market of the asset is opaque. When investors possess diverse information, trading 
becomes strategic because every investor has some advantage over others in that she 
possesses unique information that is not known by others. While theoretical research on 
diverse information and transaction characteristics such as trading volume, return volatility, 
and asset liquidity has received wide attention in the literature (e.g., Admati and Pfeiderer 
(1988), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), He and Wang (1995), Foster and Viswanathan 
(1996), Back, Cao, and Willard (2000), Goldstein and Yang (2015)), there has been little 
empirical evidence on how diversely informed investors strategically trade and how the 
strategic trading affects asset liquidity in the secondary market. 
The central premise of relationship lending is that a bank acquires and reuses 
information from repeated interactions with a borrower in making credit decisions (e.g., 
Boot (2000) and Boot and Marinc (2008)). Over the past two decades, the syndicated loan 
market has experienced rapid growth of securitization and secondary trading under the 
originate-to-distribute (OTD) lending model. Because banks can often offload risk 
exposure via securitization and loan sales, it has been a growing concern whether banks 
still rely on information produced from prior lending relationships in making their credit 
3 
decisions in the syndicated loan market. While Drucker and Puri (2008) suggest that loan 
sales provide lenders with the capacity to lend to the same borrowers in the future and 
benefit relationship building. Lin, Liu, and Wang (2017) find that selling loans to nonbank 
investors such as CLOs impairs banks’ relationships with borrowers. It remains an open 
question whether and how relationship lending plays a role in the syndicated loan market 
amid the recent market developments. 
Over the past two decades, public corporations in the U.S. have borrowed 
frequently from their competitors’ banks in the loan market. As shown in Figure 5.1, about 
40% of the firms share lenders with their industry peers in 2016. This pattern is in sharp 
contrast to the findings in equity and bond underwriting where issuers tend to avoid sharing 
investment banks with their product market competitors (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010)). 
Why do borrowers share lenders with their industry competitors given the threat of 
information leakage? A growing literature has been debating on the potential impact of 
common institutional ownership on product market competition (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Hirst (2017), He and Huang (2017), Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2017), Azar, Schmalz, 
and Tecu (2018), Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (2018), and Lewellen and Lowry (2019)). 
Borrowing from a competitor’s bank means that the firm and its competitor are partially 
connected via the common lender. Is there a similar anti-competition effect when firms 
borrow from common lenders? 





Diversely Informed Investors, Strategic Trading, and Loan Illiquidity: 
Evidence from Collateralized Loan Obligations1 
 
In the financial markets, information on the value of an asset is diverse in nature. 
Different investors usually acquire information from different sources, especially when the 
market of the asset is opaque. When investors possess diverse information, trading 
becomes strategic because every investor has some advantage over others in that she 
possesses unique information that is not known by others. While theoretical research on 
diverse information and transaction characteristics such as trading volume, return volatility, 
and asset liquidity has received wide attention in the literature (e.g., Admati and Pfeiderer 
(1988), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), He and Wang (1995), Foster and Viswanathan 
(1996), Back, Cao, and Willard (2000), Goldstein and Yang (2015)), there has been little 
empirical evidence on how diversely informed investors strategically trade and how the 
strategic trading affects asset liquidity in the secondary market. 
To provide a conceptual framework for the analysis, consider a market where there 
are some informed investors, some liquidity investors, and a market maker. Informed 
investors and liquidity investors submit orders to the market maker, and the market maker 
sets prices to fill the orders and clear the market. Each of the informed investors receives 
                                                     
1 Yafei Zhang. To be submitted to Journal of Finance. 
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an independent signal about the value of an asset. One part of the signal is also known by 
other informed investors (common information). The other part of the signal is private 
(private information). It is private information that results in investor disagreement. Ex ante, 
neither common nor private information is known by liquidity investors or the market 
maker. 
The common part of the signals leads to competition among the informed investors 
because everyone wants to trade on the common information before others do. This reveals 
the common information to the public very quickly and increases the market depth (Admati 
and Pfeiderer (1988), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Back, Cao, and Willard 
(2000)). I denote this argument as the competition hypothesis. 
Competition has no impact on revealing the diverse, private information held by 
informed investors to the public. The diversely informed investors still maintain the 
monopoly power. To maximize the trading profits, the investors have incentives to make 
smaller but more frequent transactions so that the private information is revealed to the 
market slowly. From the perspective of the market maker, because the orders submitted by 
the diversely informed investors are all small and indistinguishable, the market maker 
becomes more uncertain about the private signals contained in the order flow, which gives 
rise to the adverse selection concern (Admati and Pfeiderer (1988) and Back, Cao, and 
Willard (2000)). I denote this scenario as the adverse selection hypothesis. 
The competition and the adverse selection hypotheses have opposite predictions 
about the impact of investor disagreement on asset liquidity. To distinguish these two 
hypotheses, I exploit a novel dataset from Creditflux that contains detailed information on 
syndicated loan holdings and transactions by CLOs. More importantly, the dataset collects 
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CLOs’ different estimations about the same loan reported by CLO managers in their 
monthly reports, which enables me to measure CLO disagreement. I construct a panel 
sample of 102,527 loan-month observations for 7,378 unique securitized syndicated loans 
from December 2008 to October 2018.2 I define the CLO disagreement measure (CLODIS) 
for a loan as the standard deviation of the loan values reported by all the CLOs with 
reported holdings in the loan. I define loan illiquidity (LOANILLIQ) as the absolute return 
divided by the dollar trading amount (Amihud (2002)).  
I find that a one standard deviation increase of CLODIS leads to an increase of 13% 
of the standard deviation of LOANILLIQ. The impact is not completely driven by trading 
volume because I also find that a one standard deviation increase of CLODIS is associated 
with a 41 basis points (bp) increase of the absolute value of the loan return.3 The impact of 
CLO disagreement on loan liquidity is more pronounced in loans issued by private firms, 
smaller firms, and firms with greater analyst forecast dispersion on earnings per share 
(EPS). The impact is also stronger when informed trading is more likely to occur. These 
findings are consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis. 
Furthermore, I find that CLO disagreement increases trading frequency and 
decreases trading amount per transaction. And the impact of CLO disagreement on loan 
illiquidity decays gradually, with a still economically large and statistically significant 
                                                     
2 The beginning of the sample is the result of the 2008-09 financial crisis – the crisis shrank 
the CLO market and many collaterals in CLOs’ portfolios prior to the crisis were high-
yield bonds and structured products. The sample ends in October 2018 because of data 
availability. 
3 Lou and Shu (2017) find that the impact of the Amihud illiquidity measure on stock return 
is not attributable to the price impact but driven completely by the trading volume. I follow 
their paper and examine how CLO disagreement affects the absolute value of the loan 
return to address this concern. 
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effect after twelve months. These results suggest that the diversely informed CLOs trade 
strategically to reveal their private information slowly to the market. 
The private information captured by CLO disagreement in the loan market does not 
come from the information in the stock market, because I find that neither analyst forecast 
dispersion, nor the number of analysts has predictive power to the level of CLODIS or 
LOANILLIQ. This also suggests that stock analysts pay little attention to loan-specific risks 
when they estimate a firm’s cash flows. 
I then examine how potential information sharing affects both CLO disagreement 
and loan liquidity. Measuring the likelihood of information sharing by CLOs’ common 
connections to the same trustee bank or bond issuance arranger (call these connected 
investors), I find that information sharing reduces CLO disagreement and strengthens the 
impact of CLODIS on LOANILLIQ. 4  The results are consistent with the notion that 
information sharing reduces disagreement among the connected investors but worsens the 
information asymmetry between the connected investors and the non-connected ones, 
especially the dealers. In other words, even though the total private information in the 
market remains unchanged, when the information structure changes, the impact of 
informed trading on liquidity will be different. 
CLOs are not the only institutions that produce private information in the loan 
market. Rating agencies analyze the creditworthiness of a loan to issue credit ratings and 
are the main information providers to investors such as insurance companies. 5 
                                                     
4 The arranger of a CLO is the lead underwriter for the CLO’s bond issuance and provides 
bridge funding for the CLO to buy loans during the warehouse period. The trustee of a 
CLO, usually a large commercial bank, provides custodial services such as distributing the 
CLO reports to the stakeholders in the CLO. 
5 Please see, e.g., Moody’s rating methodologies at https://www.moodys.com/. 
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Dealers/lenders having relationships with a borrower acquire private and mostly soft 
information such as team culture, management trustworthiness, and managements’ 
opinions on corporate strategies (Liberti and Petersen (2019)). I find that the private 
information from both rating agencies and potential dealers (loan primary market lenders) 
can help alleviate the adverse impact of CLO disagreement on loan liquidity. Rating 
agencies’ private information is measured by their different ratings on the same loan, and 
a potential dealer’s private information is measured by its lending relationship with a 
borrower in the past five years (Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020b)). The results corroborate 
the conjecture in Goldstein and Yang (2015) that information diversity improves market 
efficiency. 
To address the potential reverse causality and omitted variable biases, I follow Hale 
and Santos (2009), Schenone (2010), and Ferreira and Matos (2012) and use firms’ initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of their equities as an instrument for CLO disagreement given that 
the information released during the IPO period can reduce CLOs’ disagreement on loan 
value. Indeed, the first stage regressions show that CLO disagreement is at the lowest level 
during the IPO period from six months before to six months after the IPO date. The second 
stage regression results show that the instrumented CLO disagreement still has a positive 
and significant impact on the loan illiquidity measure, suggesting that the results are robust 
after addressing the potential endogeneity issues. 
The existing literature on CLOs and the secondary loan market focuses on CLO 
fund performance (Loumioti and Vasvari (2019)), the probability of defaults and 
downgrades between securitized and non-securitized loans (Bord and Santos (2011) and 
Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina (2012)), and how a dealer’s capital affects the quoted 
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bid and ask spreads of the traded loans (Berger, Zhang, and Zhao (2020)). Yet, none of 
them sheds light on the information structure of the secondary loan market. My paper 
provides the first empirical evidence on how CLOs’ diverse, private information affects 
their strategic trading and loan liquidity. 
The paper is also related to a large literature that attempts to measure investor 
disagreement. Some papers use the secondary market trading activities such as trading 
volume around earnings announcements and return volatility as proxies of investor 
disagreement (e.g., Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice (2009) and Chang, Hsiao, 
Ljungqvist, and Tseng (2020)). Another frequently used measure of investor disagreement 
is the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts on earnings per share (EPS) for stocks (e.g., Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)). The main drawback of these measures is that they do not 
directly capture the opinions of the investors. In a recent study, Carlin, Longstaff, and 
Matoba (2014) uses the Bloomberg survey data on dealers’ prepayment speed forecasts for 
a generic mortgage-backed security (MBS) to measure investor disagreement. There is no 
cross-sectional variations for their disagreement measure, and dealers are also different 
from investors. Different from all these studies, the CLO disagreement measure in this 
paper is not only clean and direct but also captures both time-series and cross-sectional 
variations. The paper by Cici, Gibson, and Merrick (2011) measures investor dispersion by 
the different fair values marked by different bond mutual fund managers for an identical 
corporate bond. But their dispersion measure mainly captures managers’ return-smoothing 
behaviors, which is different from the disagreement measure in my paper that captures the 
private information known by different CLO managers. 
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A few recent papers have documented that information in the loan market helps 
investors profit in the stock market (Ivashina and Sun (2011) and Addoum and Murfin 
(2019)). My paper contributes to this literature by showing that the information possessed 
by loan investors is different from that possessed by stock investors. Analyst reports of a 
firm contain little information about the firm’s loan-specific risks. 
The impact of information sharing on banks’ lending decisions has been extensively 
studied in the literature. It finds that information sharing alleviates the adverse selection in 
the lending market (e.g., Jappelli and Pagano (1993), Padilla and Pagano (1997)). Colla 
and Mele (2010) find that information sharing reduces the monopolistic power of the 
informed investors and increases market liquidity. In contrast to the existing literature, I 
find that information sharing worsens information asymmetry issues in loan trading and 
reduces loan liquidity because it leaves the dealer of the market in a more disadvantageous 
information position relative to the connected investors. That is, information sharing 
exhibits a more complex impact on market efficiency than previous studies have 
documented. Whether it deteriorates or ameliorates the information asymmetry problems 
depends on the market information structure. 
This paper also complements the theoretical studies on the complementarity or 
substitutability of investors’ information (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1987), Paul (1993), 
Lee (2010), and Goldstein and Yang (2015)). I find that the information possessed by rating 
agencies and potential dealers attenuates the adverse impact of CLO disagreement on loan 
liquidity, suggesting that information held by different institutions is strategically 
complementary in the loan market. 
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The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
institutional background. Section 3 introduces the CLO-i database and describes sample 
selection. Section 4 examines the relation between CLO disagreement and loan liquidity. 
Section 5 explores the information structure of the loan market and its impact on CLO 
disagreement and loan liquidity. Section 6 shows robustness and addresses the potential 
endogeneity issues. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
3.1. Institutional Background 
3.1.1. Information Structure of the Syndicated Loan Market 
A syndicated loan is not recognized as a security under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations. As a result, public disclosure requirements are minimal, 
especially for private firms. Even for public firms, a loan issuer does not need to disclose 
as much information to the public as it does in stock or bond offerings. A large portion of 
the information in the loan market remains unknown to the public. 
CLOs have dramatically changed the landscape of the corporate loan market. In 
2018, CLOs owned more than 65% of the total value of outstanding institutional term loans 
(ITLs).6 Different from traditional loan investors that usually buy and hold loans until 
maturity, CLOs frequently trade loans on the secondary market.7 The monthly trading 
                                                     
6  The number is from https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/pages/toc-
primer/lcd-primer#sec1. A syndicated loan to a firm is typically organized as a package or 
deal. There can be different loan facilities in a deal, including credit lines, Term Loan A 
(TLA), and Term Loan B (TLB), C (TLC), and higher. Credit lines and TLAs are mostly 
financed by banks. TLBs and loan facilities labeled higher are targeted to institutional 
investors and are often referred to as ITLs. Please see S&P (2016) for more information. 
7 A typical CLO has a four-year reinvestment period during which the CLO manager can 
trade loans in its portfolio if the CLO meets collateral quality and subordination level 
requirements. After all the necessary payments to the government and the noteholders, the 
manager usually receives 20% of the remaining amounts as a management incentive fee. 
This incentive fee encourages the manager to trade loans to boost the performance. 
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volume of securitized loans in the U.S. reported by CLOs increased from $2 billion in 
December 2008 to $31 billion in October 2018. Loan transactions are typically completed 
by a dealer in an over-the-counter market. 
In addition to active trading, another unique role played by CLOs in the loan market 
is that CLOs issue securities backed by syndicated loans. By securitizing a loan, a CLO 
becomes an important bridge of information. On one hand, it invests in a (private) loan and 
gains access to the publicly unavailable information about the loan. On the other hand, it 
has an obligation to disclose information such as holdings, loan value, and transactions on 
a regular basis because it issues asset-backed securities such as triple-A rated bonds.8 It is 
common that many CLOs invest in the same loan, so CLO disagreement on the loan value 
is directly observable.9 The above unique nature of CLOs makes the syndicated loan 
market arguably the best laboratory to study market information structure and secondary 
trading. 
3.2. Estimations of Loan Value in the Monthly Reports of CLOs 
After the month in which a CLO fund closes, the manager of the CLO fund needs 
to compile a trustee report in every month before the fund matures. In a month when there 
are cash flow distributions, the manager needs to prepare a payment report which contains 
information on payments to all the investors in the CLO fund in addition to the information 
that is included in a trustee report. In these monthly reports, the CLO manager needs to 
provide price estimations (in percentages over par) for each loan in its portfolio. The 
                                                     
8 CLO managers are required to compile and distribute monthly reports to the investors. 
The reports are not publicly known at least by the date they are compiled. In each monthly 
report, the CLO manager needs to provide a fair value for each loan in the portfolio. At 
what price a CLO manager values a loan reflects its private information about the loan. 
9 In my sample, the average number of CLO funds (managers) is 33 (11). A CLO manager 
may own multiple funds at the same time. 
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purpose for the CLO managers to value loans in their portfolios includes marking portfolios 
to market, managing risk, and supporting trading decisions. 
Because trading in the secondary loan market is sporadic, usually there are no 
market transaction prices to be used as reference points. Typically, a CLO manager uses 
the following rules to determine the loan value. 1) The manager obtains the bid price 
determined by an approved independent pricing service such as the Loan Pricing 
Corporation, LoanX Inc., or Markit Group Limited. 2) If 1) is not available, the manager 
uses the arithmetic average of bid-side quotations obtained from three independent dealers. 
3) If neither 1) nor 2) is available, the manager determines the loan value by exercising 
reasonable commercial judgment. 4) If none of the above are available, the value is set at 
zero until any of the above becomes available. Note that for non-zero evaluations, the CLO 
manager does not disclose which one it uses. 
Different CLO managers often provide different prices for the same loan in the 
same month. The difference could result from CLO managers’ different information 
sources (indirect information production). For example, some CLO managers may get price 
estimations from pricing service companies, and some others may seek bids from 
secondary market dealers. The difference could also result from CLO managers’ own 
analyses on the value of the loan (direct information production). In this study, I will 
abstract away the reasons behind this difference. After all, a CLO manager’s private 
information can come from both the indirect and direct information productions.10 
                                                     
10 In the literature, investor disagreement can also result from investors’ different beliefs. 
But in this scenario, it is always assumed that the investors have the same information 
source and “agree to disagree”. Given the institutional background, CLO disagreement is 
not likely to be driven by the belief difference. 
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It has been documented that managers of bond mutual funds could manipulate the 
marked bond prices to inflate their performances (Cici, Gibson, and Merrick (2011)). 
However, this is not the case for CLO managers. Inflating the price estimations cannot 
increase the CLO fund returns because the CLO managers will only get paid (except for 
the fixed senior management fee) if the collateralization tests are passed. Therefore, the 
managers would manipulate the price estimations only if doing so can improve their 
collateralization test results. Loumioti and Vasvari (2019) find that for default and CCC-
rated loans, CLO managers have incentives to manipulate the price estimations for these 
loans to pass monthly covenant tests. However, for non-default and non-CCC loans that 
are the focus of this paper, they are valued at par when computing covenant tests. The 
managers have little incentive to manipulate the price estimations for these loans. 
3.3. Data and Sample Description 
3.3.1. CLO-i Data, Sample Selection, and Variable Construction 
The sample is from Creditflux CLO-i database. Creditflux is a leading media 
company that provides specialist news, research analyses, and data on global financial 
markets, with a focus on CLOs in the US and Europe. The CLO-i database contains 
comprehensive data on loan collaterals, CLO bond tranches, collateralization test results, 
and equity tranche payments. Creditflux retrieves information from the payment reports 
and the monthly trustee reports distributed by CLO managers. 
Most of the papers in the literature use dispersion of analyst forecasts on EPS – the 
standard deviation divided by the absolute mean – to measure investor disagreement (e.g., 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Johnson (2004), and Sadka and Scherbina (2007)). 
As suggested by Cen, Wei, and Yang (2017), the numerator in this measure captures the 
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disagreement. And the denominator, which is simply a scalar to make this variable cross-
sectionally comparable, might capture investors’ underreaction to information. Because 
loan evaluations are measured as percentages over par, normalization is not needed. 
Therefore, to focus on the investor disagreement, I measure CLO disagreement on loan 
value as the standard deviation across the price estimations: 
𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑆 = √





Where 𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is the number of CLO managers in month 𝑡 in loan 𝑖, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  is the price 
reported by CLO manager 𝑗 in month 𝑡 for loan 𝑖, and 𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the average price across 
CLO managers in month 𝑡 for loan 𝑖. 
I start from the 21,804,352 loan-CLO fund-month level observations in the CLO-i 
database. I exclude bonds, equities, credit default swaps (CDS), loans that are not 
syndicated in the U.S., loans that are not denominated in USD, and loans with no issuer 
names, maturity dates, or issue types. This step reduces the number of observations to 
16,300,847. I exclude loans with reported values that are missing, negative, or zero, which 
reduces the sample size to 5,013,406. I also exclude 66,004 defaulted loans and 487,182 
loans that are rated below Caa1 (inclusive) because CLO managers may manipulate the 
prices of these loans to pass the over-collateralization tests (Loumioti and Vasvari 
(2019)).11 This step reduces the sample to 4,460,220, which consists of 20,813 unique loans 
held by 1,555 CLO funds or 160 unique CLO managers. Because CLO funds owned by 
the same manager typically provide same or very close prices for the same loans in their 
monthly reports, I aggregate the fund level data into manager level and calculate the 
                                                     
11 The results are robust if I include these loans. Please see Specification (6) in Table 3.11. 
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weighted average price for these loans. The manager-level sample has 1,485,894 
observations. Finally, defining CLO disagreement downgrades the sample from loan-CLO 
manager-month level to loan-month level, which includes 124,055 observations. 
I estimate the average price impact in a month using the real transaction data in the 












where 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡 of loan 𝑖, 𝑃𝑖,𝑘 is the average trading price on 
day 𝑘 of loan 𝑖, and 𝑄𝑖,𝑘 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑘 of loan 𝑖. The 
illiquidity measure is available for 107,341 observations.12 I exclude DIP, revolver, letter 
of credit, TLAs, and other loans and focus on ITLs. This reduces the sample to 102,930 
observations. After removing 403 observations with missing values in the regressors, the 
final sample includes 102,527 observations for 7,378 unique loans. 
3.3.2. Overview of CLO Disagreement and Loan Illiquidity 
Figure 3.1 shows the variations of CLODIS and LOANILLIQ across time and 
ratings. Panel A shows the time-series variations for the sample period from December 
2008 to October 2018. The high level of CLODIS in 2008 and 2009 is due to the profound 
uncertainty caused by the financial crisis. The spike around August 2011 is likely due to 
the credit downgrade of U.S. sovereign debt from AAA to AA+ by Standard & Poor’s. The 
peak in the end of 2015 is probably caused by the credit downgrading by Fitch in the third 
quarter of 2015 in the U.S. energy industry.  
                                                     
12 Following the bond literature (e.g., Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2008) and 
Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018)), I exclude transactions with amount less than or equal to 
$100,000 to avoid the noises that these small transactions introduce into prices. 
Nevertheless, including these small trades yields robust results. 
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LOANILLIQ decreased dramatically after the financial crisis. Except for two slight 
bumps in January 2010 and August 2011, it kept declining until May 2014. It increased 
steadily from June 2014 to December 2015. Then it decreased towards the end of the 
sample period. 
In Panel B, I plot CLODIS and LOANILLIQ together by different rating categories. 
About 60% of the loans are rated B1 and B2. Almost all the loans are non-investment grade. 
Both CLODIS and LOANILLIQ increase monotonically when loan rating decreases. 
3.3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics. The average value of CLODIS is 0.66. To 
put this number into perspective, consider a loan with two CLO investors. The value 0.66 
would correspond to one CLO investor pricing the loan at 99.34 and the other pricing the 
loan at 100.66. The average value of PriceDispersion is 0.67. And the average difference 
between the highest and the lowest prices is 1.84. 
The average LOANILLIQ is 1.28 and the median value is 0.34.13  The average 
monthly trading amount is $1.18 million. To benchmark the numbers, the average value of 
LOANILLIQ means that a purchase order with an average amount of $1.18 million will 
increase the price from 100.00 to 101.51 (100+1.28 *1.18). As a comparison to the bond 
market, in Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), a $1 million sell order will reduce the price from 
100.00 to 98.40. On average, there are approximately 2.86 days ((1-87%) *22) with 
transactions in a trading month. The mean and median value of the number of transactions 
in a month is 8.40 and 3.00, respectively. These numbers suggest that loans are traded as 
sporadically as corporate bonds. As reported by Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2020), for 
                                                     
13 The distribution of LOANILLIQ is skewed right. The baseline regression results are 
robust if I use Log (1+LOANILLIQ) as the dependent variable. 
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corporate bonds, the average monthly non-zero trading days is 3.40, and the mean and 
median value of monthly trades is 20.00 and 3.10, respectively. 
An average loan has about 59 months to maturity (the difference between the 
maturity date and the report date). The average CLO holding amount is $68.68 million. 
50.60% of the observations are for term loans and 44.40% of the observations are for term 
loan B.14 For public firms, the average total assets is $8,569 million. The mean value of 
leverage and Tobin’s Q is 0.63 and 1.89, respectively. On average, about 6 analysts cover 
a borrower’s stock and the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts on EPS is 0.26. 
3.4. CLO Disagreement and Loan Illiquidity 
3.4.1. Baseline Results 
I investigate how CLO disagreement affects loan illiquidity by estimating the 
following model: 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝐸𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                                                                       (1) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 indicates loan, loan rating, and CLO report month, respectively. To account 
for cross-sectional correlations within the same report month, I cluster standard errors at 
the report month level.15  The dependent variable, LOANILLIQ, is the absolute return 
divided by the trading amount. It is averaged within a month. The independent variable of 
                                                     
14 Many loans are classified as term loans in Creditflux. I cannot determine whether these 
loans are TLBs, TLCs, or second-lien, etc, so I create a dummy variable for term loans to 
account for the potential different impact of term loans on loan illiquidity. 
15 For example, the Federal Reserve System might announce an interest rate change in a 
month. The CLO reports issued in that month or the following month will incorporate such 
market-level variations into the pricing of securitized loans, which increases the cross-




interest is CLODIS, which is the standard deviation of the prices provided by the CLO 
investors in a loan. 
Controls consists of a set of confounding factors that would affect loan liquidity. 
Investors are more uncertain about the value of a loan with a longer maturity than a similar 
loan with a shorter maturity, which makes the former loan more difficult to trade. Log 
(TotalCLOHoldings) is correlated with the outstanding amount of a loan and would affect 
the transaction amount per each deal.16 To control for CLO investors’ specific interests in 
term loan B (Nadauld and Weisbach (2012)), I include five loan type dummies in the 
regressions. Loans labeled as term loan D are the base group, so the indicator variable for 
these loans is omitted in the regressions. Funding conditions affect a dealer’s inventory 
costs and asset liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). I use VIX (the Volatility 
Index from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)) and TEDSpread (the difference 
between the 3-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the 3-month Treasury 
rate) to control for the funding conditions of the financial institutions (Brunnermeier, Nagel, 
and Pedersen (2008)). Because loans are traded infrequently and information may still flow 
in days without any transactions for a loan, I include the monthly return of the S&P/LSTA 
U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 Index. Illiquidity and credit risk are positively correlated (e.g., 
Ericsson and Renault (2006), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), and Bao, Pan, and Wang 
(2011)), so I include loan rating fixed effects to account for the potential impact of credit 
risk on loan illiquidity. I also include borrower and CLO report quarter fixed effects. 
                                                     
16 Another proxy for the outstanding amount of a loan is the loan offering amount, which 
is not available in the CLO-i dataset. I need to match the CLO-i data with DealScan to get 
it, which will reduce the sample size substantially. Therefore, I use the total CLO holdings 
in the main analyses. Nevertheless, the results are robust if I replace CLO holdings with 
the offering amounts. 
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The OLS regression results are reported in Table 3.2. From Specifications (1) to 
(7), I gradually include more control variables and use different fixed effects to alleviate 
the concern that the potential correlations between CLODIS and other control variables 
might bias the estimation toward finding favorable results and to understand the main 
variations that drive the results. In Specification (7), the coefficient estimate on CLODIS 
is 0.26 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Economically, a one standard 
deviation increase of CLODIS is associated with 0.35 increase in LOANILLIQ, which 
represents 11% of the standard deviation of LOANILLIQ and a 35 bp increase of the impact 
of a $1 million purchase order on loan price. 
For the control variables, loans with longer maturities are associated with greater 
illiquidity, consistent with the findings in the bond market (Amihud and Mendelson (1991), 
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011)). Total CLO holding 
amount is negatively related with loan illiquidity, suggesting that smaller loans or loans 
with lower CLO demands are less liquid in the secondary market. Relative to term loan D, 
second lien and term loan C are more liquid while general term loans and term loan B tend 
to be less liquid. The coefficient on VIX is positive, suggesting that tighter funding 
constraints increase loan illiquidity (Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018)). 
3.4.2. Alternative Measures of CLO Disagreement and Loan Illiquidity 
I also use two alternative illiquidity measures. First, I extract quoted bid and ask 
prices from Thompson Reuters and the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) 
and define QuoteSpread as the spread between the average bid and ask prices.17 Second, I 
                                                     
17 Since 1999, Thompson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation and the LSTA have jointly 
formed the first secondary mark-to-market service to provide daily bid and ask quotes for 
widely traded syndicated loans. 
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calculate an estimated bid and ask spread using daily high and low trading prices as in 
Corwin and Schultz (2012).18 Corwin and Schultz (2012) suggest that the ratio of high-to-
low prices for a day reflects both the fundamental volatility of the stock and its bid-ask 
spread given that daily high (low) prices are almost always buyer (seller) - initiated trades. 
Because the component of the high-to-low price ratio that is due to volatility increases 
proportionately with the length of the trading interval and the component due to bid-ask 
spreads does not, a stock’s bid-ask spread is a function of the high-to-low price ratio for a 
single 2-day period and the high-to-low ratios for 2 consecutive single days. Precisely, I 


























𝑂 ) is 
the observed high (low) price on day 𝑡 + 𝑗. 𝐻𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑂  (𝐿𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑂 ) is the observed high (low) price 
over the two-day period. The EstSpread could be negative when 𝛾 is too high. Following 
Corwin and Schultz (2012), I set negative value of EstSpread to be zero. 
In Table 3.3, the dependent variable in Specifications (1) and (2) is EstSpread and 
QuoteSpread, respectively. The coefficient estimates on CLODIS are both positive and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that measuring loan illiquidity by the 
estimated or quoted bid and ask spread does not change the baseline results. 
I also define another two CLO disagreement measures, PriceSTD and PriceRange. 
The former is the standard deviation divided by the mean of CLO investors’ valuations on 
                                                     
18 Schestag, Schuster, and Uhrig-Homburg (2016) find that the estimated bid and ask 
spread proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2012) is one of the best illiquidity measures for 
low-frequently traded assets. 
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the same loan and the latter is the highest minus the lowest loan valuations. The results in 
Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 3.3 show that both PriceSTD and PriceRange are 
positive and are statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the results are 
robust with alternative disagreement measures. 
3.4.3. Information Asymmetry, CLO Disagreement, and Loan Illiquidity 
The positive impact of CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity as documented in 
Table 3.2 is consistent with the conjecture that the presence of investors with diverse, 
private information elevates the transaction costs due to adverse selection. I shed further 
light on this conjecture by investigating how the impact of CLO disagreement on loan 
illiquidity varies with a borrower’s degree of ex ante asymmetric information. The OLS 
regression results are reported in Table 3.4, Specifications (1), (2), and (3). 
I construct three different proxies for a borrower’s ex ante information asymmetry. 
PublicDum is a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower can be matched with 
Compustat and zero otherwise. Log (TotalAssets) is the natural logarithm value of the total 
assets of the borrower. EPSSTD is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts on firms’ 
EPS. It is worthwhile noting that CLODIS measures the information asymmetry among the 
privately informed investors, which is different from the above information asymmetry 
variables that are all public knowledge when CLO investors issue their monthly reports. 
The coefficient estimates on CLODIS*PublicDum and CLODIS*Log (TotalAssets) are 
both negative and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate on 
CLODIS*EPSSTD is positive and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The sign on 
CLODIS*EPSSTD is opposite to the other two because EPSSTD reflects the degree of ex 
ante information asymmetry in the opposite way. These findings suggest that the impact of 
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CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity is more pronounced when firms are subject to more 
severe information asymmetry problems, consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis. 
3.4.4. Expected Informative Trading of CLOs 
Although many theoretical papers suggest that trading by informed investors 
impairs market liquidity, empirical studies provide mixed evidence (e.g., Cornell and Sirri 
(1992), Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Bettis, Cole and Lemmon (2000), and Cao, Field, 
and Hanka (2004)). In this section, I examine how expected trading by CLO investors 
affects the impact of CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity. 
Trading is more likely to take place if a CLO fails covenant tests or it is near the 
test threshold. Like covenants in bond and loan contracts, covenant tests in CLOs are used 
to help CLO bond investors to monitor the quality of the assets. For example, the weighted 
average spread (WAS) test requires a CLO to keep the WAS to be above a certain level. If 
the WAS is below the required level in a month, the CLO manager needs to trade in the 
secondary market to increase the WAS. Other frequently used covenant tests include the 
weighted average rating factor (WARF) tests, the tranche A overcollateralization (OC) 
tests, and the tranche A interest coverage (IC) tests.19 
Given the scarcity of loan trading, a rational CLO investor aware of the expected 
transaction costs due to adverse selection would buy or sell the loans that it knows well. I 
therefore proxy the likelihood of CLOs’ informed trading by two variables that are related 
to the covenant tests. FailFundRatio is the number of CLOs that have failed any of the 
covenant tests divided by the total number of CLOs in a loan. CovTestDist is the weighted 
                                                     
19 Tranche A OC test ratio is the principal balance of tranche A securities divided by the 
total principal balance of the collaterals. Tranche A IC test ratio is the interest payment of 
tranche A securities divided by the total interest payments from the collaterals. There are 
also OC tests for other CLO tranches. 
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average distance between the current WAS test result and the failure threshold for a loan.20 
The weight is a CLO’s holding divided by the total CLO holding amount in a loan. 
Specifications (4) and (5) in Table 3.4 show the OLS regression results. 
In Specification (4), the coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
CLODIS*FailFundRatio is 0.25 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that CLODIS has a stronger impact on LOANILLIQ when more CLOs in a loan failed 
covenant tests in the previous month. The coefficient estimate on CLODIS*CovTestDist is 
-0.50 and is statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that the impact of CLODIS on 
LOANILLIQ is more pronounced in loans where CLOs’ test results are closer to the failure 
thresholds. These findings suggest that expected informative trading by CLO investors 
worsens the asymmetric information between CLOs and the dealers and increases the 
transaction costs. 
3.4.5. CLO Disagreement and Strategic Trading 
3.4.5.1. CLO Disagreement, Trading Frequency, and Trading Amount 
The adverse selection hypothesis also suggests that the diversely informed investors 
will trade more frequently with a smaller amount in each transaction. In this section, I test 
this implication by examining how CLO disagreement affects trading frequency and 
trading amount. The OLS regression results are presented in Table 3.5. 
The results in Columns (1) and (2) show that CLO disagreement increases trading 
frequency. And the results in Columns (3) and (4) suggest that CLO disagreement reduces 
the trading amount in each transaction. These results provide further supports to the adverse 
selection hypothesis. Because the diverse, private information represents CLOs’ 
                                                     
20 I choose WAS test to calculate the test difference because WAS is the most frequent 
covenant test in the sample. 
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monopolistic power, they have incentives to trade strategically to reveal their private 
information to the market slowly. 
3.4.5.2. The Persistence of the Impact of CLO Disagreement on Loan Illiquidity 
The strategic trading (i.e., trading more frequently but with a smaller amount each 
time) of diversely informed CLOs leads to slow revelation of CLOs’ private information. 
In this section, I extend the illiquidity measure to longer periods to investigate how fast the 
private information possessed by CLO investors is incorporated into loan prices. 
Table 3.6 reports the OLS regression results. The dependent variables in 
Specifications (1) to (4) ((5) to (8)) are the mean (median) value of LOANILLIQ in the next 
3, 6, 9, 12 months after the CLO report month, respectively. The coefficient estimates are 
all positive and are statistically significant at the 1% level. More importantly, the 
magnitudes reduce gradually as I extend the calculation window of the illiquidity variable. 
For example, the coefficient estimates on CLODIS from Specifications (1) to (4) decline 
monotonically from 0.24 to 0.16. The impact of CLODIS on LOANILLIQ after twelve 
months still represents 62% (measured at mean) or 31% (measured at median) of the impact 
in the first month. 
These findings suggest that when investors have diverse and private information 
about the value of an asset, the secondary market incorporates their private information 
slowly due to investors’ strategic trading behaviors. The results also suggest that the 
disagreement among CLO investors does not result from their irrational believes because 




3.5. Information Structure of the Loan Market, CLO Disagreement,  
and Loan Illiquidity 
3.5.1. Information Sharing 
Does information sharing reduce CLO disagreement? And how does information 
sharing interact with the impact of CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity? A CLO typically 
hires an arranger to underwrite its bonds and a trustee company to provide custodial 
services. Presumably, CLOs that are connected to the same arranger or trustee company 
are likely to flow information between each other. I construct two variables to measure the 
likelihood of information sharing among CLOs. ArrangerRel is the number of CLOs 
sharing the same arranger divided by the number of CLOs in a loan. TrusteeRel is the 
number of CLOs sharing the same trustee divided by the number of CLOs in a loan. 
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 3.7 Panels A and B. In Panel A, 
the dependent variable is CLODIS. The coefficient estimates on ArrangerRel and 
TrusteeRel are both negative and are statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that sharing the same arranger or trustee indeed reduces CLO disagreement. More 
importantly, the results in Panel B show that both ArrangerRel and TrusteeRel consolidate 
the impact of CLODIS on LOANILLIQ. These findings suggest that information sharing 
reduces disagreement among connected CLOs but aggravates the asymmetric information 
between connected CLOs and the dealers. 
3.5.2. CLO Disagreement on Loan Value and Analyst Disagreement on Stock Value 
Different from a bond or a stock, a loan is not a registered security. The information 
in a loan contract does not need to be released to the public. Moreover, a loan contract has 
a put option feature. Holding a loan is different from holding a stock and does not gain 
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from the growth opportunities of the borrower. With these fundamental differences, loan 
investors may acquire materially different information than equity investors (Ivashina and 
Sun (2011), Goldstein and Yang (2015), and Addoum and Murfin (2019)). In this section, 
I examine the difference between CLO disagreement in the loan market and analyst 
disagreement in the stock market. 
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 3.8 Panels A and B. In Panel A, 
the dependent variable is CLODIS. The results in Specification (1) suggest that firms with 
higher leverage and lower growth opportunities have higher CLO disagreement. Loans 
with shorter maturity and higher CLO holdings are associated with higher CLO 
disagreement. CLO disagreement is also higher when the loan index return is higher. 
The coefficient estimates on EPSSTD and Log (NumAnalyst) in Specifications (2) 
to (5) are positive but are not statistically significant. Moreover, the dependent variable in 
Panel B is LOANILLIQ, and the coefficient estimates show that neither EPSSTD nor Log 
(NumAnalyst) has a statistically significant impact on loan illiquidity. These results are 
consistent with the conjecture that information production in a loan is different from that 
in a stock for the same firm. That is, loan investors and stock investors may focus on 
different types of information due to specialization. 
3.5.3. Other Informed Players in the Loan Market 
3.5.3.1. Information from Rating Agency 
In the monthly CLO reports, each loan is rated by at least one of the three biggest 
rating agencies: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. It is not uncommon that different 
CLOs in the same loan acquire ratings from different agencies and that the rating agencies 
assign different ratings to that loan. In this section, I run a horse race between CLO 
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disagreement and disagreement among rating agencies and investigate whether rating 
agencies hold similar or different information as CLO investors. 
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 3.9. In Specifications (1) and (3), 
I add RatingSTD and DiffRate into the regressions, respectively. The former is the standard 
deviation of the ratings across different CLO reports for a loan. The latter is a dummy 
variable that equals one if at least two CLO reports have different ratings for the same loan 
and zero otherwise. In both regressions, the coefficient estimates on CLODIS are almost 
identical to that in the baseline regression, suggesting that controlling for rating 
disagreement does not change the impact of CLODIS on LOANILLIQ. 21  Besides, in 
Specifications (2) and (4), both interaction terms are negative and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that rating disagreement attenuates the positive 
impact of CLODIS on LOANILLIQ. 
3.5.3.2. Dealer’s Private Information over the Course of a Lending Relationship 
When dealers also know the loan, the adverse selection due to CLO investors’ 
diverse, private information becomes a lesser concern. Therefore, I conjecture that the 
impact of CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity is weaker if dealers in the secondary loan 
market also possess private information. 
Because most of the primary market lenders reported in DealScan are banks and 
typically will become dealers in the secondary loan market, I measure dealers’ private 
information by the lending relationship between the syndicate lenders of a loan and the 
borrower ((Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020b)). 22 
                                                     
21  The negative sign on RatingSTD is likely due to the positive correlation between 
RatingSTD and CLODIS. 
22 Due to tax reasons, CLOs rarely purchase syndicated loans from the primary market. 
Instead, they get their loan shares via primary assignments in which the lead arranger of 
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Particularly, I define three different but related variables. RelationDum is a dummy 
variable that equals one if any of the lenders (mostly banks) have lent to the borrower in 
the past five years before the current loan and zero otherwise. RelationNum (RelationAmt) 
is the number (amount) of loans from a lender divided by the total number (amount) of 
loans issued by the borrower in the past five years. The greatest value is chosen when there 
are multiple lenders in a loan syndicate. 
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 3.10 Panels A, B, and C. In Panel 
A, the dependent variable is LOANILLIQ. In Specifications (1), (2), and (3), the interaction 
terms between CLODIS and the three relationship variables are all negative and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In Panels B and C where the dependent variables 
are trading frequency and turnover, respectively, the coefficient estimates on the interaction 
terms show that the presence of lending relationship attenuates the impact of CLO 
disagreement on trading frequency and turnover. 
As explained in the Introduction, CLOs, rating agencies, and potential dealers likely 
possess different and complementary information about the value of a loan. The 
information known by non-CLO institutions reduces the monopolistic power of diversely 
informed CLO investors, which reduces the adverse selection problems in the secondary 
loan market. 
3.6. Robustness Test Results and the Endogeneity Issues 
3.6.1. Robustness Tests 
I execute a rich set of tests to diagnose the robustness of the baseline findings. Table 
3.11 reports the OLS regression results. In Specification (1), I cluster the standard errors at 
                                                     
the loan will hold the loan on its book for some short period after the loan closes and then 
sell it to these CLOs at a pre-determined price (S&P (2006)). 
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firm level rather than CLO report month level. In Specification (2), I exclude 609 
observations that are during the financial crisis period (from July 2007 to April 2009). The 
results are similar as in the baseline regressions. The results are also similar if I add the 
lead lender fixed effects in Specification (3) to further account for dealers’ inventory costs 
or funding constraints. 
Lou and Shu (2017) find that the pricing of the Amihud illiquidity measure is not 
attributable to the return-to-volume ratio that is constructed to capture price impact but is 
driven by the trading volume component. I follow Lou and Shu (2017) and construct a 
return component of the Amihud illiquidity measure as the monthly average absolute loan 
returns. The coefficient estimate on CLODIS in Specification (4) means that a one standard 
deviation increase of CLODIS increases the absolute loan return by 41 bp. This implies 
that the impact of CLODIS on LOANILLIQ is driven by the change of both the volume and 
return. 
In Specifications (5) and (6), I add trades smaller than $100,000 and loans of which 
the prices are subject to potential CLO manipulations into the sample, respectively. The 
results are robust. 
3.6.2. Mechanical Relation 
Given that both CLODIS and LOANILLIQ are measured by the prices of a loan, and 
if the CLO investors simply report the trade prices, then there might be a potential 
mechanical correlation between CLODIS which is measured by the report prices and 
LOANILLIQ which is measured by the trade prices. Among the CLO investors that hold a 
loan and report their estimations about the loan value, very few of them trade in the next 
month. In un-reported results, approximately 11% of the CLO investors that report price 
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estimations in month 𝑡 trade in month 𝑡 + 1. The potential mechanical relation is likely to 
take place for the CLO investors that report their price estimations for a loan in month 𝑡 
and trade the loan in month 𝑡 + 1. Therefore, to address this concern, I exclude the price 
estimations given by the CLO investors that trade the loan in the next month. Then I re-
calculate the disagreement measure and run the baseline regressions. The results are 
reported in Table 3.12. 
In all the Specifications in Table 3.12, the coefficients on CLODIS are positive and 
statistically significant. Particularly, in Specification (4), the coefficient estimate on 
CLODIS is 0.272, which is very close to 0.258 in the baseline regression in Table 3.2, 
suggesting that the mechanical relation is not a concern.  
3.6.3. Reverse Causality 
Overall, market illiquidity does not necessarily lead to high disagreement among 
the investors. As suggested by Kyle (1985), even if a market is illiquid, it can still be 
informationally efficient. Also, as shown in 3.2, when evaluating a loan, the CLO manager 
must first seek price estimations from independent pricing services companies. And the 
access to third-party pricing companies does not depend on the illiquidity of a loan. 
Moreover, the disagreement here is mainly driven by CLOs’ private signals. When the 
market is illiquid, investor monitoring becomes difficult. CLOs’ incentive to produce 
private information is reduced, which leads to a lower CLO disagreement (e.g., Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1993)). This predicts a negative correlation between illiquidity and CLO 




3.6.4. Omitted Variable Bias 
To address the omitted variable bias resulted from the time-invariant omitted 
variables, I control for loan fixed effects. For the omitted variables that are changing over 
time, I control for loan-year and firm-year fixed effects and include additional firm 
characteristics.23 The results are reported in Table 3.13. 
In Specifications (1) to (3), I include loan, loan-year, and firm-year fixed effects in 
the model, respectively. In Specification (4), I include total assets, leverage, and Tobin’s 
Q in the model. The coefficient estimates on CLODIS are all positive and are statistically 
significant. Particularly, in Specification (3), which is the most restrictive model 
specification, the coefficient estimate is 0.135 and is statistically significant at 1% level. 
Economically, this means a one standard deviation increase of CLO disagreement is 
associated with 6% of the standard deviation increase of loan illiquidity. That is, even with 
the most restrictive fixed effects, the impact of CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity is still 
economically important. This also suggests that the baseline results are still robust after 
addressing the potential omitted variable bias. 
3.7. Conclusions 
In this paper I exploit a new dataset that contains granular information on CLOs’ 
divergent opinions on loan value and real transaction information for a large sample of 
securitized loans. I study how CLO disagreement affect loan illiquidity and how the impact 
varies with the information structure of the secondary loan market. 
                                                     
23 Approximately 70% of the loans in the sample are borrowed by private firms that do not 




I find that CLO disagreement increases the uncertainty of dealers about the private 
signals in the market and gives rise to the adverse selection concern of the dealers. 
Diversely informed CLOs trade strategically by increasing trading frequency and reducing 
trading amount per transaction, which increases loan illiquidity and leads to slow revelation 
of CLOs private information to the market.  
Information sharing among CLO investors reduces CLO disagreement but worsens 
the adverse selection concern of the dealers because the dealers are not in the sharing group. 
When the dealers also possess information about the traded loan, the adverse selection 




Table 3.1.Summary Statistics 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for the sample in this paper. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The number of observations varies 
due to missing values. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
  N Mean STD Median 
CLODIS 102,527 0.661 1.333 0.241 
PriceDispersion 102,527 0.719 1.537 0.242 
PriceRange (% of Par) 102,527 1.841 3.593 0.719 
LOANILLIQ 102,527 1.275 3.126 0.342 
EstSpread 30,698 0.151 0.675 0.000 
QuoteSpread 60,911 0.785 0.582 0.602 
Turnover (%) 93,298 25.890 57.860 8.669 
ZeroTradeDayPortion (%) 102,527 86.820 11.280 90.910 
NumTrade 102,527 8.394 13.730 3.000 
Log (NumTrade) 102,527 1.369 1.161 1.099 
TradeAmt ($Thousand) 102,527 1,175.000 797.600 1,000.000 
Log (TradeAmt) 102,527 6.847 0.692 6.908 
LargeTradePortion (%) 102,527 45.587 38.259 41.667 
MonthtoMature 102,527 59.100 18.070 60.900 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 102,527 4.038 0.366 4.126 
TotalCLOHolding ($Million) 102,527 68.630 91.140 34.650 
Log (TotalCLOHolding) 102,527 3.554 1.191 3.545 
SecondLienDum 102,527 0.025 0.155 0.000 
TermLoanDum 102,527 0.506 0.500 1.000 
TermLoanBDum 102,527 0.444 0.497 0.000 
TermLoanCDum 102,527 0.020 0.141 0.000 
TermLoanDDum 102,527 0.004 0.065 0.000 
VIX 102,527 15.930 5.014 14.340 
TEDSpread (%) 102,527 0.323 0.115 0.294 
LoanIndexReturn (%) 102,527 0.396 0.960 0.338 
PublicDum 102,527 0.317 0.465 0.000 
RatingSTD 102,527 0.315 0.357 0.288 
DiffRate 102,527 0.536 0.499 1.000 
RelationDum (Decimal) 77,431 0.800 0.400 1.000 
RelationNum (Decimal) 77,431 0.641 0.388 0.750 
RelationAmt (Decimal) 77,431 0.672 0.393 0.868 
TrusteeRel (Decimal) 102,527 0.696 0.191 0.667 
ArrangerRel (Decimal) 102,527 0.421 0.134 0.400 
FailFundRatio (Decimal) 102,527 0.548 0.301 0.500 
CovTestDist (Decimal) 102,527 0.195 0.187 0.142 
TotalAsset ($Million) 31,466 8,569.000 12,022.000 3,895.000 
Log (TotalAsset) 31,466 8.302 1.245 8.268 
Leverage 30,215 0.629 0.366 0.563 
TobinQ 24,643 1.891 1.208 1.561 
EPSSTD 16,269 0.262 0.554 0.099 
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NumAnalyst 20,257 6.280 5.993 4.000 
Log (NumAnalyst) 20,257 1.403 0.962 1.386 
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Table 3.2.CLO Disagreement and Loan Illiquidity 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of the impact of CLO disagreement on loan 










100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, 
and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. CLODIS is the standard deviation 
of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. The dependent variable is 
measured in month 𝑡. Time-varying independent variables are calculated in month 𝑡 − 1. 
Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term 
loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. Please see Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  LOANILLIQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CLODIS 0.251*** 0.263*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 
 (8.273) (8.852) (8.629) (8.584) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature)  0.190*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
  (5.770) (4.996) (4.970) 
Log (TotalCLOHolding)  -0.218*** -0.178*** -0.179*** 
  (-13.819) (-13.146) (-13.178) 
SecondLienDum   0.772*** 0.772*** 
   (5.354) (5.351) 
TermLoanDum   -0.117 -0.116 
   (-0.884) (-0.875) 
TermLoanBDum   -0.127 -0.125 
   (-0.971) (-0.961) 
TermLoanCDum   0.831*** 0.831*** 
   (5.351) (5.350) 
VIX    0.018*** 
    (2.834) 
TEDSpread    0.246 
    (1.046) 
LoanIndexReturn    0.012 
    (0.517) 
Constant 6.110*** 5.501*** 5.715*** 4.927*** 
 (30.596) (27.171) (22.168) (15.808) 
     
Observations 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 3.3.Alternative Definitions of CLO Disagreement and Loan Illiquidity 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of the impact of CLO disagreement on loan illiquidity using alternative measures. In 
Specifications (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the estimated and quoted bid-ask spread, respectively. I estimate bid-ask spread 
from daily high and low transaction prices following Corwin and Schultz (2012). Please see Appendix A for detailed definition of this 
variable. The quoted bid-ask spread comes from Thompson Reuters and the LSTA. In Specifications (3) and (4), the dependent variable 









𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average price on day 𝑗, 
and 𝑄𝑗 is the trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. PriceDispersion is the standard deviation divided by the mean of CLO investors’ 
valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. PriceRange is the difference between the highest and the lowest loan valuations. CLODIS 
is the standard deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. The dependent variables are measured in month 
𝑡. Time-varying independent variables are calculated in month 𝑡 − 1. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan 
C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  EstSpread QuoteSpread LOANILLIQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
CLODIS 0.020*** 0.087***   
 (3.369) (8.774)   
PriceDispersion   0.269***  
   (9.443)  
PriceRange    0.090*** 
    (8.196) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) -0.071*** -0.014 0.173*** 0.148*** 
 (-4.963) (-1.403) (5.286) (4.572) 
Log (TotalCLOHolding) -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.182*** -0.204*** 
 (-3.897) (-4.856) (-13.125) (-13.870) 
SecondLienDum 0.273*** 0.357*** 0.755*** 0.785*** 
 (3.508) (12.962) (5.207) (5.427) 





 (5.471) (0.109) (-0.926) (-0.814) 
TermLoanBDum 0.362*** 0.005 -0.134 -0.116 
 (5.443) (0.280) (-1.023) (-0.886) 
TermLoanCDum 0.233*** 0.014 0.820*** 0.833*** 
 (3.452) (0.737) (5.302) (5.345) 
VIX 0.001 0.004 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (0.318) (1.342) (2.816) (2.942) 
TEDSpread 0.214* 0.020 0.247 0.241 
 (1.755) (0.229) (1.062) (1.007) 
LoanIndexReturn 0.013* -0.027*** 0.010 0.013 
 (1.729) (-2.764) (0.443) (0.561) 
Constant 0.374** 2.497*** 4.442*** 5.259*** 
 (2.500) (15.559) (13.534) (17.541) 
     
Observations 30,698 60,911 102,527 102,527 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 3.4.Information Asymmetry on Loan Issuers, Expected Informed Trading, and Loan Illiquidity 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how ex ante information asymmetry about the issuer of a loan and expected informed 










𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading 
amount in millions on day 𝑗. CLODIS is the standard deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. Information 
asymmetry is represented by PublicDum, Log (TotalAssets), and EPSSTD in Specifications (1), (2), and (3), respectively. PublicDum is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the issuer can be matched with Compustat and zero otherwise. Log (TotalAssets) is the natural 
logarithm value of the total assets. EPSSTD is the standard deviation of analysts’ EPS forecasts on issuers’ stocks. In Specifications (4) 
and (5), I use FailFundRatio and CovTestDist to measure the likelihood of CLOs’ informed trading. FailFundRatio is the number of 
CLOs that failed covenant tests divided by the number of CLOs in a loan. CovTestDist is the weighted average distance between the 
test result and the failure threshold. The weight is each CLO’s holding amount divided by the total CLO holding amount in a loan. Loan 
types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the 
regressions. OtherControls includes Log (1+ MonthtoMature), Log (TotalCLOHolding), SecondLienDum, TermLoanDum, 
TermLoanBDum, TermLoanCDum, VIX, TEDSpread, LoanIndexReturn, and Constant. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LOANILLIQ 
 Information Asymmetry Informative Trading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CLODIS 0.330*** 0.687*** 0.171*** 0.084* 0.392*** 
 (8.996) (4.996) (4.294) (1.741) (9.391) 
PublicDum -0.040     
 (-0.716)     
CLODIS*PublicDum -0.174***     
 (-5.334)     
Log (TotalAssets)  -0.014    
  (-0.209)    






(-3.648)    
EPSSTD  -0.125   
   (-1.641)   
CLODIS*EPSSTD   0.292***   
   (4.618)   
FailFundRatio    -0.189**  
    (-2.240)  
CLODIS*FailFundRatio    0.253***  
    (3.092)  
CovTestDist     0.190 
     (1.631) 
CLODIS*CovTestDist     -0.496*** 
     (-5.579) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,527 28,147 14,677 102,527 102,527 
Rating/Firm/Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 3.5.CLO Disagreement and Strategic Trading 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of the impact of CLO disagreement on trading frequency and trading amount. The dependent 
variables are ZeroTradeDayPortion, Log (NumTrade), Log (TradeAmt), and LargeTradePortion in Columns (1) to (4), respectively. 
Turnover. ZeroTradeDayPortion is the number of zero trading days divided by 22. Log (NumTrade) is the natural logarithm value of 
the number of trades. Log (TradeAmt) is the natural logarithm value of the trading amount. LargeTradePortion is the number of trades 
greater or equal to $1 million divided by the total number of trades. CLODIS is the standard deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on 
a loan and multiplied by 100. The dependent variables are measured in month 𝑡. Time-varying independent variables are calculated in 
month 𝑡 − 1. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and 
omitted in the regressions. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics 
are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CLODIS -0.155*** 0.013*** -0.017*** -0.802*** 
 (-4.922) (3.776) (-6.818) (-6.925) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 0.473** -0.067*** -0.099*** -3.881*** 
 (2.446) (-3.549) (-9.128) (-7.968) 
Log (TotalCLOHoldings) -1.703*** 0.191*** 0.026*** 0.035 
 (-20.378) (26.939) (8.824) (0.214) 
SecondLienDum -4.197*** 0.355*** -0.257*** -12.489*** 
 (-5.771) (5.292) (-5.970) (-5.107) 
TermLoanDum -9.249*** 0.762*** 0.044 -3.903* 
 (-13.870) (13.733) (1.185) (-1.709) 
TermLoanBDum -8.758*** 0.699*** 0.056 -2.541 
 (-12.923) (12.612) (1.510) (-1.125) 
TermLoanCDum -4.105*** 0.237*** -0.254*** -9.650*** 
 (-6.304) (4.480) (-5.577) (-3.603) 
VIX -0.026 0.000 0.000 -0.103 
 (-0.423) (0.089) (0.055) (-0.936) 
TEDSpread -0.243 -0.062 0.011 8.342 
 (-0.065) (-0.182) (0.099) (1.415) 






 (-0.919) (0.798) (0.241) (-0.187) 
Constant 103.712*** -0.107 7.270*** 42.669*** 
 (28.916) (-0.387) (55.303) (5.989) 
     
Observations 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 3.6.The Persistence of the Impact of CLO Disagreement on Loan Illiquidity 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results on the persistent impact of CLO disagreements on loan illiquidity. In Specifications (1), (2), 
(3), and (4) ((5), (6), (7), and (8)), the dependent variable is the mean (median) value of LOANILLIQ from month 𝑡 to month 𝑡 + 2, 𝑡 +









𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is 
the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. CLODIS is the standard deviation of CLO 
investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. Time-varying independent variables are calculated in month 𝑡 − 1. Loan types 
include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. 
Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LOANILLIQ Mean LOANILLIQ Median 
 3 Month 6 Month 9 Month 12 Month 3 Month 6 Month 9 Month 12 Month 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CLODIS 0.242*** 0.220*** 0.184*** 0.160*** 0.213*** 0.159*** 0.111*** 0.083*** 
 (8.678) (8.708) (8.443) (8.391) (8.502) (8.344) (8.053) (8.348) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 0.128*** 0.112*** 0.098*** 0.086*** 0.142*** 0.117*** 0.076*** 0.044*** 
 (4.500) (4.511) (4.389) (4.004) (4.628) (5.061) (5.106) (4.117) 
Log (TotalCLOHolding) -0.177*** -0.161*** -0.144*** -0.136*** -0.183*** -0.143*** -0.114*** -0.097*** 
 (-12.309) (-12.071) (-12.311) (-12.996) (-13.121) (-13.047) (-14.763) (-16.596) 
SecondLienDum 0.868*** 0.993*** 0.992*** 1.057*** 0.781*** 0.768*** 0.654*** 0.620*** 
 (6.732) (10.247) (10.079) (11.690) (6.272) (8.364) (8.653) (9.307) 
TermLoanDum -0.013 0.086 0.096 0.134 -0.130 -0.050 -0.075 -0.086* 
 (-0.108) (0.954) (1.048) (1.607) (-1.115) (-0.684) (-1.313) (-1.693) 
TermLoanBDum -0.044 0.042 0.044 0.069 -0.136 -0.040 -0.057 -0.078 
 (-0.364) (0.460) (0.471) (0.815) (-1.173) (-0.541) (-0.989) (-1.497) 
TermLoanCDum 0.818*** 0.920*** 0.972*** 1.052*** 0.711*** 0.697*** 0.545*** 0.517*** 
 (6.145) (9.534) (10.188) (12.509) (5.658) (8.188) (7.996) (9.149) 
VIX 0.019*** 0.017** 0.008 0.002 0.017*** 0.013** 0.005* 0.002 
 (2.691) (2.290) (1.573) (0.385) (2.619) (2.367) (1.841) (0.763) 






 (-0.632) (-0.273) (0.608) (0.629) (-0.814) (-0.762) (-0.557) (-0.674) 
LoanIndexReturn 0.002 -0.000 -0.016 -0.012 0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.089) (-0.016) (-0.849) (-0.801) (0.281) (0.102) (-0.459) (-1.008) 
Constant 5.084*** 4.636*** 4.290*** 3.878*** 4.687*** 3.635*** 2.842*** 2.065*** 
 (15.106) (14.611) (17.370) (17.643) (14.438) (14.316) (16.741) (15.647) 
Observations 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 
Rating/Firm/Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 3.7.Information Sharing, CLO Disagreement, and Loan Illiquidity 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results on the impact of potential information sharing 
among CLOs on CLO disagreement and loan illiquidity. The dependent variable in Panel 
A is CLODIS, the standard deviation of CLOs’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. 










100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, 
and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. ArrangerRel is the number of 
CLOs sharing the same bond issuance arranger divided by the number of CLOs in a loan. 
TrusteeRel is the number of CLOs sharing the same trustee divided by the number of CLOs 
in a loan. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term 
loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. Please see Appendix 
A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics 
are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Information Sharing and CLO Disagreement 
  CLODIS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
ArrangerRel -0.378***  -0.346*** 
 (-6.392)  (-6.003) 
TrusteeRel  -0.180*** -0.141*** 
  (-4.658) (-3.776) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) -0.458*** -0.460*** -0.455*** 
 (-8.489) (-8.388) (-8.369) 
Log (TotalCLOHoldings) 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 
 (5.390) (5.507) (5.157) 
SecondLienDum 0.353*** 0.336*** 0.340*** 
 (3.655) (3.492) (3.493) 
TermLoanDum 0.025 0.021 0.022 
 (0.382) (0.323) (0.337) 
TermLoanBDum 0.060 0.061 0.061 
 (0.883) (0.907) (0.902) 
TermLoanCDum 0.126* 0.125* 0.121* 
 (1.794) (1.785) (1.732) 
VIX 0.007 0.007 0.008 
 (1.034) (0.987) (1.043) 
TEDSpread -0.313 -0.290 -0.314 
 (-1.451) (-1.366) (-1.455) 
LoanIndexReturn 0.040** 0.040** 0.041** 
 (2.307) (2.295) (2.347) 
Constant 6.453*** 6.307*** 6.486*** 
 (17.078) (17.009) (17.152) 
    




Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.384 0.383 0.384 
 
Panel B: Information Sharing, CLO Disagreement, and Loan Illiquidity 
  LOANILLIQ  
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
CLODIS 0.069* 0.088* -0.010 
 (1.911) (1.708) (-0.211) 
ArrangerRel 0.208***  0.209** 
 (2.631)  (2.564) 
CLODIS*ArrangerRel 0.479***  0.405*** 
 (5.946)  (4.617) 
TrusteeRel  0.060 0.060 
  (1.063) (1.012) 
CLODIS*TrusteeRel  0.269*** 0.172** 
  (4.165) (2.433) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 0.151*** 0.157*** 0.149*** 
 (4.666) (4.859) (4.613) 
Log (TotalCLOHoldings) -0.169*** -0.172*** -0.165*** 
 (-13.314) (-13.196) (-13.284) 
SecondLienDum 0.761*** 0.804*** 0.785*** 
 (5.243) (5.503) (5.363) 
TermLoanDum -0.131 -0.109 -0.125 
 (-0.988) (-0.821) (-0.931) 
TermLoanBDum -0.143 -0.124 -0.139 
 (-1.089) (-0.940) (-1.055) 
TermLoanCDum 0.823*** 0.854*** 0.841*** 
 (5.265) (5.436) (5.329) 
VIX 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 (2.699) (2.794) (2.683) 
TEDSpread 0.273 0.245 0.271 
 (1.197) (1.047) (1.187) 
LoanIndexReturn 0.009 0.010 0.008 
 (0.402) (0.459) (0.373) 
Constant 4.576*** 4.952*** 4.618*** 
 (14.051) (15.674) (13.879) 
    
Observations 102,527 102,527 102,527 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 





Table 3.8.Disagreement on Loan Values vs. Disagreement on Earnings 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results that compare CLO disagreement on loan 
values with analyst disagreement on stock. The dependent variable in Panel A is CLODIS, 
which is the standard deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 










𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡  is the number of returns in month 𝑡 , 𝑃𝑗  is the average 
trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. EPSSTD is 
the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts on EPS. Log (NumAnalyst) is the natural 
logarithm value of the number of analysts covering a firm’s stock. Log (TotalAsset) is the 
natural logarithm value of the total assets. Leverage is the total debt divided by total assets. 
TobinQ is the market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity divided 
by total assets. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and 
term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. Please see 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-
statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Disagreement on Stock and Disagreement on Loan 
  CLODIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
EPSSTD  0.030  0.023  
  (1.066)  (0.801)  
Log (NumAnalyst)   0.011  0.014 
   (1.259)  (1.506) 
Log (TotalAsset) -0.009   -0.029 -0.011 
 (-0.244)   (-0.488) (-0.186) 
Leverage 0.266***   0.435*** 0.369*** 
 (4.762)   (4.861) (4.808) 
TobinQ -0.114***   -0.152*** -0.135*** 
 (-7.037)   (-6.294) (-6.059) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) -0.429*** -0.377*** -0.368*** -0.370*** -0.363*** 
 (-6.143) (-5.474) (-5.632) (-5.432) (-5.576) 
Log (TotalCLOHolding) 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.061*** 
 (4.770) (4.001) (3.868) (3.893) (3.710) 
SecondLienDum -0.139 -0.265* -0.216 -0.316** -0.266* 
 (-1.239) (-1.780) (-1.480) (-2.108) (-1.820) 
TermLoanDum 0.141** 0.071 0.163* 0.019 0.115 
 (2.046) (0.751) (1.872) (0.199) (1.292) 
TermLoanBDum 0.112 0.075 0.167* 0.022 0.118 
 (1.506) (0.754) (1.822) (0.223) (1.292) 
TermLoanCDum 0.163** -0.064 0.060 -0.121 0.006 
 (2.141) (-0.674) (0.685) (-1.190) (0.068) 
VIX 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.000 




TEDSpread -0.501 -0.427 -0.404 -0.395 -0.384 
 (-1.462) (-1.285) (-1.147) (-1.198) (-1.105) 
LoanIndexReturn 4.670** 3.539* 3.960** 3.466* 4.071** 
 (2.345) (1.801) (2.075) (1.812) (2.171) 
Constant 4.495*** 4.053*** 4.028*** 4.508*** 4.331*** 
 (4.760) (5.951) (5.734) (5.234) (4.922) 
      
Observations 22,128 14,705 18,306 14,188 17,609 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.397 0.419 0.400 0.425 0.407 
 
Panel B: Disagreement on Stock and Loan Illiquidity 
  LOANILLIQ 
  (1) (2) 
EPSSTD 0.054  
 (0.693)  
Log (NumAnalyst)  -0.011 
  (-0.791) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 0.273*** 0.244*** 
 (4.197) (4.276) 
Log (TotalCLOHolding) -0.180*** -0.185*** 
 (-8.318) (-9.436) 
SecondLienDum 1.270*** 1.861*** 
 (3.249) (4.696) 
TermLoanDum 0.253 0.821*** 
 (1.060) (3.270) 
TermLoanBDum 0.131 0.721*** 
 (0.526) (2.770) 
TermLoanCDum 0.423* 1.022*** 
 (1.764) (4.091) 
VIX 0.009 0.014** 
 (1.096) (2.002) 
TEDSpread 0.459 0.223 
 (1.242) (0.719) 
LoanIndexReturn -0.130 2.232 
 (-0.051) (0.950) 
Constant 8.012*** 7.248*** 
 (8.312) (8.457) 
Observations 14,677 18,263 
Rating FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes 





Table 3.9.CLO Disagreement and Rating Discrepancy 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results that compare the impact of CLO disagreement 










𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 
is the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 
𝑗. CLODIS is the standard deviation divided by the mean of CLO investors’ valuations on 
a loan and multiplied by 100. Rating discrepancy by rating agencies is measured by 
RatingSTD, which is defined as the standard deviation of the loan ratings in the CLO 
reports. DiffRate is a dummy variable that equals one if CLOs report different ratings to a 
loan and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are measured in month 𝑡. Time-varying 
independent variables are calculated in month 𝑡 − 1. Loan types include second lien, term 
loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted 
in the regressions. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are 
clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LOANILLIQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CLODIS 0.258*** 0.303*** 0.258*** 0.299*** 
 (8.588) (9.015) (8.584) (8.943) 
RatingSTD -0.036 0.080**   
 (-1.091) (2.296)   
CLODIS*RatingSTD  -0.151***   
  (-4.537)   
DiffRate   0.024 0.087*** 
   (1.010) (3.455) 
CLODIS*DiffRate    -0.086*** 
    (-3.205) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.164*** 
 (4.962) (5.097) (4.977) (5.087) 
Log (TotalCLOHoldings) -0.179*** -0.177*** -0.181*** -0.181*** 
 (-13.195) (-13.151) (-13.346) (-13.346) 
SecondLienDum 0.769*** 0.782*** 0.774*** 0.775*** 
 (5.325) (5.476) (5.347) (5.386) 
TermLoanDum -0.117 -0.120 -0.116 -0.125 
 (-0.884) (-0.915) (-0.876) (-0.941) 
TermLoanBDum -0.127 -0.130 -0.125 -0.134 
 (-0.972) (-1.003) (-0.958) (-1.024) 
TermLoanCDum 0.830*** 0.832*** 0.831*** 0.827*** 
 (5.343) (5.399) (5.350) (5.355) 
VIX 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (2.830) (2.847) (2.839) (2.824) 
TEDSpread 0.246 0.252 0.246 0.251 




LoanIndexReturn 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012 
 (0.522) (0.567) (0.514) (0.534) 
Constant 4.951*** 4.803*** 4.906*** 4.752*** 
 (15.788) (14.918) (15.637) (14.814) 
     
Observations 102,527 102,527 102,527 102,527 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 3.10.Information from CLOs’ Counterparties 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results on how primary market lender’s private information affects the impact of CLO disagreement 









𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns 
in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. CLODIS is the standard 
deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. RelationDum is a dummy variable that equals one if any of the 
primary market lenders have lent to the borrower in the past five years and zero otherwise. RelationNum (RelationAmt) is the number 
(amount) of loans from a lender divided by the total number (amount) of loans issued by the borrower in the past five years. The greatest 
value is chosen when there are multiple lenders in a loan syndicate. The dependent variables are measured in month 𝑡. Time-varying 
independent variables are calculated in month 𝑡 − 1. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan 
D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. OtherControls includes Log (1+ MonthtoMature), Log 
(TotalCLOHolding), SecondLienDum, TermLoanDum, TermLoanBDum, TermLoanCDum, VIX, TEDSpread, LoanIndexReturn, and 
Constant. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Illiquidity 
  LOANILLIQ 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
CLODIS 0.347*** 0.345*** 0.349*** 
 (7.628) (8.187) (7.987) 
RelationDum 0.088*   
 (1.679)   
CLODIS*RelationDum -0.082**   
 (-2.220)   
RelationNum  0.128***  
  (2.622)  
CLODIS*RelationNum  -0.106***  
  (-2.797)  
RelationAmt   0.095* 





CLODIS*RelationAmt   -0.107*** 
   (-2.896) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature) 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 
 (3.332) (3.354) (3.416) 
Log (TotalCLOHoldings) -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.190*** 
 (-14.295) (-14.324) (-14.295) 
SecondLienDum 0.722*** 0.714*** 0.715*** 
 (3.690) (3.640) (3.649) 
TermLoanDum -0.114 -0.123 -0.117 
 (-0.655) (-0.708) (-0.672) 
TermLoanBDum -0.121 -0.131 -0.125 
 (-0.704) (-0.761) (-0.724) 
TermLoanCDum 0.942*** 0.940*** 0.944*** 
 (4.935) (4.866) (4.899) 
VIX 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
 (2.516) (2.517) (2.516) 
TEDSpread 0.517* 0.519* 0.520* 
 (1.934) (1.939) (1.944) 
LoanIndexReturn -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.071) (-0.070) (-0.068) 
Constant 4.836*** 4.796*** 4.816*** 
 (8.379) (8.355) (8.353) 
    
Observations 77,600 77,600 77,600 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.307 0.307 0.307 
 





 Log (NumTrade) ZeroTradeDayPortion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CLODIS -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.016 0.009 0.026 
 (-0.338) (-0.539) (-0.826) (-0.282) (0.165) (0.480) 
RelationDum -0.052**   0.029   
 (-2.206)   (0.161)   
CLODIS*RelationDum 0.017**   -0.158**   
 (2.059)   (-2.019)   
RelationNum  -0.061***   0.385**  
  (-2.662)   (2.042)  
CLODIS*RelationNum  0.025***   -0.257***  
  (2.776)   (-2.668)  
RelationAmt   -0.074***   0.479** 
   (-3.249)   (2.547) 
CLODIS*RelationAmt   0.027***   -0.269*** 
   (2.987)   (-2.876) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 77,600 77,600 77,600 77,600 77,600 77,600 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.376 0.376 0.376 
 
Panel C: Turnover    
 Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    





 (-2.859) (-3.092) (-3.232) 
RelationDum -2.987**   
 (-2.089)   
CLODIS*RelationDum 1.127**   
 (2.127)   
RelationNum  -1.230  
  (-0.834)  
CLODIS*RelationNum  1.416**  
  (2.529)  
RelationAmt   -1.875 
   (-1.305) 
CLODIS*RelationAmt   1.580*** 
   (2.727) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 70,967 70,967 70,967 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 






Table 3.11.Robustness Tests 
 










𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading 
amount in millions on day 𝑗 . CLODIS is the standard deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. 
Specification (1) clusters standard errors by firm rather than report month. In Specification (2), I exclude the financial crisis period from 
July 2007 to April 2009. Specification (3) adds in lead arranger fixed effects. In Specification (4), the dependent variable is the return 
component in the LOANILLIQ. It is the monthly average of daily absolute returns. Specification (5) adds trades smaller than $100,000 
to the sample. Specification (6) adds defaulted loans and loans rated at Caa1 and below to the sample. Loan types include second lien, 
term loan, term loan B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. Please see Appendix 
A for variable definitions. OtherControls includes Log (1+ MonthtoMature), Log (TotalCLOHolding), SecondLienDum, TermLoanDum, 
TermLoanBDum, TermLoanCDum, VIX, TEDSpread, LoanIndexReturn, and Constant. Standard errors are clustered at report month 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CLODIS 0.258*** 0.264*** 0.282*** 0.305*** 0.332*** 0.172*** 
 (11.132) (8.711) (8.365) (6.655) (8.368) (6.739) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.927*** 4.107*** 5.737*** 7.549*** 5.669*** 9.314*** 
 (4.908) (5.952) (9.100) (9.863) (12.644) (12.546) 
Observations 102,527 101,761 77,584 102,527 103,047 117,503 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lead Arranger FE No No Yes No No No 





Table 3.12.Mechanical Relation 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results that address the potential mechanical relation 
concern between disagreement and loan illiquidity. In this sample, when calculating CLO 
disagreement, the price estimations from the CLO investors that have trades in the next 










𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡  is the number of returns in month 𝑡 , 𝑃𝑗  is the average 
trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. CLODIS is 
the standard deviation of CLO investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. The 
dependent variable is measured in month 𝑡 . Time-varying independent variables are 
calculated in month 𝑡 − 1. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan B, term 
loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the regressions. 
Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at report 
month level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LOANILLIQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CLODIS 0.265*** 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 
 (8.073) (8.648) (8.420) (8.372) 
Log (1+MonthtoMature)  0.189*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 
  (5.336) (4.634) (4.617) 
Log (TotalCLOHoldings)  -0.246*** -0.204*** -0.205*** 
  (-13.813) (-13.122) (-13.136) 
SecondLienDum   0.783*** 0.783*** 
   (5.017) (5.011) 
TermLoanDum   -0.107 -0.107 
   (-0.765) (-0.762) 
TermLoanBDum   -0.117 -0.116 
   (-0.835) (-0.829) 
TermLoanCDum   0.834*** 0.833*** 
   (5.226) (5.223) 
VIX    0.018*** 
    (2.861) 
TEDSpread    0.181 
    (0.744) 
LoanIndexReturn    0.011 
    (0.488) 
Constant 6.515*** 5.944*** 6.141*** 5.398*** 
 (27.446) (24.257) (19.961) (15.575) 
Observations 97,693 97,693 97,693 97,693 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 3.13.Omitted Variable Bias 
 
This table shows the regression results that address the omitted variable concern. The 









𝑗=1 ∗ 100 where 𝑁𝑡 is 
the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 𝑄𝑗 is the 
dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. CLODIS is the standard deviation of CLO 
investors’ valuations on a loan and multiplied by 100. The dependent variable is measured 
in month 𝑡 . Time-varying independent variables are calculated in month 𝑡 − 1 . Log 
(TotalAsset) is the natural logarithm value of the total assets. Leverage is the total debt 
divided by total assets. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus total assets minus book 
value of equity divided by total assets. Loan types include second lien, term loan, term loan 
B, term loan C, and term loan D. Term loan D is the base group and omitted in the 
regressions. OtherControls includes Log (1+ MonthtoMature), Log (TotalCLOHolding), 
SecondLienDum, TermLoanDum, TermLoanBDum, TermLoanCDum, VIX, TEDSpread, 
LoanIndexReturn, and Constant. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard 
errors are clustered at report month level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LOANILLIQ 
 Loan FE Firm-Year FE Loan-Year FE Firm Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CLODIS 0.218*** 0.155*** 0.135*** 0.219*** 
 (6.219) (5.467) (4.868) (6.779) 
Log (TotalAssets)    0.065 
    (0.762) 
Leverage    0.403*** 
    (3.134) 
TobinQ    -0.117*** 
    (-2.657) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 102,527 102,527 102,527 22,066 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
Loan FE Yes No No No 
Year-Quarter FE Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE No Yes No No 
Loan-Year FE No No Yes No 








Figure 3.1.Variations of CLO Disagreement and Loan Illiquidity. This figure shows 
variations of CLODIS and LOANILLIQ across time and ratings. The sample is from 
December 2008 to October 2018. CLODIS is the standard deviation of CLO investors’ 









𝑗=1 ∗ 100 
where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns in month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑗 is the average trading price on day 𝑗, and 
𝑄𝑗 is the dollar trading amount in millions on day 𝑗. Panels A and B show the variations 


















































































































































































































































Panel A: Time-series Variation by Month











































Panel B: Cross-sectional Variation by Ratings





Lending Relationships and the Pricing of Syndicated Loans24 
 
The central premise of relationship lending is that a bank acquires and reuses 
information from repeated interactions with a borrower in making credit decisions (e.g., 
Boot (2000) and Boot and Marinc (2008)). Over the past two decades, the syndicated loan 
market has experienced rapid growth of securitization and secondary trading under the 
originate-to-distribute (OTD) lending model. 25  Because banks can often offload risk 
exposure via securitization and loan sales, it has been a growing concern whether banks 
still rely on information produced from prior lending relationships in making their credit 
decisions in the syndicated loan market. While Drucker and Puri (2008) suggest that loan 
sales provide lenders with the capacity to lend to the same borrowers in the future and 
benefit relationship building. Lin, Liu, and Wang (2017) find that selling loans to nonbank 
investors such as CLOs impairs banks’ relationships with borrowers. It remains an open 
question whether and how relationship lending plays a role in the syndicated loan market 
amid the recent market developments.
                                                     
24  Donghang Zhang, Yafei Zhang, and Yijia (Eddie) Zhao. Reject and resubmit by 
Management Science, 3/20/2021. 
25 The market value of outstanding collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), the vehicle of 
securitizing syndicated loans, grew from $20 billion in 2001 to $430 billion in 2016 (Lin, 
Liu, and Wang (2017)). According to Thomson and the Loan Syndications and Trading 
Association (LSTA), the U.S. secondary market loan trading volumes rose from $8 billion 




Key to the OTD lending model is the market-flex practice that allows a lead lender 
to adjust the initially proposed pricing terms based on incremental information it acquires 
from potential investors in the primary market. We exploit a new dataset from the S&P 
Leverage Commentary & Data (LCD) that contains detailed information on primary market 
pricing adjustments and the trading price when a loan breaks into the secondary market 
(i.e., break price) for a large number of institutional term loans (ITLs).26 A loan with the 
interest rate spread being adjusted down from 325 basis points (bps) to 300 bps is likely to 
be different from a loan that was initially priced at 300 bps and without any further 
adjustment. However, existing studies on lending relationships consider the two loans as 
empirically the same because they only observe the final price (i.e., 300 bps). As a result, 
the existing literature likely has missed important nuances in the loan pricing process. In 
this paper, we use the LCD data to test an important yet less studied implication of 
relationship lending – lending relationships and the resulted information advantage should 
also lead to more efficient loan pricing. Specifically, we posit that better information about 
the borrower should enable the lead bank to propose more accurate pricing terms at the 
beginning of syndication and reduce the need for further adjustments. That is, a relationship 
bank should enable a more efficient price discovery for a syndicated loan.  
Using a sample of nearly 5,000 ITLs from 2000 to 2016, we find that when a lead 
bank has a stronger prior lending relationship with a borrower, initial pricing terms 
proposed by the bank are less likely to be adjusted during the pricing process. We examine 
                                                     
26 ITLs include term loan B, term loan C, term loan D, second lien loans, and covenant-
light loans. They are called ITLs because they are structured specifically to institutional 
investors such as CLOs, loan hedge funds, and insurance companies. Like bonds, these 
ITLs pay periodic interest rates and are not amortized. ITLs are also referred to as leveraged 
loans. LCD considers a loan as leveraged if the loan is rated BB+ or lower or if it has a 




the adjustments of interest rate spread, offer price, and yield-to-maturity (YTM). We 
measure the lending relationship as the percentage of loans (in dollars), excluding the 
current loan, arranged by the lead bank out of all the loans by the borrower within the past 
five years.27 Our regression estimations also show that lending relationships are negatively 
associated with the magnitudes of pricing adjustments. For example, a one standard 
deviation increase of relationship strength is associated with a decrease of 2 bps, or 8% of 
the standard deviation, in terms of the magnitude of interest rate spread adjustments. 
Results are similar if we use an alternative lending relationship measure calculated by the 
number of loans, not the dollar amount of loans. The effect of borrower-lead relationships 
on pricing adjustments are also robust after controlling for the lead bank market share (as 
a proxy of lead bank reputation) and the borrower’s track record of accessing the loan 
market (as a proxy of public recognition of the borrower), suggesting that it is the private 
information generated through the borrower-lead relationship that affects primary market 
pricing flex.  
We find that a stronger borrower-lead bank relationship also shortens the time of 
syndication and reduces loan underpricing. The number of days on the market, i.e., the 
number of days for a loan from launch to close, has a mean of 22 days and a standard 
deviation of 13 days. A one standard deviation increase in lending relationships is 
associated with 0.74 fewer days, or 6% of the standard deviation, for a loan to be syndicated. 
Loan underpricing is defined as the difference between the offer price and the first 
secondary market trading price (i.e., the break price) and represents a cost to the borrower. 
The mean and the standard deviation of underpricing are 78 and 43 bps, respectively, for 
                                                     
27 For the first loan of a borrower in the DealScan database, the lending relationship 




our loan sample. We find that a one standard deviation increase in lending relationships 
results in a 2.9 bps reduction in underpricing, which represents 7% of the standard 
deviation. For traded loans in our sample, the average loan price declines by 1.9 bps during 
the first trading month, suggesting that the 2.9 bps reduction in loan underpricing is 
economically meaningful. 
We also find that the impact of lending relationships on loan price discovery is 
more important when information production is more helpful. Specifically, we find that the 
effects of lending relationships on pricing adjustments and syndication duration are more 
pronounced among firms that do not have publicly available financial information. Lending 
relationships are also more important for loans without S&P credit ratings than for those 
with good credit ratings (BB- or better). The impact of lending relationships on pricing also 
exhibits heterogenous empirical patterns for hot versus cold loans. We define cold loans as 
the ones with offer price being adjusted downward, interest spread being adjusted upward, 
or both, i.e., the ones with weak demand. We define hot loans as the ones with strong 
demand and with opposite adjustments. We find that relationships lead to less upward 
spread adjustment and less downward price adjustment for cold loans. Meanwhile, we also 
find relationships reduce underpricing for hot loans. These results suggest that both cold 
and hot loans are on average priced higher with a relationship bank.  
Furthermore, lending relationships also have an impact on syndicate structure. We 
find that a lead bank that has prior lending relationships with a borrower relies less on 
information from other syndicate members. As a result, a relationship lead bank selects 
more participant lenders that are connected with the lead bank and fewer participants that 




participant and lead-participant relationships help overcome the moral hazard issues 
resulted from the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (Corwin and 
Schultz (2005) and Sufi (2007)). A lead bank’s own information set serves as a lever in 
determining which lenders will participate in the syndicate. 
To address the potential endogeneity of lending relationships, we use bank closures 
and mergers as exogenous shocks to borrower-lead bank relationships and create an 
instrumental variable (IV) to predict changes in the relationships. Bank closures and 
mergers are unlikely to be driven by any individual borrower (Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2010), Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012), and Derrien and Kecskes (2013)). Such 
events, however, can force borrowers to switch lead banks. For bank closures, a borrower 
will have to change the lead bank afterwards. For bank mergers and acquisitions, the 
literature suggests that subsequent reorganizations likely weaken a borrower’s bank 
relationship (e.g., Berger and Udell (2002), Stein (2002), and Sapienza (2002)).28 The first-
stage regression results confirm that this IV has a significantly negative impact on lending 
relationships. The Wald test rejects the weak instrument null hypothesis. In the second 
stage regressions, the coefficients on the predicted lending relationship all remain negative 
and are statistically significant, suggesting that our main findings are unlikely driven by 
potentially endogenous borrower-bank matching. 
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the relationship 
lending literature by uncovering important nuances in how information from lending 
                                                     
28 A bank merger can influence the relationship borrowers of both the acquirer and the 
target because a merger usually leads to a more complex hierarchical organizational 
structure that impedes the transformation of soft information (Stein (2002)). Meanwhile, 
personnel reshuffle associated with a merger can also impact personal relationships 





relationships is used in loan pricing. This literature generally documents that relationships 
are associated with lower loan interest rates (e.g., Berger and Udell (1995) and Bharath, 
Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011)). Less loan underpricing implies lower loan 
interest rates, and our evidence is thus consistent with this literature. But a likewise 
important yet less examined implication of relationship lending is that informed 
relationship lenders should also be able to more accurately and more efficiently price a 
loan. For example, Botsch and Vanasco (2019) recently find that, as lending relationships 
deepen, loan interest rates do not necessarily go down but do become more informative 
about borrower future credit performance. We take advantage of the new LCD dataset and 
provide new and direct evidence on how informed lenders can more efficiently set loan 
prices in the primary market. 
Another challenge for the existing relationship lending studies is that this 
documented association between relationship strength and lower loan prices may also be 
driven by a bank’s cross-selling incentives, in which the bank charges a relationship 
borrower a lower rate in expectation that this borrower will divert more businesses to the 
bank in later times (e.g., Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) and Ivashina 
and Kovner (2011)). Our results on the primary market pricing adjustment are difficult to 
be linked with any cross-selling incentives. Rather, they provide cleaner support for the 
informational effect of relationship lending. 
Second, our evidence adds to the ongoing debate on whether securitization and 
secondary market trading worsens information asymmetry problems in lending and the role 
of relationship lending under the OTD model (e.g., Parlour and Winton (2013)). While 




and the screening and monitoring incentives of lenders (Berndt and Gupta (2009), Keys, 
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), Wang and Xia (2014), and Lin, Liu, and Wang (2017)), 
others find the opposite (Drucker and Puri (2008), Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2012), and 
Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina (2012)). Our paper has a different angle and contributes 
to this debate by showing that relationship lending still helps to mitigate information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers during the price discovery in the primary loan 
market.  
Finally, we provide a richer understanding of the informational effect of 
relationship lending. The literature has provided supportive evidence for the certification 
effect of lending relationships on stock and bond underpricing (Schenone (2004), Yasuda 
(2005), and Duarte-Silva (2010)). There also exists a relation between information 
asymmetry and price revisions in the primary market for equity offerings (e.g., Hanley and 
Hoberg (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2013)). The primary market price discovery 
of syndicated loans, however, exhibits a striking difference from that of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in that both hot loans and cold loans are underpriced (Zhang, Zhang, and 
Zhao (2020a)). We find that relationship lenders play a different role for cold loans versus 
hot loans. More specifically, a relationship lender’s private information helps information 
production in loan price discovery and reduces loan underpricing for both hot and cold 
loans, although this effect is only statistically significant for hot loans. But only for cold 
loans with weak demand, consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1994) and DeYoung, Gron, 
Torna, and Winton (2015), it is a relationship lender’s information advantage and capital 





4.1. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Our research is informed by the book-building models of security offering such as 
in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Sherman and Titman (2002). The book-building 
model assumes that less-informed underwriters acquire information about the valuation of 
the security being offered from more-informed outside investors to price a security. 
Empirical findings of primary market pricing adjustments and underpricing are consistent 
with underwriter soliciting information from outside investors. For example, studies find 
that IPO prices are often adjusted in the primary market, reflecting information acquired 
from potential investors during the book-building process (e.g., Hanley (1993); Cornelli 
and Goldreich (2003)). In book-building models, underpricing is needed to compensate 
investors for their information revelation (Benveniste and Spindt (1989)) and investors’ 
costly information production (Sherman and Titman (2002)). Recent studies find that 
syndicated loans issuance also follows a similar bookbuilding process known as the 
‘market flex’ practice (Bruche, Malhebe, and Meisenzahl (2020) and Zhang, Zhang, and 
Zhao (2020a)).29 Consistent with the lead bank assesses demand information from potential 
loan investors, primary market loan pricing adjustments are also found to be common.  
An important implication of the bookbuilding model is that, when the underwriter 
is more informed, it would be less reliant on information acquired from outside investors 
                                                     
29 In an institutional loan offering, the borrower first selects a lead bank. The lead bank 
conducts its due diligence and proposes initial loan pricing terms such as interest rate 
spread and offer price. The lead bank then solicits demand information from potential 
investors. Depending on demand interests the lead bank receives during the bookbuilding 
process, the lead bank may adjust (or flex) the proposed pricing terms (e.g., increase the 





through bookbuilding.30 As a result, there will be fewer price adjustments in the primary 
market and lower compensation to investors in the form of underpricing. Lower 
underpricing also means that the primary market offering price will be set closer to the 
security’s market value (i.e., more accurate pricing in the primary market). That is, an 
underwriter may view other sources of information as substitutes for information acquired 
through bookbuilding in pricing a security. Consistent with this prediction, for example, 
Hanley and Hoberg (2010) show that more informative IPO prospectuses (as a proxy for 
greater pre-market due diligence by the underwriter) lead to fewer pricing adjustments and 
lower underpricing, although they did not specify from which exact channel underwriters 
obtain the information in the pre-market.   
In our paper, we examine whether a lead bank substitutes bookbuilding with 
information it had acquired in the pre-market from prior lending relationships in syndicated 
loan offerings. Our focus on the role of relationship lending as a specific information source 
builds on a large literature suggesting that a relationship bank obtains reusable and 
proprietary information about a borrower through repeated lending. This information 
advantage allows the relationship bank to grant more credits (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) and DeYoung, Gron, Torna, and Winton (2015)), to charge lower interest rate 
spreads (e.g., Berger and Udell (1995), Drucker and Puri (2005)), and to allow more 
flexible contractual terms (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011)). Note that 
the lead bank will only substitute bookbuilding if other sources of information production 
                                                     
30 Baron (1982) also models a bank that is better informed about demand information than 
the issuer and relates underpricing to a delegation contract that addresses incentive 
problems associated with this asymmetric information. Baron (1982), however, does not 
incorporate the primary market pricing adjustments, which is a widespread phenomenon 




is less costly. In our case, a relationship bank already has acquired information from 
previous lending, thus should incur little cost to use this information. Therefore, if a 
relationship bank substitutes information acquired from a prior lending relationship with 
the borrower with information acquisition from bookbuilding, we should observe that 
relationship loans have fewer pricing revisions and smaller revision magnitudes in the 
primary market. This is our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: A stronger relationship between the borrower and the lead bank of 
a loan is associated with a lower likelihood and a smaller magnitude of spread, offer price, 
and YTM adjustments in the primary market. 
By nature, a stronger relationship means that the bank engaged more intensively in 
the borrower’s previous loan deals. Information acquired through managing previous loan 
offerings and on-going monitoring throughout loan tenures should enable the lead bank to 
better forecast aggregate demand of the next issuance of this borrower. As relationship lead 
banks can build up demand for a loan deal faster, a deal should also close quicker. Note 
that a relationship renders the lead bank borrower-specific information, which helps gauge 
investor appetite for borrower-specific deals. This knowledge is different from a 
relationship bank’s exposure to the overall securitization market. While a lead bank’s 
market-wide experience may help with individual loan pricing as well, this is not the focus 
of our examination. Indeed, we empirically show that proxies of a lead bank’s market-wide 
experience do not confound the effect of borrower-bank relationship. The borrower-
specific knowledge is also incremental to the borrower’s own exposure in the loan market, 




Recent findings document that loans are underpriced. Relationship lead bank 
should also have implication for loan underpricing. In the bookbuilding theory, 
underpricing is a costly compensation to reward investors to truthfully reveal their demand 
information. If an underwriter is more informed and thus relies less on extracting 
information from outside investors, the theory implies that there should be less 
underpricing. That is, a more informed lead bank can set the offering price closer to the 
loan’s market value, which suggests that loan pricing will be more accurate. This is our 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A stronger relationship between the borrower and the lead bank 
results in a lower underpricing for a loan. 
Note that the hypothesized effect of relationship on loan underpricing could also be 
potentially consistent with signaling models of underpricing (e.g., Welch (1989)): a firm 
won’t need to underprice in order to reveal its quality when investors know that a 
relationship lead bank can more credibly certify. 31  However, the certification effect 
assumes that it is the issuer that knows more than outsider investors. This is a critical 
difference from the bookbuilding model – which assumes that the less-informed 
issuer/underwriter learn from more-informed outside investors – and cannot explain the 
fact that underwriters often make pricing adjustments in the primary market based on 
investor feedbacks. Another explanation independent of information asymmetry may be 
                                                     
31 Duarte-Silva (2010) find that relationship banks play a certification role in seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). Yasuda (2005) finds banking relationships affect issuers’ choice 
of bond underwriter beyond lower fees and attributes this effect to better certification. 
Schenone (2004) documents that firms with a previous banking relationship with the equity 
IPO underwriter have lower underpricing, but does not examine whether information 
advantage of relationship banks affects underpricing through reduced information 
production from bookbuilding or through certification. As well, none of these studies 




that a loan deal underwritten by a relationship bank simply draws more demand and thus 
is less underpriced. But if this explanation is true, we should see that relationship deals 
have more frequent and issuer-favorable pricing adjustments as demand outstrips supply. 
This prediction stands in contrast with bookbuilding theory’s prediction.     
Yet, there are potential adverse effects associated with having a relationship lender 
as the lead bank as well. A separate strand of relationship banking literature concerns that 
a relationship bank’s information advantage may cause ‘hold-up’ problems (e.g., Rajan 
(1992); Santos and Winton (2008)). Proprietary information possessed by a relationship 
bank may exacerbate the adverse selection between the lead bank and syndicate 
participates (Sufi (2007)). The information hold-up theory thus posits that loans 
underwritten by relationship banks may have to be underpriced to a greater extent to close 
the deal and the syndication process may take longer. Therefore, the net effect of 
relationship on loan underpricing is an empirical question.    
Loan offerings also have two important distinctive features compared to an equity 
IPO. First, the lead bank in a loan offering often commits its own capital, while an 
underwriter in an IPO does not directly buy the shares. Second, loan underpricing is U-
shaped in that both hot and cold loans are underpriced (Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020a)). 
Both hot IPOs and hot loans are underpriced for the same, information production reason 
– the underpricing is necessary to induce investors to reveal positive information truthfully. 
However, Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020a) show that the underpricing of a cold loan is to 
cover the lead bank’s loan retention costs. The different involvement of the lead bank and 
the different rationale for underpricing for hot versus cold loans suggest that lending 




banks often supply more capital for cold loans (Bruche, Malhebe, and Meisenzahl (2020)) 
and the information advantage enables the relationship lead bank to supply more funds 
(Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Schwert (2018)), the negative correlation between lending 
relationship and loan underpricing can also result from the lead bank’s loan retention in 
cold loans. These differences between syndicated loan offerings and other offerings motive 
us to further examine the effect of relationship for cold loans and hot loans separately when 
we test Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The need for information acquisition during a loan offering can affect the lead 
bank’s choice of participant lenders as well. For example, Sufi (2007) finds that less 
informed lead banks tend to choose participant lenders with more information about a 
borrower (e.g., lenders with previous lending relationships with the borrower). We posit 
that a relationship lead bank that is better informed about a borrower has less need to invite 
such participant lenders. 
The relationships among syndicate members are also critical in determining the 
composition of a syndicate (Corwin and Schultz (2005)). The lead bank favors potential 
participants with whom it has a relationship to minimize the competition for future lead 
mandates and to reduce agency costs among syndicate members (Henderson and Tookes 
(2012)). We refer to those lenders that have relationships with the lead as lenders from the 
lead bank’s network or connected lenders. When the lead bank has a prior lending 
relationship with a borrower and the need for information production is reduced, the lead 
bank is more likely to choose connected participant lenders instead of lenders that have a 
relationship with the borrower. Taken together, we have the following hypothesis on 




Hypothesis 3: A stronger relationship between the borrower and the lead bank 
results in a syndicate in which there exists a stronger relationship between the lead bank 
and the participants while a weaker relationship between the borrower and the participant 
lenders. 
4.2. Data and Sample 
We use data from the S&P Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD) for information 
on loan primary market pricing terms. As one of the leading research providers on 
leveraged loans in the U.S. and Europe, LCD collects loan primary market pricing 
information from lenders. The LCD database provides comprehensive coverage of 
leveraged loans and contains information on loan pricing terms proposed by lead banks 
and the final pricing terms when loans are placed. 
We begin the sample construction with 12,121 deal-level syndicated loans in the 
LCD database from 2000 to 2016. We convert the deal-level data into facility-level 
observations because a deal package typically contains multiple facilities that are structured 
to target different types of investors and are priced differently. The 12,121 deals correspond 
to 20,777 facilities. We use Thomson Reuters’s (now Refinitiv) LPC DealScan database 
for loan level data. We use borrowing firm name and loan launch date to merge loan 
facilities from LCD with the facility-level data in DealScan. The merged sample has 11,934 
facilities, including 5,914 institutional term loans (ITLs), 4,957 revolving credit lines, and 
1,063 Term Loan A (TLA) facilities.32 Our empirical analysis focuses on ITLs. For the 
                                                     
32 Because there is no common identifier for LCD and DealScan, we use firm name and 
loan launch date for merging the two databases. For example, for a facility LCD-A in LCD, 
if a facility DealScan-A in DealScan is issued by the same firm within 3 months of the 
launch date and has the same amount as in LCD, we consider LCD-A and DealScan-A as 
matched facilities. The summary statistics of the matched sample are quite similar as the 




5,914 ITLs, we further require that a loan has information on adjustments of pricing terms 
in the primary market.33 This filter results in a reduction of 438 observations. We also 
exclude 585 second-lien facilities.34 The final sample includes 4,891 ITLs. 
We only include institutional facilities in the final sample for the following reasons. 
First, the pricing of ITLs is a more straightforward application of supply and demand 
analysis than pricing pro-rata facilities (i.e., credit lines and TLAs). The latter needs to 
consider more the potential benefits of cross-selling for future banking business. By 
focusing on ITLs, we are less concerned about our results being driven by cross-selling 
motives. Second, institutional facilities are more likely to be traded on the secondary 
market so that we can observe the level of underpricing. Finally, in the LCD database, 
institutional term loans have more comprehensive pricing adjustment information, which 
is critical to our analysis.  
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the sample. RelationAmt is the main 
measure of relationship strength. Following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 
(2011) and Ivashina and Kovner (2011), we define RelationAmt for a loan as the total dollar 
amount of loans that the lead bank arranged for the borrowing firm within the past five 
years, excluding the current loan, over the total dollar amount of all loans that the firm 
borrowed during the same period.35 RelationAmt has a mean value of 26.25%. We also use 
                                                     
33 We also replace missing values of adjustments with zeros and include them in the 
analysis. The results are not affected. 
34 Second-lien facilities are junior to first-lien facilities. This feature makes the pricing 
terms of second-lien facilities very complex and different from those of first-lien facilities, 
so we do not include them in our main analyses. In unreported tests, the main results are 
not affected if we include second-lien facilities. 
35 A lender is defined as the lead bank if it is reported in DealScan as the administrative 
agent. If no lender is reported as the administrative agent, we define a lender that acts as 




the number of loans instead of the loan amount for relationship measurement, and this 
variable, denoted as RelationNum, has a similar distribution as RelationAmt.36 In addition, 
we also report the summary statistics for the relationship measures between the lead and 
participant lenders and those between the borrowing firm and the participant lenders of a 
loan. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix B. 
AbsSpreadAdj is the absolute value of spread adjustment, which is the final interest 
spread minus the initially proposed interest spread in bps. AbsOfferPriceAdj is the absolute 
value of the change from the initially proposed offer price to the final offer price at loan 
close.37 On average, the absolute values of the adjustments of the two pricing terms are 
17.29 and 32.02 bps, respectively. The LCD database also includes yield to maturity 
(YTM). LCD uses interest rate (spread plus LIBOR), offer price, maturity, and prepayment 
assumptions based on sample averages to calculate YTM for a loan. The variable, 
AbsYTMAdj, captures the absolute value of the change of the initially proposed YTM to 
the finalized YTM at loan close. AbsYTMAdj has a mean value of 34.91 bps.38  
                                                     
36 We also calculate lending relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower of a 
loan using the number of loans where the current lead arranger can be either a lead arranger 
or a participant lender in previous loans. In un-tabulated results, this lending relationship 
proxy has the mean value of 29.14%, slightly higher than the mean of RelationAmt or 
RelationNum. Our baseline results do not change if we use this variable as the relationship 
measure in our regressions. 
37 Offer price can be denoted as original issue discount (OID) or upfront fee in the LCD 
database. Practitioners use them interchangeably to indicate the price of a loan (S&P (2016) 
and Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016)). 
38 Both the initial and final offer prices are needed to calculate offer price adjustment for a 
loan. In our sample, although 3,368 loans have information on final offer prices, only 2,760 
loans have information on initial offer prices. Thus, we can calculate offer price adjustment 
only for 2,760 loans. For the same reason, we also have a much smaller number of loans 
with YTM adjustments. Note that we use YTM information reported by the LCD database. 
Regression results are robust if we treat loans with missing adjustments as zero adjustments. 
Also, for loans with available YTM adjustment information, none is issued before 2008, 




Primary market price adjustments have asymmetric impacts on underpricing (see, 
e.g., Bradley and Jordan (2002)). Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020a) show that both cold and 
hot loans are underpriced, but the impacts of price and spread adjustments on loan 
underpricing have opposite signs for cold and hot loans. We differentiate between 
downward and upward adjustments by defining the following set of variables, 
SpreadAdjUp, SpreadAdjDown, OfferPriceAdjUp, and OfferPriceAdjDown. For each of 
these four variables, it takes the actual value if the adjustment is in the direction as indicated 
by the variable name, and zero otherwise. For example, SpreadAdjUp would take a value 
of 40 bps if a loan’s spread is adjusted upward by 40 bps, and it would take a value of zero 
if a loan’s spread is unchanged or adjusted downward by 50 bps. SpreadAdjUp and 
SpreadAdjDown have mean values of 9.44 bps and -7.50 bps, respectively. 
OfferPriceAdjUp and OfferPriceAdjDown have mean values of 11.43 bps and -20.31 bps, 
respectively. Note that the mean values for these four variables reflect many loan 
observations with zero values because of the way they are defined.39  
Loan underpricing, UnderpricingOP, is defined as the change from the final offer 
price at loan close to the break price (the first price when a loan trades on, or breaks into, 
the secondary market). Both offer and break prices are measured relative to the par value. 
Note that from loan close to breaking into the secondary market, loan price is likely the 
                                                     
loans issued before the subprime crisis and re-run the regressions for offer price and spread 
adjustments. The results are robust. 
39 To provide a clearer picture of the magnitudes of these adjustments, we also calculate 
the mean adjustments after excluding all loan observations with zero or adjustments in the 
opposite directions. The average upward and downward spread adjustments are 38.27 and 
– 50.31 bps, respectively, and the numbers of loans with upward and downward spread 
adjustments are 1,221 and 794, respectively (the rest with non-missing values have no 
adjustments). The average upward and downward adjustments of offer prices are 48.78 and 
-148.21 bps, respectively, and the number of loans with upward and downward price 




only variable that changes while other loan terms such as spread and maturity remain the 
same. Therefore, UnderpricingOP captures investors’ short-term gain. As reported in 
Table 4.1, this variable has a mean value of 77.84 bps, suggesting that on average loans are 
underpriced. For an average loan of $427.22 million in our sample, it means that 
approximately $3.33 million (=$427.22*0.7784%) are left on the table. The money left on 
the table highlights the cost of bookbuilding and the importance of bank relationship if a 
relationship lead bank can make bookbuilding more efficient and less costly. 
We also use UnderpricingYTM as an alternative measure of loan underpricing. It is 
defined as the change from the YTM at loan close to the YTM when the loan breaks into 
the secondary market. UnderpricingYTM has an average value of -20.03 bps. The interest 
rate spread for a loan does not change from its close to breaking into the secondary market, 
so a decrease in YTM indicates an increase in loan price, i.e., loan underpricing. 
We also report summary statistics for other control variables in Table 4.1. The mean 
value of syndicate duration, DaysOnMarket, which is measured from launch date to close 
date, is 22.09 days.40 The market share of lead arrangers has a mean value of 4.07%. We 
use TotalSales as a measure for firm size. This variable is provided by LCD but is not 
available for all firms, has a mean value of $2,053 million, and is highly skewed. The 
average loan size is $427.22 million, and the average loan maturity is 6.01 years. Half of 
the borrowers are public firms. Approximately two-thirds of the loans have a financial 
sponsor. A little more than a half of the loans have prepayment penalty or interest rate floor. 
                                                     
40 We find that for loans that have secondary trading information, about 60% are traded 
before the loan is closed. Therefore, we also define DaysOnMarket as the number of days 
between launch date and the earlier date of loan close date or break date when the first 
secondary market price is observed. Our regression results remain virtually the same with 




About one-third of the loans are issued for refinancing. The majority of the loans are 
secured. Covenant-lite loans account for nearly a quarter of the sample. 
4.3. Lending Relationships and Primary Market Price Discovery 
4.3.1. Lending Relationships and the Likelihood of Price Adjustments 
In this and the next sub-sections, we examine whether a lead bank with a stronger 
lending relationship with a borrower can better certify the information content in its initial 
proposals to investors and can thus reduce the likelihood and magnitudes of pricing 
adjustments in the primary market. We first estimate a set of Probit and linear probability 
models as specified in Eq. (1): 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘, 𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
The dependent variables are dummy variables for primary market pricing adjustments. The 
subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑡 index for firm, bank, and time, respectively. 
We use three dummy variables, DumSpreadAdj, DumOfferPriceAdj, and 
DumYTMAdj, to capture whether there are primary market pricing adjustments. 
DumSpreadAdj equals to one if there is an interest spread adjustment and zero otherwise. 
DumOfferPriceAdj and DumYTMAdj indicate whether there exists an offer price or YTM 
adjustment, respectively. The key explanatory variable is the strength of the lead-borrower 
lending relationship, either RelationAmt or RelationNum. 
For the control variables, we include LeadMkshare to account for the impact of lead 
bank reputation on pricing adjustments. Log (LoanAmt) is to capture the impact of market 




maturity probably requires more information, so we control for loan maturity, Log 
(Maturity). PublicDum is also included in the model since public firms would be more 
transparent and have less information asymmetry problems. To control for the risks of a 
borrower and a loan, we include SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, 
RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, and CovLiteDum in the model. We also include year, 
borrower industry, lead arranger, loan rating, and loan purpose fixed effects in the 
regressions.41 
Probit marginal effects and linear probability coefficient estimates are reported in 
Table 4.2 Panels A and B, respectively. We focus on discussing the results from the Probit 
models as reported in Panel A since the linear probability regressions produce qualitatively 
the same results. In Panel A, Columns (1) to (4) show that the coefficients on RelationAmt 
and RelationNum are all statistically significant at the one percent level, suggesting that a 
stronger lending relationship significantly reduces the probabilities of spread or offer price 
adjustment. Economically, a one standard deviation increase (39.09%) of lending 
relationship measured by loan amount (RelationAmt) results in a decrease of 3.12% (-
0.39*0.08) in the likelihood of adjusting loan spreads and offer prices. We use YTM 
adjustments in Columns (5) and (6) and find consistent results. 
Other control variables carry expected signs. For instance, loan amount and 
maturity are both positively associated with the likelihood of adjustments, suggesting that 
pricing larger loans or loans with longer maturities is more complex and requires more 
information than pricing other loans. The coefficients on PrepayDum are also positive and 
statistically significant, consistent with the notion that loan prepayments increase the 
                                                     




uncertainty of interest payments. The coefficients on RefinancingDum are negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that refinancing loans might have less information 
asymmetry. 
4.3.2. Lending Relationships and the Magnitudes of Price Adjustments 
To examine the effect of lending relationships on adjustment magnitudes, we 
estimate a set of OLS regressions. The model is specified as follows: 
𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘, 𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (2) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑡 stand for firm, bank, and time, respectively. 
The dependent variables are the absolute values of spread, offer price, and YTM 
adjustments. We use the absolute value of adjustments because both upward and downward 
adjustments have significant impacts on loan pricing and allocations (Bruche, Malhebe, 
and Meisenzahl (2020) and Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020a)). The regression results are 
reported in Table 4.3. Columns (1) and (2) show that a stronger lending relationship is 
significantly associated with a smaller magnitude of spread adjustments. Economically, a 
one standard deviation increase of lending relationship measured by loan amount leads to 
a 3.05 bps decrease in the absolute value of spread adjustments. This effect is sizeable as 
it represents a 17.63% decrease from the mean of 17.29 bps for absolute spread adjustments. 
Columns (3) to (6) use the absolute values of offer price and YTM adjustments as the 
dependent variables and yield similar results. 
Overall, the results in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are consistent with Hypothesis 1. A lead 




the borrower can propose pricing terms more accurately. Consequently, a prior lending 
relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower for a loan help decrease both the 
probability and the magnitude of pricing adjustments in the primary market.  
An alternative explanation of these results may be that borrowers tend to establish 
relationships with more reputable lenders and reputable lenders have more experience in 
loan pricing and/or have greater trust among potential investors. We argue that this 
alternative explanation is unlikely for two reasons. First, we control for lead bank market 
share (LeadMkshare) in all regressions, and its inclusion does not change the effect of 
borrower-lead relationships on pricing adjustments. Second, we use bank mergers and 
closures as a shock to isolate the exogenous, predicted relationship, and the IV regression 
results in Section 2.7.3 and Table 4.11 are also supportive of Hypothesis 1.  
4.3.3. Lending Relationships and Syndication Duration 
Can the borrowing firm benefit from a decline in the need of pricing adjustments? 
To shed further light on the role of lending relationship in loan underwriting and price 
discovery, we examine its impact on syndication duration. We use DaysOnMarket, the 
number of days from loan launch to loan completion, as the measure for syndication 
duration. We expect that a stronger relationship makes the syndication process faster. A 
short syndication duration helps to reduce the uncertainty for the borrower. 
Table 4.4 reports the OLS regression results. The coefficients on the lending 
relationship measured by both loan amounts and loan numbers are negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level in all columns, suggesting that a stronger lending 
relationship reduces syndication time. Using Column (1) as an example, economically, a 




0.74 days of syndication duration, which represents a 3.36% decrease from the average 
number of days on the market. 
The findings again support Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with our previous 
results on primary market pricing adjustments, as the syndication process would take less 
time if there were fewer adjustments. Our results are also consistent with Ivashina and Sun 
(2011). They suggest that syndication time (days on the market) reflects demand from 
institutional investors. A stronger lending relationship and the resulted certification effect 
as suggested in Hypothesis 1 will likely drum up institutional demand for a loan. 
4.3.4. Borrower Information Asymmetry and the Cross-sectional Variations  
of the Impact of Lending Relationships 
We argue that the results in Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 reflect the information 
advantage for a lead bank when it has a stronger lending relationship with a borrowing firm. 
If these effects are related to information asymmetry, the impact of lending relationships 
on primary market pricing adjustments should be stronger among more opaque firms. 
We rely on the fact that public firms are more transparent than private firms and 
that borrowers with credit ratings are subject to fewer information asymmetry problems 
than non-rated borrowers. The OLS regression results are reported in Table 4.5. The 
dependent variable name and the sub-samples (Private vs. Public in Panel A and Non-Rated 
vs. Rated in Panel B) are indicated at the top of each column. In Panel A, we compare 
private with public firms. For each pair of the comparisons, the coefficient estimate on 
RelationAmt is much larger, and the statistical significance is much greater among loans 
for private borrowers. Moreover, the coefficient differences, reported at the bottom of each 




price adjustments. For example, in Panel A Columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on 
RelationAmt for private firms is -0.086 while that for public firms is -0.038. Economically, 
the coefficient difference implies that for private firms, a one standard deviation increase 
of lending relationship results in a 3.36 bps decrease of absolute spread adjustments, which 
is more than two times greater than the impact of the same increase of lending relationship 
on absolute spread adjustments for public firms. 
In Panel B, we compare non-rated with rated loans. Again, for each pair of the 
comparisons, the coefficient estimate on RelationAmt is much larger among loans that are 
subject to more severe information asymmetry problems. 
The results in Table 4.5 are strongly consistent with our hypothesis that prior 
lending relationships alleviate information asymmetry and reflect an information 
advantage for the lead bank. 
4.4. Lending Relationships and Loan Underpricing 
We next examine how lending relationship affects loan underpricing. As we posit 
in Hypothesis 2, an informed lead bank relies less on the information revealed from other 
investors and is more likely to retain part of a loan at a lower cost. Consequently, lending 
relationships should be negatively associated with loan underpricing. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 4.6. We construct the underpricing 
measures based on both loan offer price and YTM. The dependent variables in Columns 
(1) to (4) are UnderpricingOP, which is the change from final loan offer price to break 
price. The dependent variables in Columns (5) to (8) are UnderpricingYTM, which is the 




information to calculate UnderpricingOP and UnderpricingYTM, the regression sample 
size becomes smaller in these tests due to missing break price or break YTM. 
The key independent variables are the two lending relationship measures, 
RelationAmt and RelationNum. From Columns (1) to (4), the coefficients on lending 
relationship measures are similar with or without the pricing adjustment variables. 42 
Column (3) shows that underpricing decreases as the lead-borrower relationship gets 
stronger, and the coefficient on RelationAmt is statistically significant at the one percent 
level. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in lead-borrower lending 
relationship is associated with a 2.74 bps reduction in underpricing, which represents a 4% 
decrease from the sample mean of 77.84 bps. To put things into perspective, the 2.74 bps 
reduction in underpricing is larger than the average post-issuance loan price change within 
the first trading month, which is about 1.94 bps.43 Column (4) shows that the estimates 
using the alternative measure of lending relationship are similar.  
These results not only are consistent with our findings of the impact of lending 
relationships on primary market adjustments but also highlight another important tangible 
benefit of a stronger lending relationship – lending relationship helps reduce underpricing 
so that the borrower can raise more funds at the time of loan issuance. 
From Columns (5) to (8), we use UnderpricingYTM as an alternative measure of 
underpricing. Note that loan underpricing has the opposite sign when we measure it using 
                                                     
42 The pricing adjustment variables are controls for primary market information production 
and the lead bank’s loan retention costs (Hanley (1993), Bradley and Jordan (2002), and 
Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020a)). 





YTM, so are the coefficients on RelationAmt and RelationNum. The results are different 
depending on whether we include pricing adjustment variables in the regressions.  
We include LeadMkshare to control for lead bank’s reputation to the extent that 
reputable underwriters are associated with greater monitoring incentive (Winton and 
Yerramilli (2015)) and lower IPO underpricing (Carter and Manaster (1990)). The negative 
coefficients on LeadMkshare in Columns (3) and (4) and the positive coefficients in 
Columns (7) and (8), which have opposite signs because of the different dependent 
variables, are consistent with the literature despite being insignificant. After controlling for 
lead bank reputation, the lead-borrower banking relationship still has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on loan underpricing, suggesting that lead bank reputation 
does not drive the impact of lending relationships on loan underpricing.  
The results in Table 4.6 suggest that, in addition to its impact on primary market 
adjustments, lending relationships have a direct impact on loan pricing. Lower 
underpricing is attributed to a relationship bank’s private information advantage and better 
certification by a relationship lender with private information. We do not further 
distinguish between the information production and certification effects of lending 
relationship because certification inherently relies on a relationship bank’s private 
information (Benzoni and Schenone (2010) and Duarte-Silva (2010)), and both effects are 
relevant for the impact of lending relationship on syndicated loan underwriting. 
4.5. Hot versus Cold Loans and the Impact of Lending Relationships  
In this section, we study how prior relationships affect primary market price 
discovery differently for cold and hot loans. We define cold loans as the ones with upward 




presence of weak investor demand. Note that an upward YTM adjustment can be due to a 
decrease of loan offer price, an increase in loan interest rate spread, or both. We define hot 
loans as loans with strong demand and hence downward YTM adjustments.44 The lead 
bank of a loan plays a different role depending on whether the demand is strong or weak, 
and the rationale for loan underpricing is different for hot versus cold loans. We thus take 
advantage of these unique features of loan underwriting to shed light on the interactions of 
banking relationships and primary market price discovery that are potentially very different 
from other securities issuances such as IPOs.  
We re-estimate our baseline regressions separately for cold and hot loans, and Table 
4.7 reports the OLS regression results.45 In Panel A, the dependent variables are pricing 
adjustments and syndicate duration. The coefficient estimates on RelationAmt are 
economically greater and statistically more significant in Columns (1), (3), and (5) that use 
the sub-sample of cold loans than those in Columns (2), (4), and (6) that use the sub-sample 
of hot loans, suggesting that the impacts of lending relationships on pricing adjustments 
concentrate among cold loans. The results in Columns (7) and (8) show that a stronger 
lending relationship reduces the syndication duration for cold loans, but not for hot loans. 
Because cold loans by definition are loans with downward price or upward spread 
adjustments, a smaller adjustment for cold loans means they are priced higher. And a 
shorter syndication duration reduces the risk that the loan may be failed to complete. This 
finding suggests that an informed lead bank is more willing to supply capital to cold loans.  
                                                     
44 In this test, we exclude loans with zero YTM adjustments since they belong to neither 
hot nor cold loans.  
45 To save space, we only report the coefficient estimates for RelationAmt. The results are 




We examine loan underpricing separately for cold and hot loans in Table 4.7 Panel 
B. The results in Panel B show that lending relationships help reduce loan underpricing for 
both hot and cold loans, and the economic impact of lending relationships for both groups 
are similar. We classify hot and cold loans based on investor demand. Investors can hide 
their demand to get the underpricing of a cold loan and the mispricing of a hot loan as being 
mislabeled as a cold one. The lead bank counters this incentive of misreporting demand by 
using its own capital to reduce the amount of a cold loan an investor can get. Meanwhile, 
the lead bank can reward investors in a hot loan with underpricing and more loan 
allocations. Because an investor’s gain is mispricing/underpricing times its loan allocation, 
the lead bank can thus achieve a more efficient outcome as long as the impact of the 
expected decrease in loan allocations due to the lead bank’s loan retention of a cold loan 
exceeds the investor incentive of misreporting. Put differently, the expected benefits from 
the underpricing of hot and cold loans are connected and must be balanced out. As a result, 
it is not surprising that the economic impact of lending relationships is similar for hot and 
cold loans.  
Statistically, the coefficient estimates on lending relationships on loan underpricing 
are only significant for hot loans. The difference in the statistical significance for hot and 
cold loans is likely to come from two sources. First, the hot loan sub-sample has more 
observations and thus greater statistical power. Second, the underpricing of a hot loan is to 
induce investors to reveal positive information truthfully, and the underpricing of a cold 
loan is to offset the lead bank’s loan retention and capital costs (Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao 
(2020a)). Although lending relationships matter for both information production and 




idiosyncratic factors. Consequently, a less noisy process can more easily yield statistically 
significant results.  
Taken together, the results in Table 4.7 suggest that lending relationships indeed 
play different roles of hot and cold loans in the primary market. These results provide a 
richer picture on the role of underwriters and banking relationships in securities offerings. 
4.6. Lending Relationships and Syndicate Structure 
Syndicate members are chosen partly based on how severe the information 
asymmetry problems between a borrower and its lenders are (Sufi (2007)). In this section, 
we investigate the impacts of lending relationships on syndicate structure and test 
Hypothesis 3. 
The regression results are reported in Table 4.8. In Panel A, the dependent variable 
in Columns (1) and (2) is LeadPartRelation, the relationship between the lead arranger and 
the participant lenders in a syndicate. We calculate the lead-participant relationship as the 
number of loans syndicated by the lead arranger and participated by the participate lender 
in the last five years divided by the total number of loans arranged by the lead arranger in 
the same period.46 When there are multiple participants, we follow Ivashina and Kovner 
(2011) and choose the one with the highest relationship value. In Columns (1) and (2), the 
coefficients on RelationAmt and RelationNum are positive and statistically significant at 
the ten and five percent levels, respectively. This result suggests that a lead bank tends to 
choose participant lenders that are closer to itself when it has a stronger relationship with 
the borrower. 
                                                     
46 Allocation data, i.e., loan share data, for participant lenders in Dealscan are very limited, 
and for institutional loans they are likely to be inaccurate due to tax reasons (S&P (2016)). 
So we use the number of loans rather than the amount that a participate lender contributes 




In addition to the highest relationship value between the lead and the participant 
lenders, we use LeadConnectedPartRatio as the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4). 
The LeadConnectedPartRatio is defined as the number of participant lenders in the 
syndicate of the current loan that are in the same syndicate with the lead bank at least once 
in the past five years divided by the total number of participant lenders. The coefficients 
on the lead-borrower lending relationship measures in Columns (3) and (4) are positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level, again suggesting that the syndicate of a 
loan has more participant lenders that have relationships with the lead arranger when the 
lead arranger has a stronger relationship with the borrower. 
In Columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is FirmPartRelation, the 
relationship between the borrowing firm of a loan and the participant (non-lead) lenders of 
the loan. For each participant lender, we calculate the ratio of the total dollar amount of 
loans arranged by the participant lender to the borrower in the last five years over the total 
dollar amount of loans issued by the borrower in the same period. The variable 
FirmPartRelation is the highest ratio among all participant lenders of the loan. In both 
Columns (5) and (6), the coefficients on the lending relationship measures between the lead 
and the borrower are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. This 
result suggests that a stronger lending relationship between the lead and the borrower is 
associated with weaker relationships between the borrower and the participant lenders.47 
                                                     
47 We acknowledge that the way we construct the relationship variables may mechanically 
introduce a negative association between lead-borrower lending relationships and 
participant-borrower lending relationships. To address this concern, similar to Sufi (2007), 
we also measure the lead-borrower lending relationship by the distance between the 




Similarly, we use FirmConnectedPartRatio, the number of participant lenders that 
have a lending relationship with the borrower divided by the total number of participant 
lenders, as the dependent variable in Columns (7) and (8). The results suggest that a 
stronger lending relationship between the lead and the borrower of a loan is associated with 
fewer participant lenders that have relationships with the borrower. 
The results in Table 4.8 Panel A support Hypothesis 3. Our findings are consistent 
with Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Sufi (2007), suggesting that information asymmetry 
problems play an important role in syndicate formation. To promote information 
production, the lead bank of a loan needs to invite informed lenders. To reduce the 
competition for future mandates and the agency costs, the lead bank would include more 
lenders from its network. A lead bank’s information advantage due to its lending 
relationships with the borrower gives the lead bank more freedom to balance the two 
conflicting objectives. 
A bank with a greater market share can develop lending relationships with more 
investors and participate in syndicates with more banks. That is, the impact of lead-
borrower relationships on the choice of participant lenders as shown in Table 4.8 Panel A 
could be driven by large banks with greater market shares. To shed light on this issue 
concerning large banks, we add the lead bank’s market share in the regressions and present 
the estimations in Table 4.8 Panel B. The coefficients on lending relationship measures are 
similar as those in Panel A. These results suggest that the lending relationship between the 
lead bank and the borrower is critical in determining the syndicate structure, even for large 




Overall, the results in Table 4.8 Panels A and B show that prior lending 
relationships between the lead and the borrower affect the syndicate structure and the 
participation of other lenders in a loan. These results corroborate our findings on the 
impacts of lead-borrower relationships on primary market loan price discovery – if prior 
lending relationships enable a lead bank to provide better certification of a loan and make 
the loan pricing more efficient, the lead bank can attract or use more banks that do not 
necessarily possess information on the borrower. 
4.7. Additional Tests and Addressing the Endogeneity of Lending Relationships 
4.7.1. Excluding First Deals and Distinguishing Between Private Information  
and Borrower Public Recognition 
In this section, we first address the potential impact of a measurement issue of 
borrower-lead relationships. By construction, our relationship measure will take zero value 
if a borrower appears in our dataset for the first time. This arrangement may bias our result 
upward because these first-time borrowers also likely have greater information asymmetry. 
We therefore conduct a test by excluding first deal of each borrower from our sample. As 
shown in Panel A of Table 4.9, our key findings remain intact.   
Next, we conduct a test to distinguish between the impact of private information 
generated through the borrower-lead relationship and the borrower’s self-certification. The 
literature suggests that a bank can also learn about a borrower through the borrower’s 
public track record (e.g., Botsch and Vanasco (2019)). In other words, a firm’s previous 
borrowings could also certify its creditworthiness to potential lenders, which we call “self-




shall expect that a borrower’s public recognition in the loan market may also affect primary 
market flex activities. 
To control for the impact of a borrower’s self-certification, we add a control 
variable, Log (1+PriorLoans), which captures how many loans the borrower had borrowed 
before as a proxy for the borrower’s public recognition in the loan market. In Panel B, we 
find that the coefficient estimates on our relationship measure - RelationAmt - are still 
negative and remain statistically significant at the one percent level in all the columns. And 
not surprisingly, the coefficient estimates on Log (1+PriorLoans) in Panel B are also 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the borrower’s self-certification also 
matters in alleviating information asymmetry problems.  
4.7.2. Lead Lender’s Information about Loan Demand 
It is possible that the primary market pricing adjustments might be due to the lead 
lender’s information about the securitization demand from institutional investors such as 
CLOs, which might be different from the information captured by our lending relationship 
measures. The lead lender likely knows more about the securitization demand if it arranges 
more loans that are later securitized. We measure lead lender’s information about 
securitization demand for a loan by Log (1+SecuritizedLoans), which is the natural 
logarithm value of one plus the number of securitized loans that were arranged by the lead 
bank in the past three years. We include this variable in the model to see whether it affects 
our baseline results. The OLS regression results are reported in Table 4.9 Panel C. 
The coefficient estimates on the lending relationship measure are still statistically 
significant and economically important after we control for lead lender’s information about 




4.7.3. Additional Tests 
We execute a set of robustness tests to show that our core results on lending 
relationships do not capture spurious correlations. We focus on the magnitudes of primary 
market spread, offer price, and YTM adjustments and use the loan amount-based 
relationship measure, RelationAmt, as the lending relationship measure. The OLS 
regression results are presented in Table 4.10. 48 
We have three groups of robustness tests. First, many loan terms such as financial 
covenants are at the deal/package level. A facility-level analysis may produce relatively 
small standard errors and hence inflate statistical significance (Sufi (2007)). To ease this 
concern, we re-estimate Eq. (2) at the package level. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 4.10 Panel 
A indicate that the effects of lending relationships on primary market adjustments are 
robust. 
Second, because firm size is a key determinant of a firm’s information asymmetry, 
we control for the natural logarithm of firm sales in in Panel B.49 The sales variable is 
negatively associated with primary market adjustments, and its coefficients are statistically 
significant in Columns (1) and (2), suggesting that larger firms have less severe information 
asymmetry problems and their primary market adjustments are less. The coefficients on 
                                                     
48 The results are robust for the likelihood of primary market pricing adjustments and the 
number of days on market except that the effect of lending relationships on days on market 
is weak when controlling for firm fixed effects. The results are similar if we measure 
lending relationships based on number of loans. The results are also robust if we exclude 
142 loans issued during the sub-prime crisis (from July 2007 to April 2009). 
49 We use firm sales to control for the size effect as sales information is available for both 
public and private firms in DealScan. Note that we still have many missing values and a 
smaller sample when we control for sales. The correlation between sales and total assets 
for those firms that have information on both is 0.76, suggesting that sales is a good 




the lending relationship measure remain negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. 
Third, we re-estimate our baseline models by including borrower fixed effects in in 
Table 4.10 Panel C. Due to data availability, we are not able to control for many firm 
characteristics.50 Nevertheless, the estimations with borrower fixed effects help ease some 
concerns that firm characteristics, instead of borrowers’ lending relationships with the lead 
banks, are driving our early results. The coefficients on the lending relationship measure 
in all columns in Panel C remain negative and statistically significant, although the t-
statistics decrease due to the decreases of statistical power after adding firm fixed effects. 
4.7.4. Bank Mergers and Closures as Shocks to Lending Relationships 
One endogeneity concern for our lending relationship measures is the mutual 
selection between borrowers and lead lenders (Schwert (2018)). For example, a borrower 
of better quality may find it easier to establish a relationship with a bank of better reputation. 
Such a borrower of better quality suffers less information asymmetry problems, and its 
loan can be easier to price. Furthermore, a bank with a better reputation can provide 
stronger certification. As a result, the primary market adjustments for the loan in this 
example can be less. In other words, the mutual selection and matching between borrowing 
firms and banks may generate a negative association between lending relationships and 
loan primary market pricing adjustments that is unrelated to the lead bank’s information 
advantage as we posit. Although we find robust results after controlling for the borrower- 
and lead bank-fixed effects as well as the lead bank reputation, some unobserved time-
varying factors may still drive the matching between lead banks and firms. 
                                                     
50 As shown in Table 1, approximately half of the sample are loans issued by private firms, 




To address potential endogeneity concerns, we take advantage of bank closure and 
merger events as plausibly exogenous shocks to lending relationships and employ an IV 
approach. We compile a list of 215 bank closures and mergers from Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2010), Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), and Wang, Xie, and Zhang (2014) and cross-check 
them with the Thomson’s SDC M&A database. For each loan, we then construct a dummy 
variable, BankCMDummy, that equals one if the lead bank of the borrower’s previous loan 
that is immediately before the current loan experiences a merger or closure during the 
period between the previous and the current loans. We use BankCMDummy as an IV for 
our lending relationship measure, RelationAmt, in the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regressions. 
The variable BankCMDummy is relevant and exogenous for our empirical setup. 
Several studies have demonstrated that bank mergers and closures increase the probability 
of relationship termination (Sapienza (2002), Erel (2011), Degryse, Masschelein, and 
Mitchell (2011), and Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012)). At the same time, it is 
unlikely that banks’ merger or closure decisions are affected by any individual borrower. 
Therefore, both the inclusion and exclusion conditions of our IV are plausibly satisfied. 
We report the 2SLS regression results in Table 4.11. Panel A uses the full sample. 
The first stage regression in Column (1) shows that BankCMDummy is negatively 
associated with RelationAmt, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the instrumental variable is 
weak. This result suggests that the merger or closure of a lead bank increases the likelihood 




For the second stage regressions, we use the dummy variables for primary market 
adjustments, the magnitudes of the adjustments, and the number of days on market as the 
dependent variables. In Columns (2) to (4), the dependent variables are the three dummy 
variables for spread, offer price, and YTM changes, and we estimate an IV Probit model 
using maximum likelihood estimation. 51  The coefficients on PredRelationAmt, the 
instrumented measure for lending relationships, are all negative and statistically significant 
at the one percent level. The IV regression results are consistent with the baseline 
regressions as in Table 4.2 Panel A. 
In Columns (5) to (7), the dependent variables are the absolute values of spread, 
offer price, and YTM adjustments, and we estimate a regular 2SLS model. Again, 
consistent with the baseline results in Table 4.3, the 2SLS estimation results indicate that 
a stronger lending relationship is negatively associated with the magnitudes of spread, offer 
price, and YTM adjustments. The coefficients are all statistically significant at the one 
percent level. 
In Column (8), the dependent variable is the number of days on market. The 2SLS 
estimation of the coefficient on the lending relationship measure is negative and 
statistically significant at one percent level, consistent with the baseline regression results 
in Table 4.4. Overall, all the tests in Table 4.11 Panel A suggest that our core findings are 
not affected by potential endogeneity concerns.  
We then conduct two robustness tests of our IV strategy. In Table 4.11 Panel B, we 
re-estimate all the regressions in Panel A after excluding each borrower’s first loan. 
                                                     
51 We also use Newey's two-step method, an alternative estimation method for Probit 
model with continuous endogenous variables (Newey (1987)) and a regular 2SLS method. 




Because lending relationships are zero for both the first deals and the firms that switch to 
non-relationship lead banks, focusing on seasoned deals may more clearly identify the 
variation of lending relationships that results from the firm’s switching behavior. 
Nonetheless, we find that our results in Panel B are robust and similar to those in Panel A. 
In Table 4.11 Panel C, we exclude bank closures and use only bank mergers in 
constructing our IV and re-estimate all the regressions in Panel A. We do so for two reasons. 
First, it is possible that the failure of a relationship bank increases the market uncertainty 
about the borrower’s quality. The elevated uncertainty increases the need of adjustments 
on the next loan, and these adjustments are not due to relationship termination. Second, an 
IV without bank closures also confirms that bank mergers are associated with relationship 
changes, a result consistent with prior literature (e.g., Sapienza (2002), Erel (2011)). The 
2SLS results in Table 4.11 Panel C are again similar to those in Panel A, suggesting that 
only using bank consolidations to construct the IV is also supportive of our core results. 
4.8. Conclusion 
Lending relationships enable banks to reuse information from their interactions 
with borrowers in making future credit decisions. In this paper, we provide direct evidence 
on how lead banks use such information in more efficiently setting loan prices. Specifically, 
we find that loans experience fewer adjustments of interest spread, offer price, and YTM 
in the primary market and take less time to close when the lead bank has a stronger lending 
relationship with the borrower. We also find that a stronger relationship reduces loan 
underpricing. Furthermore, lending relationships affect syndicate structure – a stronger 
lending relationship between the lead and the borrower reduces the number of participant 




that have relationships with the lead. These findings shed new lights on important nuances 
in how information from lending relationships is used in loan pricing.  
The results also have implication for the originate-to-distribute (OTD) lending 
model, under which a lead bank acts as both the underwriter and a lender in a loan offering. 
How to understand this dual role of banks in the syndicated loan market becomes important 
for both regulators and practitioners. While there are concerns that loan syndications and 
the growth of loan securitization and loan sales in the secondary market might have 
moderated banks’ incentives to produce information and thus diminished the benefits of 
relationship lending, our findings show that relationship lending still adds value under the 
OTD model. The differential impact of banking relationships on loan pricing for cold 
versus hot loans also provides a richer understanding of the role of underwriters and 





Table 4.1.Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 4,891 institutional facilities (institutional term loans, or ITLs) from 2000 to 
2016. RelationAmt and RelationNum are measures for prior lending relationships between the borrower and the lead bank of an ITL. 
RelationAmt is calculated as the ratio of the total dollar amount of loans arranged by the lead bank to the borrowing firm in the past five 
years over the total dollar amount of loans issued by the borrower in the same period. RelationNum is defined in the same way except 
that we use number of loans instead of dollar amount. LeadPartRelation is the number of loans syndicated by the lead bank and 
participated in by the participate lender in the last five years divided by the total number of loans syndicated by the lead bank in the 
same period. When there are multiple participant lenders, we choose the highest value out of all participant lenders for LeadPartRelation. 
LeadConnectedPartRatio is the number of participants that participated in at least one loan arranged by the lead bank in the last five 
years divided by total number of participants in the syndicate of the current loan. FirmPartRelation is the total number of loans arranged 
by a participant lender for the borrowing firm in the last five years divided by the total number of loans issued by the borrowing firm in 
the same period. When there are multiple participant lenders, we choose the highest value of this measure out of all participant lenders. 
FirmConnectedPartRatio is the number of participants that have been the lead bank for at least one loan of the borrower in the last five 
years divided by total number of participants in the syndicate of the current loan. All the relationship variables are in percentages unless 
otherwise noted. For primary market price discovery for a loan, spread adjustment is the change in basis points (bps) from the initially 
proposed spread over LIBOR to the spread at loan close. AbsSpreadAdj is the absolute value of spread adjustments. 
SpreadAdjUp/SpreadAdjDown is the spread adjustment when it is positive/negative and zero otherwise. Offer price adjustment is the 
change from the initially proposed offer price to the final offer price at loan close. Offer prices are expressed as percentage of par value 
and offer price adjustments are reported in bps. We define AbsOfferPriceAdj, OfferPriceAdjUp, and OfferPriceAdjDown in the same 
way as those for spread adjustments. Yield to maturity (YTM) is an aggregate measure based on interest rate spread, offer price, loan 
maturity, and certain assumptions on prepayments. AbsYTMAdj is defined in the same way as the absolute values of spread and offer 
price adjustments. We use both price change and change in YTM to measure the underpricing of a loan. UnderpricingOP is defined as 
the change in bps from the final loan offer price to the break price when the loan starts trading on the secondary market. 
UnderpricingYTM is the change of the YTM from loan close to the implied YTM when the loan breaks into the secondary market. The 
other variable names are self-explanatory, and detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix B. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the one percent level. 





RelationAmt (%) 4,852 26.251 39.094 0.000 0.000 52.687 
RelationNum (%) 4,852 26.070 38.436 0.000 0.000 50.000 
LeadPartRelation (%) 4,318 12.659 9.898 5.028 10.613 17.808 
LeadConnectedPartRatio (%) 4,318 62.720 33.131 40.000 66.667 100.000 
FirmPartRelation (%) 4,318 9.684 25.402 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FirmConnectedPartRatio (%) 4,318 5.754 16.448 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
AbsSpreadAdj (bps) 4,890 17.292 26.310 0.000 0.000 25.000 
AbsOfferPriceAdj (bps) 2,760 32.020 64.611 0.000 0.000 50.000 
AbsYTMAdj (bps) 2,570 34.915 43.241 1.000 19.350 51.900 
SpreadAdjUp (bps) 4,890 9.437 19.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SpreadAdjDown (bps) 4,890 -7.497 19.978 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OfferPriceAdjUp (bps) 2,760 11.426 22.941 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OfferPriceAdjDown (bps) 2,760 -20.305 63.681 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UnderpricingOP (bps) 2,664 77.839 43.062 50.000 75.000 100.000 
UnderpricingYTM (bps) 3,211 -20.033 19.416 -22.700 -15.200 -9.900 
       
DaysOnMarket 4,891 22.085 13.431 14.000 20.000 28.000 
LeadMkshare 4,852 4.069 4.716 0.576 2.085 5.255 
TotalSales ($Million) 2,758 2,052.554 4,139.489 260.200 621.893 1,764.160 
LoanAmt ($Million) 4,891 427.217 480.148 140.000 260.000 500.000 
Maturity (years) 4,827 6.010 1.100 5.400 6.000 7.000 
PublicDum 4,891 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SponsorDum 4,891 0.635 0.481 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PrepayDum 4,891 0.532 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
InterestFloorDum 4,891 0.530 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
RefinancingDum 4,891 0.384 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SecuredDum 4,891 0.965 0.185 1.000 1.000 1.000 







Table 4.2.Lead-Borrower Lending Relationships and the Likelihood of Primary Market Pricing Adjustments 
 
In Panel A, we report the estimations of marginal effects from Probit regressions on how the lead-borrower lending relationship for a 
loan affects the probability of adjustments of its pricing terms in the primary market. We do not include fixed effects in Panel A due to 
potential estimation bias. The sample consists of 4,891 ITLs that have information on primary market pricing adjustments. The numbers 
of observations vary across different regressions due to missing values. We report the estimations of linear probability models with 
various fixed effects in Panel B. The sample in Panel B has fewer observations because singleton observations are dropped when 
estimating robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. The dependent variables are DumSpreadAdj, 
DumOfferPriceAdj, and DumYTMAdj. DumSpreadAdj is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan’s interest rate spread is adjusted 
in the primary market and zero otherwise. DumOfferPriceAdj is a dummy variable that equals one if offer price is adjusted in the primary 
market and zero otherwise. DumYTMAdj is a dummy variable that equals one if changes in YTM are observed in the primary market 
and zero otherwise. Note that YTM changes reflect adjustments in interest rate spread, offer price, or both. RelationAmt/RelationNum 
is the total amount/number of loans arranged by the lead arranger to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total 
amount/number of loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. Other variables are defined in the Appendix B. We report the z-
statistics in the parentheses below the marginal effects in Panel A and report the t-statistics in Panel B. We calculate the z- and t-statistics 
using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. Log likelihood ratios for the Probit regressions are also reported. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Marginal Effects of Probit Model    
  DumSpreadAdj DumOfferPriceAdj DumYTMAdj 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RelationAmt -0.082***  -0.079***  -0.090***  
 (-3.873)  (-2.925)  (-3.557)  
RelationNum  -0.076***  -0.069***  -0.079*** 
  (-3.698)  (-2.770)  (-3.405) 
LeadMkshare -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.813) (-0.848) (1.262) (1.220) (0.847) (0.800) 
Log (LoanAmt) 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.014 0.014 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (10.666) (10.704) (1.259) (1.214) (7.405) (7.395) 
Log (Maturity) 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 







PublicDum -0.009 -0.010 0.023 0.022 -0.005 -0.007 
 (-0.478) (-0.527) (1.576) (1.473) (-0.332) (-0.425) 
SponsorDum -0.032** -0.032** 0.002 0.002 -0.022 -0.022 
 (-2.260) (-2.269) (0.097) (0.104) (-1.092) (-1.073) 
PrepayDum 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 
 (3.879) (3.879) (3.451) (3.444) (4.286) (4.276) 
InterestFloorDum -0.024 -0.025 -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.073** -0.075** 
 (-1.016) (-1.042) (-5.415) (-5.355) (-2.225) (-2.398) 
RefinancingDum -0.151*** -0.153*** -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.123*** -0.126*** 
 (-10.836) (-11.161) (-9.368) (-9.469) (-7.119) (-7.216) 
SecuredDum 0.095** 0.095** 0.073 0.072 0.074 0.074 
 (2.477) (2.454) (1.533) (1.517) (1.502) (1.489) 
CovLiteDum -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.010 
 (-5.942) (-5.981) (-0.575) (-0.594) (-0.602) (-0.630) 
       
Observations 4,788 4,788 2,735 2,735 2,553 2,553 
Log-Likelihood -3,021 -3,023 -1,713 -1,715 -1,313 -1,315 
 
Panel B: Linear Probability Model     
  DumSpreadAdj DumOfferPriceAdj DumYTMAdj 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RelationAmt -0.059***  -0.053  -0.068**  
 (-2.617)  (-1.611)  (-2.198)  
RelationNum  -0.051**  -0.050  -0.061** 
  (-2.280)  (-1.555)  (-2.037) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 4,689 4,689 2,669 2,669 2,500 2,500 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.126 0.125 0.111 0.111 0.109 0.108 
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Table 4.3.Lead-Borrower Lending Relationships and the Magnitude of Primary 
Market Pricing Adjustments 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the effects of lead-borrower banking 
relationships on the magnitudes of pricing adjustments in the primary market. The sample 
includes observations with non-zero pricing adjustments. The dependent variable of 
Columns (1) and (2) is the absolute value of interest rate spread adjustments. The dependent 
variable of Columns (3) and (4) is the absolute value of offer price adjustments. The 
dependent variable of Columns (5) and (6) is the absolute value of YTM adjustments. 
RelationAmt/RelationNum is the total amount/number of loans arranged by the lead bank 
to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount/number of loans issued 
by the borrower in the last five years. OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log 
(LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, 
RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions of all the 
control variables are in the Appendix B. T-statistics below the coefficient estimates are 
calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-
tailed test. 
  AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















  (-5.820)  (-4.204)  (-4.385) 
OtherControl
s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,919 1,919 1,109 1,109 1,038 1,038 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating 
FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.167 0.168 0.107 0.107 0.176 0.177 
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Table 4.4.Lead-Borrower Lending Relationships and Syndication Duration 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the effects of lead-borrower banking 
relationships on syndication duration (days on the market). The sample consists of 4,690 
ITLs that have information on primary market pricing adjustments and have non-missing 
values for regression variables. DaysOnMarket is the number of days from the launch date 
of a loan to the close date. RelationAmt/RelationNum is the total amount/number of loans 
arranged by the lead bank to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total 
amount/number of loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. In Columns (3) and 
(4), RelationAmt and RelationNum are in decimals for the ease of presenting their 
coefficient estimates. The definitions of all the control variables are in the Appendix B. 
The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  DaysOnMarket Log (1+DaysOnMarket) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
RelationAmt -0.019***  -0.083***  
 (-3.632)  (-3.063)  
RelationNum  -0.017***  -0.077*** 
  (-3.004)  (-2.806) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 4,690 4,690 4,690 4,690 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 4.5.Cross-sectional Variations of the Impact of Lending Relationships on Primary Market Price Discovery 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the differential effects of lead-borrower lending relationships on primary market 
adjustments and days on market for opaque and transparent firms. In Panel A, we split the sample into private vs. public firms. We 
classify a firm as being public if a loan issuer can be matched with Compustat. In Panel B, we separate the sample by whether the loan 
is rated by S&P. The dependent variables are the absolute values of pricing adjustments and syndicate duration. RelationAmt is the total 
dollar amount of loans arranged by the lead arranger to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount of loans issued by 
the borrower in the last five years. In Columns (7) and (8), RelationAmt is in decimals for the ease of presenting their coefficient estimates. 
OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log (LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, 
RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions of the control variables are in the Appendix B. The Wald 
test results for the coefficient estimate differences (left - right) between the two sub-samples for each pair are reported in the last row. 
The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank 
and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Private vs. Public       
  AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj Log (1+DaysOnMarket) 
 Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RelationAmt -0.086*** -0.038*** -0.148*** -0.065** -0.140*** -0.046 -0.145*** -0.022 
 (-6.000) (-3.250) (-3.593) (-2.170) (-5.251) (-1.601) (-2.964) (-0.670) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,328 2,332 1,489 1,153 1,411 1,072 2,329 2,332 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.099 0.135 0.202 0.157 0.211 0.141 0.156 
Wald Difference -0.048*** -0.083* -0.094*** -0.123** 
 






  AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj Log(1+DaysOnMarket) 
 Non-Rate Rate Non-Rate Rate Non-Rate Rate Non-Rate Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RelationAmt -0.080*** -0.049*** -0.219* -0.115*** -0.204*** -0.091*** -0.158** -0.071** 
 (-3.484) (-3.778) (-1.947) (-4.566) (-3.832) (-3.976) (-2.331) (-2.544) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 932 3,720 286 2,360 243 2,242 933 3,720 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.144 0.136 0.148 0.149 0.141 0.192 0.149 0.140 







Table 4.6.Lead-Borrower Lending Relationships and Loan Underpricing 
 
This table presents the results on the effects of lead-borrower lending relationships on loan underpricing. The dependent variables are 
UnderpricingOP and UnderpricingYTM. UnderpricingOP is the change from offer price to break price in basis points. The offer price 
for a loan is the price at which the loan is closed. The break price is the first trade price when the loan breaks into the secondary market. 
UnderpricingYTM is the change from primary YTM to secondary break YTM. Primary YTM is the implied YTM based on the loan 
close price. Secondary break YTM is the implied YTM based on the break price. RelationAmt/RelationNum is the total amount/number 
of loans arranged by the lead arranger to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount/number of loans issued by the 
borrower in the last five years. SpreadAdjUp/SpreadAdjDown is the spread adjustment when it is positive/negative and zero otherwise. 
OfferPriceAdjUp and OfferPriceAdjDown are defined similarly. OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log (LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), 
PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions 
of the control variables are in the Appendix B. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  UnderpricingOfferPrice   UnderpricingYTM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RelationAmt -0.071***  -0.070***   0.007  0.018***  
 (-3.306)  (-3.603)   (0.617)  (2.905)  
RelationNum  -0.054**  -0.049***   0.001  0.012** 
  (-2.621)  (-2.686)   (0.116)  (2.196) 
SpreadAdjUp   0.203*** 0.204***    -0.049*** -0.049*** 
   (4.137) (4.153)    (-4.087) (-4.103) 
SpreadAdjDown   -0.036 -0.038    0.002 0.003 
   (-0.526) (-0.552)    (0.109) (0.135) 
OfferPriceAdjUp   0.199*** 0.199***    -0.044*** -0.044*** 
   (5.302) (5.309)    (-4.768) (-4.772) 
OfferPriceAdjDown   -0.053*** -0.054***    0.027*** 0.027*** 
   (-2.795) (-2.833)    (3.282) (3.309) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,586 2,586 2,259 2,259  3,118 3,118 2,239 2,239 






Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 4.7.Lead-Borrower Lending Relationships and Price Discovery of Cold and Hot Loans 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the differential effects of lending relationships on primary market price discovery for 
cold versus hot loans. We define cold loans as loans with positive primary market YTM adjustments. Note that positive YTM 
adjustments reflect an increase of the interest rate spread or a decrease of the offer price or both for a loan. Such changes reflect weak 
demand for the loan. Similarly, hot loans are loans with negative adjustments in YTM, reflecting strong demand. In Panel A, the 
dependent variables are the absolute values of pricing adjustments and syndicate duration. In Panel B, the dependent variables are 
UnderpricingOP and UnderpricingYTM. UnderpricingOP is the change from offer price to break price in basis points. The offer price 
for a loan is the price at which the loan is closed. The break price is the first trade price when the loan breaks into the secondary market. 
UnderpricingYTM is the change from primary YTM to secondary break YTM. Primary YTM is the implied YTM at the close price, and 
secondary break YTM is the implied YTM at the break price. RelationAmt is the total amount of loans arranged by the lead arranger to 
the borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount of loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. In Panel A Columns 
(7) and (8), RelationAmt is in decimals for the ease of presenting their coefficient estimates. OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log 
(LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, 
and Constant. The definitions of the control variables are in the Appendix B. The Wald test results for the coefficient estimate differences 
(left - right) between two sub-samples for each pair of columns are reported in the last row. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Adjustments and Days on Market      
  AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj Log (1+DaysOnMarket) 
 Cold Hot Cold Hot Cold Hot Cold Hot 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RelationAmt -0.106** 0.009 -0.218*** -0.024 -0.174*** 0.006 -0.118 -0.006 
 (-2.369) (0.553) (-2.739) (-1.234) (-3.096) (0.250) (-1.358) (-0.151) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 707 1,153 705 1,149 707 1,153 707 1,153 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.140 0.176 0.132 0.220 0.199 0.176 0.199 
Wald Difference -0.097*** -0.194** -0.168*** -0.112* 
 
Panel B: Underpricing     
 UnderpricingOP UnderpricingYTM 
 Cold Hot Cold Hot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
RelationAmt -0.080 -0.068*** 0.018 0.017*** 
 (-1.314) (-2.835) (1.136) (2.781) 
SpreadAdjUp 0.163** 0.276*** -0.040* -0.064*** 
 (2.259) (3.242) (-1.933) (-3.101) 
SpreadAdjDown -0.032 -0.557*** 0.006 0.104*** 
 (-0.381) (-4.603) (0.291) (3.824) 
OfferPriceAdjUp -0.014 0.081* 0.032 -0.018* 
 (-0.114) (1.844) (0.745) (-1.679) 
OfferPriceAdjDown -0.083*** 0.105 0.029*** -0.028 
 (-2.773) (0.187) (3.493) (-0.217) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 623 1,072 623 1,072 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.274 0.368 0.440 







Table 4.8.Lead-Borrower Lending Relationships and Syndicate Structure 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the effects of lending relationships on the use of participant lenders. The dependent 
variable of Columns (1) and (2) is LeadPartRelation, a proxy for the relationship strength between the lead bank and the participant 
lenders of a syndicated loan. We define LeadPartRelation as the total number of loans participated in by the participant lender and 
arranged by the lead bank in the last five years divided by the total number of loans arranged by the lead lender in the last five years. 
When there are multiple participant lenders, we choose the highest value of the measure of all participant lenders. The dependent variable 
of Columns (3) and (4) is LeadConnectedPartRatio, the number of participants that participated in at least one loan arranged by the lead 
bank divided by the total number of participants in the syndicate of the current loan. The dependent variable of Columns (5) and (6) is 
FirmPartRelation, a proxy for the relationship strength between the borrowing firm and the participant lenders of a syndicated loan. 
FirmPartRelation is the total number of loans arranged by a participant lender for the borrower in the last five years divided by the total 
number of loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. When there are multiple participant lenders, we choose the highest value 
of this measure out of all participant lenders. The dependent variable of Columns (7) and (8) is FirmConnectedPartRatio, the number 
of participants that have been the lead bank for at least one loan of the borrowing firm divided by total number of participants in the 
current syndicate. RelationAmt is the total amount of loans arranged by the lead bank to the borrower in the last five years divided by 
the total amount of loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. RelationNum is defined in the same way as RelationAmt except 
that we replace loan amounts with the number of loans. OtherControls includes Log (LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), PublicDum, 
SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions of the 
control variables are in the Appendix B. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  LeadPartRelation LeadConnectedPartRatio FirmPartRelation FirmConnectedPartRatio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RelationAmt 0.005  0.036***  -0.084***  -0.030***  
 (1.064)  (2.979)  (-6.793)  (-5.080)  
RelationNum  0.007  0.040***  -0.078***  -0.017** 
  (1.510)  (2.968)  (-6.190)  (-2.002) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         







Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Table 4.9.Alternative Explanation: Self-certification and Information on Demand 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results that exclude the explanations of self-certification and lead bank’s information on demand. 
The dependent variables, as indicated at the top of each column, are the absolute values of spread, offer price, and YTM adjustments. 
RelationAmt is the total amount of loans arranged by the lead bank to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount of 
loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. In Panel A, we exclude first deals for each borrower. In Panel B, Log (1+PriorLoans) 
is the natural logarithm value of one plus the number of prior loans before the current loan of a borrower. In Panel C, Log 
(1+SecuritizedLoans) is the natural logarithm value of one plus the number of securitized loans that were arranged by the lead bank in 
the past three years. OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log (LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, 
InterestFloorDum, RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions of the control variables are in the 
Appendix B. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates in all models are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a 
two-tailed test. 
  Panel A: Excluding First Deals   Panel B: Controlling for Prior Loans 
 AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj  AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
RelationAmt -0.046*** -0.079*** -0.081***  -0.035*** -0.078*** -0.059*** 
 (-3.941) (-3.149) (-3.898)  (-3.031) (-2.971) (-2.796) 
Log (1+PriorLoans)     -5.102*** -12.169*** -11.197*** 
     (-5.916) (-5.335) (-6.896) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,633 2,132 2,024  4,689 2,669 2,500 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.122 0.168   0.131 0.150 0.192 
 







 AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj 
 (1) (2) (3) 
RelationAmt -0.044*** -0.098** -0.084*** 
 (-3.021) (-2.467) (-3.436) 
Log (1+SecuritizedLoans) -1.989* -1.159 -3.875 
 (-1.790) (-0.287) (-1.608) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,561 1,821 1,753 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4.10.Additional Tests 
 
This table presents the results for several robustness checks. The dependent variables, as indicated at the top of each column, are the 
absolute values of spread, offer price, and YTM adjustments. RelationAmt is the total amount of loans arranged by the lead bank to the 
borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount of loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. Log (TotalSales) is the 
natural logarithm of firm sales when the loan is issued. OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log (LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), 
PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions 
of the control variables are in the Appendix B. We report three groups of robustness checks in Panels A, B, and C, and each group 
includes three regressions with the three adjustment variables as the dependent variables. In Panel A, we run the regressions at the deal 
package level instead of the facility level. We control for sales of the borrower in Panel B. In Panel C, borrower fixed effects are also 
included. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates in all models are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a 
two-tailed test. 
  Panel A: Deal Level  Panel B: Controlling for Sales 
 AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj  AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj 
  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
RelationAmt -0.069*** -0.164*** -0.139***  -0.051*** -0.174*** -0.147*** 
 (-6.606) (-4.554) (-5.830)  (-4.148) (-3.145) (-4.117) 
Log (TotalSales)     -0.994* -5.118** -2.242 
     (-1.860) (-2.150) (-1.363) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,491 2,436 2,253  2,697 1,051 932 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.154 0.177  0.115 0.212 0.235 
 







 AbsSpreadAdj AbsOfferPriceAdj AbsYTMAdj 
  (1) (2) (3) 
RelationAmt -0.048** -0.104* -0.073* 
 (-2.543) (-1.842) (-1.797) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,788 2,735 2,553 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower FEs Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4.11.Instrumental Variable (IV) Regressions 
 
This table presents the 2SLS regression results using bank closures and mergers as the IV. In Panel A, the full sample is included in the 
regressions. In Panel B, we exclude the first deal of each borrower from the sample. In Panel C we exclude bank closures in the 
construction of the IV. For all the panels, the first-stage regression results are reported in Column (1), and the dependent variable is 
RelationAmt, the total amount of loans arranged by the lead bank to the borrower in the last five years divided by the total amount of 
loans issued by the borrower in the last five years. In Panels A and B, BankCMDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 
issued immediately after the lead arranger in the previous loan by the same borrower is closed or merged, and zero otherwise. In Panel 
C, we exclude bank closures, and BankCMDummy equals one if a loan is issued immediately after the lead arranger in the previous loan 
by the same borrower experiences a merger, and zero otherwise. The second stage regression results are reported in Columns (2) through 
(5). The dependent variables in Columns (2) to (4) are the absolute values of spread, offer price, and YTM adjustments, respectively. In 
Column (5), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm value of one plus the number of days from the launch to the completion 
dates. RelationAmt in Column (5) is in decimal for the ease of presenting the coefficient estimate. PredRelationAmt is the predicted 
value of lending relationship from the first stage regression. OtherControls includes LeadMkshare, Log (LoanAmt), Log (Maturity), 
PublicDum, SponsorDum, PrepayDum, InterestFloorDum, RefinancingDum, SecuredDum, CovLiteDum, and Constant. The definitions 
of the control variables are in the Appendix B. The t/z-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates in all models are 
calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank and firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Full Sample       
 First Stage  Second Stage 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
BankCMDummy -12.461***      
 (-6.250)      
PredRelationAmt   -0.550*** -1.003* -0.787*** -0.870*** 
   (-4.973) (-1.974) (-2.952) (-3.082) 
OtherControls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 4,690  4,689 2,669 2,500 4,690 
Year/Industry/Arranger/SP Rating/Purpose FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Log-likelihood       
Weak Instrument Cragg-Donald Wald F 49.300      
Under-identification Kleibergen-Paap LM 8.542      
F-statistics     21.700 24.410 2,041.000 2.625 
 
Panel B: Exclude First Deals       
 First Stage  Second Stage 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BankCMDummy -10.440***      
 (-4.921)      
PredRelationAmt   -0.578*** -1.172* -0.853** -1.242*** 
   (-3.125) (-1.707) (-2.359) (-3.109) 
OtherControls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,634  3,633 2,132 2,024 3,634 
Year FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.185      
Log-likelihood       
Weak Instrument Cragg-Donald Wald F 21.630      
Under-identification Kleibergen-Paap LM 8.073      
F-statistics     198.900 74.540 96.510 10.590 
 
Panel C: Exclude Bank Closures in IV       
 First Stage  Second Stage 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BankCMDummy -11.449***      
 (-5.207)      






   
(-4.868) (-1.631) (-2.867) (-2.675) 
OtherControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,537  4,536 2,614 2,464 4,537 
Year FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arranger FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP Rating FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.194      
Log-likelihood       
Weak Instrument Cragg-Donald Wald F 39.420      
Under-identification Kleibergen-Paap LM 6.903      





Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank52 
 
Over the past two decades, public corporations in the U.S. have borrowed 
frequently from their competitors’ banks in the loan market. As shown in Figure 5.1, about 
40% of the firms share lenders with their industry peers in 2016. This pattern is in sharp 
contrast to the findings in equity and bond underwriting where issuers tend to avoid sharing 
investment banks with their product market competitors (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010)). 
Why do borrowers share lenders with their industry competitors given the threat of 
information leakage? A growing literature has been debating on the potential impact of 
common institutional ownership on product market competition (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Hirst (2017), He and Huang (2017), Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2017), Azar, Schmalz, 
and Tecu (2018), Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (2018), and Lewellen and Lowry (2019)). 
Borrowing from a competitor’s bank means that the firm and its competitor are partially 
connected via the common lender. Is there a similar anti-competition effect when firms 
borrow from common lenders? In this paper, we aim to understand why firms borrow from 
their competitors’ banks. 
Theory does not provide clear guidance as to why a firm may or may not share a 
bank with its industry competitors. We have three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is the 
                                                     




Information Leakage Hypothesis. Borrowing from a competitor’s bank raises the concern 
that the bank might share important inside information with the competitor, intentionally 
or accidentally. This information leakage, especially when the information is regarding the 
borrower’s ongoing projects, can attract unwanted strategic competitions from the 
competitor. For example, a new product may not gain the expected market share due to the 
introduction of close substitutes by competitors that get product information from common 
lenders. In this sense, a borrower might be reluctant to share common lenders with industry 
competitors. As documented by Asker and Ljungqvist (2010), firms’ concern about the 
leakage of confidential information to strategic rivals affects investment bank choices in 
securities underwriting. The reluctance to share underwriters reduces the pool of available 
investment banks that a firm can choose from, giving rise to a hold-up problem. Expecting 
this, the underwriter charges a higher service fee. If the Information Leakage Hypothesis 
dominates, a similar hold-up problem would also arise, and we would observe greater 
borrowing costs when industry peers have to use common lenders.  
We have two competing hypotheses as to why industry peers may use common 
lenders. The first one is the Monitoring Hypothesis. Borrowing from a competitor’s bank 
can facilitate information production, which renders the bank an informational advantage. 
Such an informational advantage can mitigate conflicts of interest between the managers 
of the firm and the lenders and those between the shareholders and the creditors.  
The agency conflicts between firm managers and lenders arise due to possible 
hidden actions of the managers. The inability of investors to verify the efforts of a manager 
leads to moral hazard problems - the manager can appropriate private benefits at the cost 




likely to have a better understanding about the product market conditions, such as evolving 
consumer and supplier preferences, regulatory requirements, and product innovations.53 
Such information enables the lender to better assess the manager’s efforts, which reduces 
the lender’s monitoring cost. 
The shareholder-creditor agency conflicts lead to risk-shifting concerns for 
creditors after a loan contract has been signed. Shareholders have an incentive to pursue 
riskier projects because of the option nature of a firm’s equity (Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Myers (1977)). With lending experience to a borrower’s industry competitors, the bank 
can more easily renegotiate with the borrowing firm regarding cash flow and control rights. 
Also, previous lending experience in the same industry can increase the credibility of the 
lender’s liquidation threats, which mitigates the shareholders’ risk-shifting incentives after 
the borrower gets the loan (Gorton and Kahl (2000)). Therefore, borrowing from a 
competitor’ bank might facilitate the renegotiations between lenders and shareholders, 
which also lowers the cost of bank monitoring.  
The second hypothesis for the use of common lenders is the Collusion Hypothesis. 
When the bank knows more about a borrower via previous lending experience to the 
borrower’s industry competitors, the bank gains more bargaining power against both the 
firm manager and shareholders (Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)). The bank may intervene 
in the firm’s corporate strategies so long as intervention maximizes the bank’s private 
benefits. To the extent that a fierce competition increases the default risk of all the 
                                                     
53 For example, in the industry expertise section on the website of J.P. Morgan Chase, it 
states that “Our financial experts leverage their in-depth knowledge of current trends, 
challenges and opportunities in your industry to provide customized financial solutions to 





competing borrowers and hence the risk exposure of the bank as a common lender, the 
bank has an incentive to persuade competing borrowers to collude. It is worthwhile 
stressing that informational advantage and the consequently enhanced bargaining power is 
key for the bank to exert influences on borrowers’ corporate strategies. This is different 
from the limited liability effect of debt in a firm’s competing strategies where information 
does not play a role (Brander and Lewis (1986) and Saidi and Streitz (2019)). 
Both the Monitoring Hypothesis and the Collusion Hypothesis suggest that industry 
peers can enjoy lower borrowing costs when they share common lenders. A decrease in 
monitoring costs enables a bank to potentially charge a lower rate. A common lender’s 
information advantage and its mitigation effect on agency problems can make a loan less 
risky. Potential collusions among borrowers of the same bank can also make loans less 
risky. However, these two hypotheses have opposite implications on a firm’s product 
market behavior and competing strategy when it shares a common lender with an industry 
peer. We examine product market outcomes to distinguish the two hypotheses.  
We find that borrowing from a competitor’s bank reduces loan spreads by 11.14 
basis points (bps). Conditional on firms that switch banks, switching to a competitor’s bank 
lowers loan spreads by 17.42 bps. The evidence is not supportive of the Information 
Leakage Hypothesis. 
To shed further light on the Monitoring and Collusion Hypotheses, we conduct a 
rich set of cross-sectional analysis on the impact of common lenders on loan spreads. Bank 
monitoring involves a trade-off between the expected gains and costs. Loans with fewer 
participant lenders have less severe free-riding issues, so lead banks in these loans have a 




gain will be greater when the firm value is more likely to go below the debt principal, or 
when the firm has a higher default risk. 
Besides, if a borrower’s business has a higher similarity with its competitors, the 
bank’s lending experience with those competitors would be more applicable, which makes 
monitoring much easier and reduces expected monitoring costs. 
Our cross-sectional results show that common lenders have a stronger negative 
impact on loan spreads when fewer lenders participate in the syndicate of a loan, when the 
borrower has higher default risk, and when the business of the borrower is more similar to 
that of its industry peers. That is, when the competitor’s bank has a stronger incentive to 
monitor or coordinate between its two borrowers, borrowing from the bank has a more 
pronounced impact on loan spreads. 
To differentiate between ex ante and ex-post implications of the Monitoring 
Hypothesis and distinguish the Monitoring Hypothesis from the Collusion Hypothesis, we 
study how borrowing from a competitor’s bank affects loan arrangement upon syndication 
and loan amendments afterwards. We find that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is 
associated with lower lead share and lower syndicate concentration. This is consistent with 
the idea that lead bank’s commitment to monitoring becomes more credible when it knows 
more about the borrower. Participant lenders thus allow the lead bank to retain a lower loan 
share. This result is consistent with Huang, Zhang, and Zhao (2018) that the lead bank’s 
informational advantage due to its relationships with the borrower does not create agency 
conflicts between the lead bank and participant lenders in the syndicated loan market. We 




are more consistent with the potential benefits due to the lead bank’s information advantage 
and hence are more supportive of the Monitoring Hypothesis.  
Furthermore, controlling for borrower risk, loans arranged by a competitor’s bank 
experience more frequent amendments. Loan amendments with a competitor’s bank being 
the lead also involve a greater number of loan terms being amended, and such amendments 
often involve especially loan prices and financial covenants. These results suggest that, 
with previous lending experience to the borrower’s industry competitors, a bank becomes 
more sensitive to the arrival of firm-specific new information or industry-level shocks, so 
loan terms are more likely to be amended. Again, these results are more consistent with the 
information advantage of a common lender and are more supportive of the Monitoring 
Hypothesis.  
Finally, we investigate the impact of borrowing from a competitor’ s bank on firm’s 
profitability and competing strategies. We find that firms that borrow from their 
competitors’ banks, relative to firms that borrow from other banks, experience greater 
increases in their profitability after they get the loans. To further identify whether the 
improved firm performance is attributed to post-borrowing monitoring of the lead banks, 
we examine firm performance around covenant violations when corporate control rights 
temporarily shift to creditors. We find that firm profitability increases even more after 
covenant violations for firms borrowing from their competitors’ banks. 
The improvement of firm performance can be attributed to either bank monitoring 
or firm collusion, or both, so the evidence on profitability cannot tell the difference between 
bank monitoring and borrower collusion. To distinguish the two hypotheses, we analyze 




expenditures to see whether a competitor’s bank reduces competition. We find that 
borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated with faster market share growth for all 
industries and faster sales growth for more competitive industries. Firms also increase 
R&D expenditures after they receive funds from competitors’ banks, especially in more 
competitive industries. These results cannot be reconciled with the collusion evidence 
documented by Saidi and Streitz (2019) that industries with a higher chance to share 
common lenders have a higher markup and a lower output. Instead, our results suggest that 
the Monitoring Hypothesis likely dominates.  
Furthermore, we find that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated with 
greater loan amounts and longer loan maturities, indicating that a common lender is more 
likely to maintain a longer relationship with a borrower when it has lent to the borrower’s 
industry competitors before. A relationship bank is more likely to support a borrower when 
the borrower is in distress. Our results on loan amount and maturity suggest that bank 
monitoring and an expected long-term relationship with a common lender enables a firm 
to compete more aggressively (e.g., acquire market share, boost sales by promotion, or 
invest in R&D to differentiate products from others), not collude, with its industry peers. 
This paper has several contributions. First, we document that, different from issuers 
in the securities issuance, borrowers in the syndicated loan market frequently share lenders 
with their industry competitors. This sheds new light on the difference between informed 
and arm’s length transactions. Relative to arm’s length transactions, information in the loan 
market is more likely to be proprietary and cannot be credibly transmitted to others (Fama 
(1985), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Boot (2000), Farinha and Santos (2002), Guiso and 




proprietary nature of bank lending makes building relationships more important and thus 
reduces the risk of information spillover. As Dang, Gorton, Holmstrom, and Ordonez (2017) 
put, “[B]anks provide private money because they can keep the information that they 
produce about backing assets secret.” Our paper complements the study of Asker and 
Ljungqvist (2010) by showing that the possibility of information spillover should also 
depend on the nature of information and who possesses it. 
Second, a growing literature has been debating on the potential impact of common 
shareholders on industry competition (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst (2017), He and Huang 
(2017), Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2017), Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2018), Dennis, 
Gerardi, and Schenone (2018), and Lewellen and Lowry (2019)). A recent paper by Saidi 
and Streitz (2019), to which our paper is most related, finds that a higher bank’s market 
share leads to a lower average loan spread. Together with their industry-level evidence on 
markups, they suggest that bank’ product market concentration can reduce industry 
competition. Our paper joins the debate on connected firms by highlighting the 
informational advantage that a bank preserves by lending to competing firms. The 
informational advantage facilitates bank monitoring but does not hurt consumer welfare by 
promoting collusion. 
Third, the literature suggests that a firm might switch to a more reputable bank to 
enjoy higher-quality services (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) and Fernando, 
Gatchev, and Spindt (2005)), to a new bank to avoid monopoly rents (Greenbaum, Kanatas, 
and Venezia (1989) and Ongena and Smith (2001)), and to public lenders to graduate from 




also switch to their product market competitors’ banks to reduce bonding costs ex ante and 
enjoy enhanced bank monitoring ex-post. 
Lastly, literature has been investigating how the trade-off between specialization 
and diversification affects bank’s risk exposure and stock returns (Winton (1999), Acharya, 
Hasan, and Saunders (2006), and Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2010)). However, we have 
little understanding of how this trade-off might manifest on the borrower side. Our paper 
shows that specialization can improve a bank’s industry expertise, which facilitates 
monitoring and reduces the borrowing cost of firms. In this regard, our paper also 
contributes to the literature that stresses the importance of industry expertise of CEOs 
(Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013)), boards of directors (Wang, Xie, and Zhu (2013)), 
financial analysts (Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2014)), and M&A advisors (Wang, Xie, 
and Zhang (2014)). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes sample 
construction and summary statistics. Section 3 contrasts the Monitoring Hypothesis with 
the Information Leakage Hypothesis. Section 4 differentiates between the Monitoring 
Hypothesis and the Collusion Hypothesis. Section 5 implements instrumental variable 
regressions to address potential endogeneity issues. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
5.1. Data and Sample 
5.1.1. Sample Construction 
We start the sample construction from 323,167 loan facilities from 1981 to 2016 in 
the Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database. We exclude loans that are not 
syndicated in the U.S. Following Jiang, Li, and Shao (2010), we exclude bankers’ 




trade letter of credits, multi-option facilities, and other or undisclosed loans, yielding 
137,024 facilities. We need to know the lead bank(s) in a loan syndication and the four-
digit SIC code of the borrower to identify competitors, so facilities with missing lead banks 
or SIC codes are excluded. This decreases the sample size to 51,077 facilities. 
Among these facilities, we successfully identify 49,611 loans to be borrowed either 
from competitors’ banks or not from competitors’ banks.54 To control for borrower’s risk 
profile, we match the loan sample with Compustat to extract borrower financial 
information. This excludes private firms and reduces the sample to 21,072 loan facilities.55 
We also drop 2,951 loans with missing information on pricing terms such as interest rate 
spread, maturity, and amount. The final sample consists of 18,121 loans that are borrowed 
by public corporations from 1989 to 2016. 
5.1.2. Definitions of Competitors and Explanatory Variables 
Following recent literature on the interaction between corporate finance and 
product market competition (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010), Fresard (2010), Hadlock and 
Sonti (2012), and He and Huang (2017)), we define competitors as firms in the same four-
digit SIC code as the borrower.56 
The main explanatory variable is CompetitorBankDummy, a dummy variable that 
equals one if at least one of the lead lenders in a syndicated loan has lent to the borrower’s 
competitors within three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. In addition to 
                                                     
54 Some of the facilities do not have facility start dates, so the number is smaller than 51,077. 
55 We run an out-of-sample test using private firms in Column (2) of Panel A in Table 3.3. 
The results are robust and a little stronger. Private firms have more severe information 
asymmetry problems, and the stronger effect with private firms is consistent with the 
Monitoring Hypothesis. 
56 The results are robust if we use three-digit SIC codes and Fama-French 48 industries to 




the dummy variable, we also construct another four continuous measures to capture 
different features of the loans arranged by a competitor’s bank.  
NumCompetitorBank is the number of lead banks in a loan that have lent to the 
borrower’s competitors within three years. NumPeers is the number of competitors that the 
lead bank in a loan has lent to within three years before the current loan. When there are 
multiple lead banks, the highest value is chosen. NumPeersUniq is the number of unique 
competitors that all the lead banks have lent to within three years before the current loan. 
NumPeersUniq is different from NumPeers only when a loan has multiple lead banks and 
not all of them lend to the same firms.57 For example, Citibank and US Bank co-led a $ 450 
million credit line for MDC Holdings Inc on December 13, 2013. Citibank arranged a loan 
for WCI Communities Inc on August 27, 2013, and US Bank arranged a loan for TRI 
Pointe Homes Inc on July 18, 2013. Both WCI Communities and TRI Pointe Homes are in 
the same four-digit SIC industry as MDC Holdings. In this case, NumPeers would be one 
and NumPeersUniq would be two. RatioCompetitorBank is NumCompetitorBank divided 
by the total number of lead banks in a loan. 
5.1.3. Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank: Time-Series and Industry Variations 
Figure 5.1 shows the time-series variations of the fraction of firms borrowing from 
competitors’ banks and the fraction of loans arranged by competitors’ banks. The plot uses 
all the syndicated loans from 1987 to 2016 in the Dealscan database. We begin with loans   
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only one lead bank. But it is possible that loans with multiple lead banks might be 
fundamentally different from the ones with a single lead bank. We construct 





in 1987 because Dealscan starts to have comprehensive coverage of the syndicated loans 
from 1987 (Jiang, Li, and Shao (2010) and Chu (2017)). 
The bar shows the number of loans in each year. The annual number of loans has 
grown tremendously from about 600 at 1987 to a peak of around 4,000 at 1997. It then 
decreases toward the end of the period, with a little recovering in the post-crisis period. 
The line with solid circles shows the variation of the fraction of loans (number) borrowed 
from competitors’ banks across years.58 The fraction of loans borrowed from competitors’ 
banks gradually increases from below 10% at 1987 to about 45% at 1997, after which it 
remains stable towards the end of the sample period, fluctuating mostly between 40% to 
50%, although an apparent decline trend of the aggregated loan market shows up after 1997. 
The line with squares shows the variation of the fraction of firms borrowing from 
competitors’ banks. It reveals a similar pattern as the fraction of loans. 
The time-series patterns in Figure 5.1 might be coincident with the commercial 
bank mergers due to banking industry deregulations and product market consolidations. 
Nevertheless, a non-trivial part, more than 40%, of the loans are originated by banks of 
borrowers’ product market competitors. This is different from the findings in the equity 
and debt underwriting markets (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010)). The underwriting market is 
typically transaction-oriented, with few interactions between issuers and underwriters 
(Rajan and Winton (1995) and Boot and Thakor (2000)). Relationship is relatively short-
term, and the information that underwriter collects during the underwriting process is 
relatively easy to verify and transfer. This leads to the concern that the underwriter might 
spill over information to its clients that are competing with the issuer. In contrast, private 
                                                     




lending market is relationship-oriented, and most of the information would be proprietary 
(Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), and Boot and Thakor 
(2000)). This reduces the borrower’s concern of information leakage, which might explain 
the observed difference above. 
Figure 5.2 shows industry distribution (Fama-French 12) of loans borrowed from 
competitors’ banks. The vertical (horizontal) part in a stacked bar is the fraction of loans 
(not) borrowed from competitors’ banks for each industry. Utilities has about 66% of loans 
borrowed from competitors’ banks, which is the highest among all the industries. In Energy, 
Finance, and Telecom industries, these loans account for more than a half. Manufacturing 
has the lowest coverage of loans borrowed from competitors’ banks, which is about 17%. 
Firms in Consumer NonDurables, Chemicals, and Shops are also not very active in 
borrowing from competitors’ banks. 
Results in Figure 5.2 suggest that whether a firm borrows from a competitor’s bank 
depends on the trade-off between the risk of information leakage and the benefits of 
enhanced monitoring. Regulated industries, such as Finance and Utilities, are relatively 
transparent due to government regulation, so information leakage would not be a big 
concern. However, in industries such as Chemicals and Manufacturing, competitor’s 
information would play a very important role in strategic competition, which makes 
borrowers more concerned about information spillover. So, firms in these industries rarely 
borrow from their competitors’ banks. 
5.1.4. Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of the main variables. The average all-in-




bps, suggesting that the distribution of loan spreads is skewed right. So, in the main 
regressions, we use the natural logarithm value of loan spreads as the dependent variable. 
About 40% of the loans are borrowed from competitors’ banks, which echoes the 
pattern shown in Figure 5.1. Very few loans have more than one lead bank, so the 
distribution of NumCompetitorBank is similar to that of CompetitorBankDummy. 
NumPeers has a mean value of 1.62, meaning that the lead bank in a loan also lead-lends 
to 1.62 competitors of the borrower. NumPeersUniq has similar distribution as NumPeers 
because, again, most loans have only one lead bank. On average, 40% of the lead banks in 
a syndicate lend money to the borrower’s competitors in the past three years. 
The average sales of the borrowers is $2,346 million, and the distribution of sales 
is skewed right. On average, 32% of a borrower’s loans in the past five years are from the 
same lead bank in the current loan. The mean lead share is 42% and the mean number of 
lenders is approximately 7. 76% of the loans are revolving credit lines. The average loan 
has an amount of $250.2 million and a maturity of 40.77 months. About a half of the loans 
are secured by collaterals. 
5.2. Contrasting Monitoring with Information Leakage on Loan Spreads 
5.2.1. Baseline Results 
We investigate the impact of borrowing from a competitor’s bank on loan spreads 
by estimating the following model with the ordinary least squares (OLS): 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +




where 𝑖 indicates firms, 𝑗 indicates lead banks, and 𝑡 indicates years. To account for serial 
correlations within the same lead bank, we cluster standard errors at lead bank level 
(Petersen (2009)).59 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm value of all-in-drawn loan spreads 
over LIBOR in bps. The independent variable of interest is CompetitorBankDummy, which 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has arranged at least one 
facility for the borrower’s competitors in the past three years, and zero otherwise. 
Controls consists of a set of confounding factors that would affect loan spreads. 
Specifically, we include borrower characteristics such as sales, cash flow volatility, 
earnings, and book leverage to control for borrower’s risk profile. Lending relationship 
between the borrower and the bank also plays an important role in determining loan price 
(e.g., Berger and Udell (1995), Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011), and 
Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2020b)), so it is also controlled for in the regressions. To capture 
effects from the supply side in a loan syndication, number of lenders is included in the 
model. Revolving credit lines can be a special design in a loan package to facilitate bank’s 
monitoring, especially when institutional facilities are bundled together (Berger, Zhang, 
and Zhao (2018) and Berlin, Nini, and Yu (2018)). Therefore, we include a revolver 
dummy in the regressions. Other loan terms such as facility amount, maturity, and security 
are included to capture loan-specific risks. For example, secured loans are typically more 
risky than non-secured loans. Note that these loan terms and loan price are simultaneously 
determined in a loan contract. 
                                                     




In addition to year and firm fixed effects, we also add loan purpose dummies and 
borrower’s S&P rating dummies to better capture loan- and borrower-level risks.60 
Table 5.2 reports the OLS regression results. From Specification (1) to (3), we 
gradually add in control variables to mitigate the concern of multi-collinearity and the 
concern that loan spread is simultaneously determined with other loan terms. The 
coefficient estimates of CompetitorBankDummy are all negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level. In Specification (3) that represents the baseline regression, the 
coefficient is -0.055. This implies that everything else equal, borrowing from a 
competitor’s bank is associated with 11.14 bps lower spread. For the average loan with an 
amount of $250.20 million in the sample, this suggests that a firm can save up to $278,723 
(= $250.20 million * 0.1114%) in interest rate payments every year. 
The baseline results lend support to the monitoring hypothesis rather than the 
information leakage hypothesis. Lending to a firm’s competitors exposes the lead bank to 
different competitors’ perceptions on the current and future product market competition, 
rendering the lead bank a more comprehensive understanding about the industry and the 
firm’s risk profile. This will reduce the monitoring cost and strengthen the advisory value 
of the bank, which lowers the borrowing cost of the firm. 
5.2.2. Robustness of the Baseline Results 
We execute a rich set of tests to diagnose the robustness of the baseline findings. 
Table 5.3 reports the results. In Panel A, Specification (1) uses loan spreads as the 
                                                     
60 We use S&P quality rankings from Compustat. Loans with missing quality rankings are 
excluded from the sample. Robustness test in Specification (4) of Table 3.3 shows that 
including loans with missing quality rankings does not affect the results. We do not use 
long-term debt ratings because most of the firms have missing long-term debt ratings. 
Nevertheless, in untabulated results, we replace missing with NR for long-term debt ratings, 




dependent variable. In Specification (2), the sample consists of loans issued by private 
firms. Specification (3) excludes financial firms with the one-digit SIC code of six. 
Specification (4) includes loans with missing ratings and replaces missing ratings with NRs 
in the regression. Specification (5) replaces firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects. 
Specification (6) controls for bank fixed effects in addition to fixed effects in the main 
regressions. In Specifications (7) and (8), competitors are defined as in the same three-digit 
SIC industries and the same Fama-French 48 industries, respectively. The coefficients on 
CompetitorBankDummy are statistically significant at 1% or 5% levels and are all 
economically important. 
It is worthwhile stressing that in Specification (6) where bank fixed effects are 
controlled for, the coefficient on CompetitorBankDummy is -0.033 and statistically 
significant at 10% level. The impact is smaller than that in Table 5.1, Specification (3), 
suggesting that the effect of borrowing from a competitor’s bank on loan spreads might 
mainly come from firms that switch to competitors’ banks. We will zoom on in firms’ 
switching behavior in next section. 
Panel B reports the OLS regression results using another four continuous 
measurements as explanatory variables. The coefficient estimates on all the continuous 
measurements are significant at 1% level. And the impacts are also economically important. 
For example, the coefficient on Log (1+NumPeers) is -0.060, which is the elasticity 
between loan spread and the number of competitors that the lead bank has lent to. Consider 
the average loan with yield spread of 202.5 bps in the sample, it means a one-standard-




with a 17.58 decrease of loan spread. The findings here suggest that loan spread is 
monotonically decreasing with the number of competitors that the lead bank has lent to. 
Panels C and D show the results of propensity score matching. For each loan that 
is borrowed from a competitor’s bank, we find a certain number of loans (the exact number 
depends on the matching model) that are not originated by a competitor’s bank along 
borrower size, cash flow volatility, earnings, book leverage, industry, and year. The 
regression results using the matched sample in Panel D suggest that our findings are intact 
even after we address potential sample selection issues. 
5.2.3. Switching to Competitor’s Bank and Loan Spread 
In the baseline regressions, we control for firm fixed effects. The variation hence 
comes from either the status change of lead banks or the switching behavior of borrowers. 
In the former scenario, the lead bank changes status from not lending to the firm’s 
competitors to lending to the firm’s competitors. For example, consider a loan 𝑙1 between 
firm 𝑖1 and bank 𝑗 on day 1. There is another loan 𝑙3 between firm 𝑖1 and bank 𝑗 on day 3. 
On day 2, bank 𝑗 lends to 𝑖1’s competitor 𝑖2. Suppose there is no lending before day 1. 
Then when loan 𝑙1is issued, the value of CompetitorBankDummy is zero because bank 𝑗 
has not yet lent to firm 𝑖1’s competitor before loan 𝑙1. When loan 𝑙3 is issued, the value of 
CompetitorBankDummy will be one because bank 𝑗 has lent to firm 𝑖1’s competitor 𝑖2. 
In the latter scenario, the borrower switches from a lead bank that has not lent to 
the borrower’s competitors to another lead bank that has done so. Consider a loan 𝑙1 
between firm 𝑖 and bank 𝑗1 on day 1. Suppose bank 𝑗1 has not lent to firm 𝑖’s competitors. 




to firm 𝑖’s competitors. In this case, CompetitorBankDummy will equal to zero for loan 𝑙1 
but one for loan 𝑙2. 
We conduct sub-sample analyses to distinguish the two scenarios discussed above. 
Table 5.4 shows the results. In Specifications (1), (2), and (3), we use a sub-sample of loans 
where the lead bank has lending relationship with the borrower in the past five, seven, and 
ten years, respectively. For these loans, the borrower stays with the relationship lead bank. 
Note that a borrower may have multiple relationships with different banks. The coefficient 
estimates on CompetitorBankDummy are all significant at 5% level, and range from -0.075 
to -0.069, depending on the measurement window of lending relationship. 
In Specifications (4), (5), and (6), the sample consists of loans where the lead bank 
has no lending relationship with the borrower in the past five, seven, and ten years, 
respectively. In other words, these borrowers switch to new lead banks. The coefficient 
estimates on CompetitorBankDummy are statistically significant at 5% or 10% levels and 
are all economically important. For example, in Specification (5) where the borrower has 
no lending relationship with the lead bank in the past seven years, the coefficient is -0.086 
and significant at 5% level. Consider the average loan with yield spread of 202.5 bps in the 
sample, this implies that switching to a competitor’ bank is associated with 17.42 bps lower 
spreads than switching to other banks. 
The results suggest that conditional on not switching, the borrower enjoys lower 
loan spreads if the lead bank has lent money to the borrower’s competitors. Conditional on 
switching, the borrower has lower loan spread if it switches to a lead bank who has lent 
money to the borrower’s competitors. The impact of borrowing from a competitor’s bank 




from a competitor’s bank tends to have a stronger impact on loan spreads in switching 
borrowers than in staying borrowers. This is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis in 
that bank monitoring is more helpful if information asymmetry problems between the 
borrower and the bank are more severe. 
5.2.4. Lead Bank’s Trade-off between Monitoring Gain and Cost 
The analyses so far suggest that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated 
with a lower loan spread. And a large part of the impact comes from firms that switch to 
their competitors’ banks. That is, the monitoring effect dominates the information leakage 
effect. We will provide further evidence on the monitoring hypothesis. 
5.2.4.1. Free-Riding, Monitoring Gain, and Monitoring Cost 
In a typical syndicated loan, there are more than one lender in the syndicate. And 
the lead bank takes the main responsibility of loan issuance and maintains a relationship 
with the borrower (Sufi (2007)). Free-riding issue might arise between lead bank and other 
lenders if the lead bank monitors the borrower. The lead bank bears all the cost but will 
have to share the benefits with other co-lead or non-lead lenders (Holmstrom (1982)). If 
borrowing from a competitor’s bank strengthens the lead bank’s ex post monitoring, then 
free-riding would play a role. And we conjecture that the more participating banks in a 
syndicate, the more severe the free-riding issue would be, and the lower the impact of 
borrowing from a competitor’s bank on loan spreads. 
Also, the incentive of lead bank’s monitoring depends on the trade-off between the 
expected gain and cost. Bank’s commitment to monitoring would be stronger when the 




lead bank is higher when the borrower is in higher default risk, and monitoring cost is lower 
when the borrower’s business is more similar to its industry competitors. 
Table 5.5, Panels A, B, and C show the cross-sectional results. In Panel A, 
Specification (1) ((2)) uses a sub-sample that has the number of participating lenders below 
(above) the 33th (66th) percentile. 61  The coefficient on CompetitorBankDummy in 
Specification (1) is -0.088 and statistically significant at 5% level, while the coefficient in 
Specification (2) is -0.024 and statistically insignificant. It means that when the number of 
participant lenders in the syndicate increases to a certain threshold, borrowing from a 
competitor’s bank does not significantly reduce the financing cost. Interestingly, the results 
in Specifications (3) to (6) further suggest that the threshold might be around four since 
once the number of participant lenders exceeds five, the impact of borrowing from a 
competitor’s bank vanishes. On the one hand, the increased number of participant lenders 
complicates the renegotiation among lenders (Chu (2018)), which increases the monitoring 
cost for the lead bank. On the other hand, when there are more participant lenders, the free-
riding issue reduces the lead bank’s incentive to monitoring ex ante because the lead bank 
will benefit less from monitoring. 
Panel B shows the results regarding expected monitoring gain. Following the 
existing literature, we consider borrowers with lower Z-score, smaller size, higher cash 
flow volatility, and lower earnings as ones with higher default risk or lower recovery rate 
(Altman (1968), Minton and Schrand (1999), Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Duffie, Saita, 
and Wang (2007)). The lead bank could gain more by monitoring these firms. The results 
                                                     
61 A syndicated loan may have multiple lead banks, other lead banks might also free-ride 
the monitoring of one lead bank. Here we implicitly assume that all the lead banks share 
the monitoring gain as well as the monitoring cost. Nevertheless, we separate the sample 




show that for firms with higher default risk, borrowing from competitors’ banks has much 
stronger impact on loan spreads, in both statistical significance and economic importance. 
Panel C shows the results with respect to the expected monitoring cost. 
Specification (1) ((2)) uses a sub-sample that has the value of the average similarity score 
above (below) the 66th (33th) percentile. Similarity between a firm and its industry peers 
is measured by the score computed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Hoberg and Phillips 
(2016).62 The coefficient on CompetitorBankDummy in Specification (1) is -0.082 and 
statistically significant at 5% level while the coefficient in Specification (2) is -0.043 and 
not statistically significant. It means that the impact of borrowing from a competitor’s bank 
on loan spreads is much stronger when the current borrower is more similar to its industry 
peers, which supports the monitoring hypothesis. 
5.2.4.2. Commitment to Monitoring 
The financing arrangement in the syndicated loan market suffers from moral hazard 
problems when lead bank in a syndicate knows more about the borrower than participating 
lenders. Loan retention – the percent retained by the lead bank in a loan syndication – 
serves as a commitment of lead bank’s ex post monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) 
and Sufi (2007)). If lead bank obtains useful information regarding the product market 
condition via lending to the borrower’s competitors, the ex post monitoring cost of the lead 
bank would be lower. This will increase the creditability of bank’s commitment to 
monitoring and reduce the loan share retained by the bank.63 Sufi (2007) documents that 
                                                     
62 Hoberg and Philips (2010) and Hoberg and Philips (2016) calculate a similarity score 
between each public firm and all the rest of the firms in the same industry (the industry is 
also defined by this score). To measure the similarity between one firm and its industry 
peers, we take the average. Please see the cited two papers for more detail. 
63 The loan share information for institutional loans might not be correct, because the lead 




when the lead arranger knows more about the borrower, the percent of a loan held by the 
lead arranger and the share concentration are both lower. Therefore, borrowing from a 
competitor’s bank would be associated with a lower loan share held by the lead bank. 
Table 5.6 shows the results. The dependent variable in Specifications (1) and (2) is 
LeadShare, which is the percentage of a loan retained by the lead bank in decimals. The 
coefficient estimates on CompetitorBankDummy are both -0.009 and statistically 
significant at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Economically, it means that borrowing from 
a competitor’s bank is associated with 1% smaller share of the loan retained by the bank, 
which represents 3% of the standard deviation (0.36) of lead shares in the sample. 
In Specifications (3) and (4), the dependent variable is ShareConcentration, which 
is the sum of squared ownership of all the lenders in a loan. The coefficients on 
CompetitorBankDummy are negative and statistically significant. This means that 
borrowing from a competitor’s bank is related with a less concentrated syndicate. 
In summary, the results support the monitoring hypothesis in that the product 
market information reduces monitoring cost for the lead bank, which signals its 
commitment of monitoring to participant lenders. Participant lenders are less worried about 
moral hazard problems and require a smaller loan share held by the lead bank. 
5.2.4.3. Loan Amendments and Post-Borrowing Monitoring 
After a syndicated loan is closed, it can be amended from time to time due to 
incomplete contracting and the arrival of new information. Upon the amendment, all the 
pricing terms such as amount, spread, maturity, security, and covenants can be revised 
                                                     
purposes (S&P (2016)). However, about 76% of the loans in our sample are revolving 
credit lines that are not institutional loans. The tax issue for institutional loan shares is not 




(Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Ivashina and Sun (2011)). A frequent impetus for 
amendments is a change in the market conditions (Roberts and Sufi (2009)). The previous 
lending experience to the borrower’s product market competitors accumulates industry 
insights for the lead bank. As a result, the lead bank might be more sensitive to any potential 
changes in the product market than the banks without such experience and even than the 
borrower. This would increase the renegotiation frequency between the borrower and the 
lenders. 
We construct four variables to measure the amendment frequencies from the 
amendment file in the Dealscan. The first one is Log (AmendTimes), which is the natural 
logarithm value of the number of amendment times of a loan. The second one is Log 
(1+AmendItems), which is the natural logarithm value of the number of amended items. 
An amendment file typically makes changes along the following nine dimensions: loan 
amount, add-on facility, price, maturity, provision, covenant, definition of some terms, 
waive, and security. Less than five percent of the amended sample do not mention any of 
the above nine items. AmendItems is the total number of the above important items being 
amended for a loan. The third one, Log (1+PriceItems), refers to the amendment frequency 
of the loan price. And the last one, Log (1+CovItems), refers to the amendment frequency 
of the covenants. 
The initial terms such as pricing grid and financial covenants allocate the 
bargaining power in a state contingent manner (Roberts and Sufi (2009)), so the original 
contracting terms may not be set to price default risk but rather be set to efficiently allocate 
bargaining power in later renegotiation (Gorton and Kahn (2000)). To account for such 




ante, in addition to the variables in the baseline regressions, we control for 
PerformPriceDummy, whether a loan has performance pricing option, and 
CovenantDummy, whether a loan has financial covenants. 
Table 5.7 shows the OLS regression results. The coefficient estimates on 
CompetitorBankDummy are all positive and statistically significant at 5% or 10% levels, 
suggesting that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated with more frequent loan 
amendments and more terms being amended, especially the terms with respect to price and 
covenants. Economically, consider the loan with the average number of amendment times 
of 2.68. The coefficient in Specification (1) suggests that borrowing from a competitor’s 
bank increases the number of amendment times by 0.42 (2.68*0.155), which represents 15% 
of the standard deviation (2.78) of amendment times in the sample. 
The evidence here lends direct support to the monitoring hypothesis in that previous 
lending experience to the borrower’s industry competitors facilitates the lead bank’s ex 
post monitoring by frequently renegotiating the loan contract time over time. 
5.2.5. Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank and Firm Profitability 
Literature suggests that better outside monitoring leads to better firm performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)). Nini, Smith, 
and Sufi (2012) find that creditors play an active role in corporate governance even outside 
of default states, and creditors’ governance increases firm value. If the monitoring 
hypothesis can explain the decreased financing cost in firms that borrow from competitors’ 
banks, we would expect that these firms experience better post-borrowing firm 
performance. To test this conjecture, we examine the profitability changes around two 




Looking at firm’s performance around covenant violations has two purposes. First, 
it mitigates the potential sample selection and endogeneity issues regarding the relation 
between borrowing from a competitor’s bank and firm performance. The reason is that lead 
bank might be able to cherry-pick firms with good potentials to perform well when it lends 
money to the firm. But it is very unlikely that the lead bank can “pick” the timing of 
covenant violations. Second, covenant violations are directly related with the monitoring 
of the lenders (See Rauh and Sufi (2010) for a literature review). If borrowing from a 
competitor’s bank, indeed, strengthens bank’s monitoring, then such a relation should be 
stronger around covenant violations when corporate control rights shift to creditors. 
We estimate the following model using the ordinary least squares (OLS): 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡/𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡/𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑖  and 𝑡  stand for facility and year, respectively. The dependent variable is 
IndAdjProfit, the industry-median adjusted profitability. Adjusting profitability is 
important because some industries may just have a high profitability and some others may 
just have a low profitability. For example, in the Compustat from 1975 to 2017, the median 
industry profitability of savings institutions (SIC 6036) is 2% while that of laboratory 
analytical instruments (one of the manufacturing industries, SIC 3826) is 10%. A pure 
comparison between firms in these two industries would be misleading. 
Post (CovVioPost) is a dummy variable that equals one if the facility-year 




market-to-book ratio, one-year lagged profitability, book leverage, corporate investment, 
and growth rate of the property, plant, and equipment. 
Table 5.8 shows the regression results. In Specification (1), the coefficient on the 
interaction term, CompetitorBankDummy*Post, is 0.004 and statistically significant at 5% 
level. Economically, it means that firms borrowing from a competitor’s bank experience 
an increase of profitability equal 4% of the standard deviation (0.112) in the sample, 
relative to firms not borrowing from a competitor’s bank. 
In Specifications (2) to (4), the coefficients on the interaction term, 
CompetitorBankDummy*CovVioPost, are much greater than those in Specification (1) and 
are all statistically significant. For example, in Specification (4) where only the first 
covenant violation for a borrower is included, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
0.013, which represents 11% of the standard deviation (0.115) of the sample. 
The results suggest that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated with a 
higher firm profitability, especially around covenant violations when corporate control 
rights temporarily switch to creditors. This lends support to the monitoring hypothesis. 
5.3. Lead Bank’s Informational Advantage: Facilitating Monitoring or Collusion? 
As we illustrated in the Introduction, when the bank knows more about the 
borrower via previous lending experience to the borrower’s industry competitors, the bank 
gains more bargaining power against both the firm manager and shareholders. The bank 
might pressure the manager to change corporate strategies to maximize the bank’s private 
benefits. When lending to competing borrowers, the bank may persuade the borrowers to 
collude to maximize the bank’s investment returns. Because a lower industry competition 




firm profitability may not distinguish the monitoring hypothesis from the collusion 
hypothesis. 
Moreover, in a concurrent paper, Saidi and Streitz (2019) find that a higher market 
share of the lead bank results in lower average loan spreads. And they argue that a higher 
market share is related with a higher probability that the lead bank simultaneously lends to 
multiple firms that are competing with each other. The lead bank hence has an incentive to 
internalize externalities among the competing firms, so it charges a lower loan spread to 
soften the competition. This is documented by literature as the limited-liability channel 
between financial market and product market (Brander and Lewis (1986)). 
In this section, we provide further evidence to differentiate between the monitoring 
hypothesis and the collusion hypothesis. To that end, we explicitly examine the impact of 
borrowing from a competitor’s bank on firm’s competing strategies. As documented by 
Saidi and Streitz (2019), a higher probability of common lending leads to a higher mark-
up and a lower output. This means that product price should be higher. As a result, firms 
that borrow from common lenders should lose market share and/or experience sales decline. 
In the contrary, Table 5.9 shows that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated 
with a higher market share growth. Sub-sample results in Panel B indicate that borrowing 
from a competitor’s bank is associated with a higher sales growth in more competitive 
industries. These findings are not consistent with the limited-liability effect documented 
by Saidi and Streitz (2019). 
Furthermore, the last column in Panel A and the last two columns in Panel B 
suggest that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated with more R&D 




in Table 5.10 show that borrowing from a competitor’s bank is associated with greater loan 
amount and longer maturity, suggesting that the bank is willing to interact with the 
borrower in a long-term relationship. 
Taken together, our paper suggests that lending money to competing firms may not 
necessarily lead to firm collusion. Instead, lending to multiple competing firms renders the 
bank an informational advantage, which facilitates monitoring as well as bank’s 
willingness to establish a long-term relationship with the firm. As a consequence, firms are 
able to take on risky projects to, for example, differentiate their product from others. 
5.4. Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Although we have controlled for a large set of confounding factors including firm 
and loan characteristics, firm-bank relationship, and firm fixed effects in the main 
regressions, it is still possible that some time-varying factors might simultaneously 
determine whether a firm borrows from a competitor’s bank and loan spread. For example, 
the unobservable personal relationship between loan officer and firm manager might 
increase the firm’s chance to get funds from the bank and decrease loan spread because of 
trust. Since this type of impact is in the same direction as predicted by bank monitoring, it 
is plausible to argue that personal relationship might dominate bank monitoring. 
We conduct a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression method to address the 
potential endogeneity issue (Heckman (1979)). We use bank mergers as an instrumental 
variable to predict the probability of a loan to be borrowed from competitor’s bank. The 
mergers between financial institutions are arguably not driven by any individual client 
firms. And this identification strategy has been commonly used in corporate finance 




banks tend to specialize their lending in certain industries (Boot and Thakor (2000) and 
Degryse and Ongena (2007)). Very likely, one of the merging banks has lent to the current 
borrower’s competitors before the merger. Then the loans after bank merger would be more 
likely to be borrowed from a competitor’s bank.64 
As expected, the first-stage results in Specifications (1) (probit model without fixed 
effects) and (2) (linear probability model with all the fixed effects) in Table 5.11 show that 
lead bank mergers, indeed, increase the probability of a loan to be borrowed from a 
competitor’s bank. The coefficient on the instrumented explanatory variable in 
Specification (3) is -0.265 and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that 
borrowing from a competitor’s bank reduces loan spreads by about 53.66 bps. This is about 
five times larger than the economic impact in the baseline regression (11.14 bps), which 
means that the baseline regression probably underestimates the true impact. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Forty percent of U.S. firms share common lenders with their industry competitors. 
Common lender banks, by accumulating lending experience with other firms in the same 
industries, possess an informational advantage relative to the borrowers and other 
stakeholders. As a result, common lender banks are more willing to monitor the borrowers 
and maintain a longer relationship, which results in a lower borrowing cost and higher 
profitability for the borrowers. 
                                                     
64 Note that in Table 5.4, we find that the impact of borrowing from competitor’s bank on 
loan spread comes from two variations. First, the same lead bank might convert from a 
bank that does not lend to the borrower’s competitors to a bank that does so. Second, the 
firm might switch form non-competitor’s bank to competitor’s bank. Bank mergers 




Our findings highlight a unique feature in the loan market where information tends 
to be proprietary and the business model is relationship-oriented. This unique feature of 
the loan market reduces the risk of information leakage and allow firms to use common 
lenders more often. This pattern contrasts with the avoidance of common underwriters with 
securities issuance (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010)). 
Loans arranged by a common lender bank have greater face values and longer 
maturities, indicating the lead bank’s willingness to establish long-term relationships with 
the borrower. A borrower with loans from a common lender bank invests more in R&D 







Table 5.1.Summary Statistics 
 
This table shows the summary statistics of the main variables based on the sample of corporate loan facilities from 1987 to 2016 in the 
Dealscan database. Spread is the all-in-drawn spread over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in basis points (bps). 
CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors within 
three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. Competitors are firms in the same four-digit SIC industry as the borrower. 
NumCompetitorBank is the number of lead banks in a loan that have lent to the current borrower’s competitors within three years. 
NumPeers is the number of competitors that the lead bank in a loan has lent to within three years before the current loan. When there 
are multiple lead banks, the highest value is chosen. NumPeersUniq is the number of unique competitors that all the lead banks have 
lent to within three years before the current loan. NumPeersUniq is different from NumPeers only when a loan has multiple lead banks 
and not all of them lend to the same firms. RatioCompetitorBank is NumCompetitorBank divided by the total number of lead banks in 
a loan. Sales is the total sales in million dollars of a borrower when a loan is issued. CashFlowVol is the standard deviation of the 
operating net cash flow in the previous five years. Earnings is the earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets. Leverage 
is the book value of total debt divided by total assets. RelationAmt is the total amount of loans arranged by the lead lender to the borrower 
in last five years divided by the total amount of loans issued by the borrower in last five years. RelationNum is the total number of loans 
arranged by the lead lender to the borrower in last five years divided by the total number of loans issued by the borrower in last five 
years. LeadShare is the percent of a loan retained by the lead bank in decimals. ShareConcentration is the sum of the squared ownership 
of all the lenders in a loan. NumLenders is the total number of lenders for a loan. RevolverDummy is a dummy variable that equals one 
if a facility is a revolving credit, and zero otherwise. FacilityAmt is the total amount of a facility in million dollars. Maturity is the 
maturity of a loan in months. SecuredDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is secured, and zero otherwise. 
MissingSecuredDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the secured status of a loan is missing, and zero otherwise. All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level. 
  N Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75 
Spread (in bps) 18,121 202.50 139.70 100.00 175.00 275.00 
Log (Spread) 18,121 5.03 0.82 4.61 5.17 5.62 
CompetitorBankDummy 18,121 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NumCompetitorBank 18,121 0.41 0.51 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Log (1+NumCompetitorBank) 18,121 0.28 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.69 
NumPeers 18,121 1.62 3.79 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Log (1+NumPeers) 18,121 0.52 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.69 






Log (1+NumPeersUniq) 18,121 0.52 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.69 
RatioCompetitorBank 18,121 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Sales (in $ millions) 18,121 2,346.00 5,985.00 100.50 365.40 1,559.00 
Log (Sales) 18,121 19.81 1.95 18.43 19.72 21.17 
CashFlowVol (%) 18,121 6.34 7.08 2.24 4.19 7.60 
Earnings (%) 18,121 6.09 11.34 3.16 7.20 11.44 
Leverage (%) 18,121 31.20 22.78 13.83 29.12 43.96 
RelationAmt 18,121 0.32 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 
RelationNum 18,121 0.31 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LeadShare 12,763 0.42 0.36 0.13 0.26 0.75 
ShareConcentration 13,147 0.38 0.37 0.09 0.20 0.59 
NumLenders 18,121 6.57 8.00 1.00 3.00 10.00 
Log (NumLenders) 18,121 1.17 1.20 0.00 1.10 2.30 
RevolverDummy 18,121 0.76 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FacilityAmt (in $ millions) 18,121 250.20 478.70 15.00 70.00 250.00 
Log (FacilityAmt) 18,121 17.93 1.88 16.52 18.06 19.34 
Maturity (in months) 18,121 40.77 22.12 23.00 36.00 60.00 
Log (Maturity) 18,121 3.51 0.71 3.14 3.58 4.09 
SecuredDummy 18,121 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MissingSecuredDummy 18,121 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5.2.Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank and Loan Spreads 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how borrowing from a competitor’s bank 
affects loan spreads. The dependent variable is Log (Spread), which is the natural logarithm 
value of the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR in bps. CompetitorBankDummy is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s 
competitors within three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. Please see Table 
1 for definitions of all the other control variables. The regressions are at the facility level. 
The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  Log (Spread) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CompetitorBankDummy -0.083*** -0.066*** -0.055*** 
 (-4.687) (-3.100) (-2.847) 
Log (Sales)  -0.058*** -0.039*** 
  (-5.094) (-3.655) 
CashFlowVol  0.008*** 0.007*** 
  (4.557) (4.094) 
Earnings  -0.012*** -0.010*** 
  (-9.750) (-9.446) 
Leverage  0.007*** 0.006*** 
  (10.317) (10.796) 
RelationAmt  -0.022 -0.016 
  (-1.422) (-1.234) 
Log (NumLenders)  -0.035*** 0.001 
  (-2.777) (0.042) 
RevolverDummy  -0.167*** -0.138*** 
  (-11.367) (-9.663) 
Log (FacilityAmt)   -0.069*** 
   (-8.206) 
Maturity   -0.026** 
   (-2.555) 
SecuredDummy   0.281*** 
   (16.310) 
MissingSecuredDummy   0.007 
   (0.476) 
Constant 5.547*** 6.105*** 6.776*** 
 (60.056) (11.890) (15.638) 
Observations 18,121 11,358 11,358 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs No Yes Yes 






Table 5.3.Robustness Checks 
 
This table checks the robustness of baseline results. Panel A shows the OLS regression results using different model specifications. In 
Specification (1), the dependent variable is Spread which is the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR in bps. From Specifications (2) to 
(6), the dependent variable is Log (Spread), which is the natural logarithm value of Spread. Specification (2) includes private firms only. 
Specification (3) excludes financial companies with the first SIC digit of six. Specification (4) includes loans with missing ratings in the 
regression. The rating value is set as NR for them. Specification (5) replaces firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects. Specification 
(6) controls for lead bank fixed effects. In Specification (7) ((8)), the competitors are defined as the firms in the same three-digit SIC 
(Fama-French 48) industry as the borrower. CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has 
lent to the borrower’s competitors within three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. Panel B shows the OLS regression 
results using continuous measures as the explanatory variable. Log (1+NumCompetitorBank) is the natural logarithm value of one plus 
NumCompetitorBank. NumCompetitorBank is the number of lead banks in a loan that have lent to the current borrower’s competitors 
within three years. Log (1+NumPeers) is the natural logarithm value of one plus the number of competitors that the lead bank in a loan 
has lent to within three years before the current loan. When there are multiple lead banks, the highest value is chosen. Log 
(1+NumPeersUniq) is the natural logarithm value of one plus the number of unique competitors that all the lead banks have lent to 
within three years before the current loan. NumPeersUniq is different from NumPeers only when a loan has multiple lead banks and not 
all of them lend to the same firms. RatioCompetitorBank is NumCompetitorBank divided by the total number of lead banks in a loan. 
Panels C and D show the regression results using the matched sample. Panel C compares firm characteristics between firms borrowing 
from competitors’ banks and firms not borrowing from competitors’ banks before and after matching. For each treatment loan that is 
borrowed from a competitor’s bank, we find the nearest control loans that are not borrowed from a competitor’s bank. Panel D shows 
the OLS regression results for the matched sample. Controls includes Log (Sales), CashFlowVol, Earnings, Leverage, RelationAmt, Log 
(NumLenders), RevolverDummy, Log (FacilityAmt), Maturity, SecuredDummy, MissingSecuredDummy, and Constant. In Specification 
(2) of Panel A, Controls does not have CashFlowVol, Earnings, and Leverage because the sample only includes private firms. Please 
see Table 1 for variable definitions. The regressions are at the facility level. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Robustness tests 
    Log (Spread) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         






 (-2.480) (-2.587) (-2.316) (-3.344) (-4.122) (-1.815) (-2.235) (-2.427) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 11,358 8,326 9,920 18,121 11,358 11,358 11,358 11,358 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs No No No No Yes No No No 
Bank FEs No No No No No Yes No No 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.729 0.777 0.785 0.786 0.786 0.684 0.783 0.783 
 
Panel B: Alternative measures of the explanatory variable 
  Log (Spread) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (1+NumCompetitorBank) -0.080***    
 (-2.847)    
Log (1+NumPeers)  -0.060***   
  (-3.994)   
Log (1+NumPeersUniq)   -0.059***  
   (-3.932)  
RatioCompetitorBank    -0.054*** 
    (-2.896) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,358 11,358 11,358 11,358 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Panel C: Firm characteristics before and after matching   
  Before Matching   After Matching 
 Competitor's Bank Not Competitor's Bank   Competitor's Bank Not Competitor's Bank  
 (N = 10,848) (N = 7,273)   (N = 5,080) (N = 7,259)  
  Mean Mean Diff   Mean Mean Diff 
Log (Sales) 19.640 20.069 -0.429***  20.102 20.067 0.035 
CashFlowVol 6.705 5.786 0.919***  5.947 5.787 0.160 
Earnings 6.333 5.717 0.616***  5.842 5.711 0.130 
Leverage 30.539 32.192 -1.653***   32.579 32.182 0.397 
 
Panel D: Regressions of matched sample  
  Log (Spread) 
 Nearest Three Nearest Five Gaussian Kernel 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
CompetitorBankDummy -0.052** -0.059*** -0.056*** 
 (-2.231) (-2.698) (-2.854) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 8,004 8,650 9,996 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes 






Table 5.4.Switching to A Competitor’s Bank 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how switching to a competitor’s bank affects loan spreads. The dependent variable is 
Log (Spread), which is the natural logarithm value of the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR in bps. CompetitorBankDummy is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors within three years before the current 
loan, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1), (2), and (3) use a sub-sample where the lead bank in a loan has lending relationship with 
the borrower in the past five, seven, and ten years, respectively. Specifications (4), (5), and (6) use a sub-sample where the lead bank in 
a loan has no lending relationship with the borrower in the past five, seven, and ten years, respectively. Please see Table 1 for variable 
definitions. The regressions are at the loan facility level. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated 
using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 Log (Spread) 
 Stay with Old Lead Switch to New Lead 
 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CompetitorBankDummy -0.075** -0.069** -0.070** -0.080* -0.086** -0.087** 
 (-2.308) (-2.163) (-2.104) (-1.820) (-2.072) (-2.262) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 4,391 4,713 4,895 3,107 3,518 3,848 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Table 5.5.Free-Riding, Monitoring Gains, and Monitoring Costs 
 
Panel A shows the OLS regression results of how free-riding problem affects the impact of borrowing from a competitor’s bank on loan 
spreads. The dependent variable is Log (Spread), which is the natural logarithm value of the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR in 
bps. CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors 
within three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. Specification (1) ((2)) uses a sub-sample that has the number of 
participating lenders below (above) the 33th (66th) percentile. Specification (3) ((4)) contains loans with less (more) than three 
participating lenders. Specification (5) ((6)) contains loans with less (more) than five participating lenders. Panel B shows the OLS 
regression results of how the expected monitoring gain affects the impact of borrowing from a competitor’s bank on loan spreads. 
Specification (1) ((2)) uses a sub-sample that has the value of Z-score (Altman (1968)) below (above) the 33th (66th) percentile. 
Specification (3) ((4)) uses a sub-sample that has the value of Log (Sales) below (above) the 33th (66th) percentile. Specification (5) 
((6)) uses a sub-sample that has the value of CashFlowVol above (below) the 66th (33th) percentile. Specification (7) ((8)) uses a sub-
sample that has the value of Earnings below (above) the 33th (66th) percentile. Panel C shows the OLS regression results of how the 
expected monitoring cost affects the impact of borrowing from acompetitor’s bank on loan spreads. Specification (1) ((2)) uses a sub-
sample that has the value of Similarity above (below) the 66th (33th) percentile. Similarity is text-based measurement of the similarity 
between firms (Please see Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Hoberg and Phillips (2016)). Controls includes Log (Sales), CashFlowVol, 
Earnings, Leverage, RelationAmt, Log (NumLenders), RevolverDummy, Log (FacilityAmt), Maturity, SecuredDummy, 
MissingSecuredDummy, and Constant. Please see Table 1 for variable definitions. FEs includes year, firm, purpose, and S&P rating 
fixed effects. The regressions are at the loan facility level. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated 
using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Free-riding and renegotiation costs 
  Log (Spread) 
 Number of Participants 
 <= P33 >= P66 <= 3 > 3 <= 5 > 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CompetitorBankDummy -0.088** -0.024 -0.090*** -0.043* -0.080*** -0.025 
 (-2.364) (-0.825) (-3.284) (-1.812) (-3.632) (-0.952) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Observations 4,203 4,292 5,709 5,649 6,653 4,705 
FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.766 0.821 0.756 0.813 0.751 0.816 
 
Panel B: Expected monitoring gains 
  Log (Spread) 
 Z-Score Log (Sales) CashFlowVol Earnings 
 <= P33 >= P66 <= P33 >= P66 >= P66 <= P33 <= P33 >= P66 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CompetitorBankDummy -0.098** -0.062 -0.086** -0.011 -0.090*** -0.056* -0.103** -0.054** 
 (-2.214) (-1.435) (-2.190) (-0.381) (-2.720) (-1.811) (-2.035) (-2.196) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 2,856 3,184 2,952 4,671 3,286 4,201 3,400 4,077 
FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.787 0.824 0.684 0.800 0.742 0.810 0.782 0.813 
 
Panel C: Expected monitoring costs 
  Log (Spread) 
 Similarity >= P66 Similarity <= P33 
  (1) (2) 
      
CompetitorBankDummy -0.082** -0.043 
 (-2.197) (-1.457) 
Controls Yes Yes 
   
Observations 3,193 3,127 
FEs Yes Yes 




Table 5.6.Lead Share and Commitment to Monitoring 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how borrowing from a competitor’s bank 
affects the loan share retained by the lead bank. The dependent variable in Specifications 
(1) and (2) is LeadShare, which is the percentage of a loan retained by the lead bank in 
decimals. The dependent variable in Specifications (3) and (4) is ShareConcentration, 
which is the sum of the squared ownership of all the lenders in a loan. 
CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan 
has lent to the borrower’s competitors within three years before the current loan, and zero 
otherwise. BookCapitalRatio is the total equity capital divided by unweighted capital assets 
of the lead bank in a loan. All the other control variables are defined as the same in Table 
1. The regressions are at the loan facility level. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank 
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, in 
a two-tailed test. 
  LeadShare ShareConcentration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CompetitorBankDummy -0.009** -0.009* -0.009** -0.009* 
 (-2.036) (-1.858) (-2.410) (-1.958) 
BookCapitalRatio  -0.160  -0.183 
  (-1.130)  (-1.296) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 8,085 5,581 8,354 5,611 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 5.7.Loan Amendments and Lead Bank Monitoring 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how borrowing from a competitor’s bank affects the loan amendments. The dependent 
variable in Specification (1) is Log (AmendTimes), which is the natural logarithm value of the number of amendment times of a loan. 
The dependent variable in Specification (2) is Log (1+AmendItems), which is the natural logarithm value of one plus the number of 
amended items. The dependent variable in Specification (3) is Log (1+PriceItems), which is the natural logarithm value of one plus the 
number of times that price related terms are amended. The dependent variable in Specification (4) is Log (1+CovItems), which is the 
natural logarithm value of one plus the number of times that the financial covenants are amended. CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors within three years before the current loan, and 
zero otherwise. PerformPriceDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a loan has the performance pricing option, and zero 
otherwise. CovenantDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if there are financial covenants in a loan package, and zero otherwise. 
All the other control variables are defined as the same in Table 1. The regressions are at the loan facility level. The t-statistics in the 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank level. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  Log (AmendTimes) Log (1+AmendItems) Log (1+PriceItems) Log (1+CovItems) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CompetitorBankDummy 0.155** 0.173* 0.133** 0.083* 
 (2.053) (1.861) (2.295) (1.663) 
PerformPriceDummy -0.059 -0.030 -0.004 0.008 
 (-0.749) (-0.352) (-0.103) (0.136) 
CovenantDummy 0.217* 0.338*** 0.088 0.174** 
 (1.827) (2.750) (1.012) (2.449) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,520 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 5.8.Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank and Firm Profitability 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how borrowing from a competitor’s bank affects firm profitability. The dependent 
variable is IndAdjProfit, which is firm 𝑖’s profitability at year 𝑡 + 1 minus the median profitability of firm 𝑖’s industry at year 𝑡 + 1. 
Specification (1) analyzes firm profitability around loan issuances. Post is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is after 
the loan issuance, and zero otherwise. The study window is three years before and three years after loan issuance. Specifications (2) to 
(4) analyze firm profitability around covenant violations. CovVioPost is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is after the 
covenant violation, and zero otherwise. The loan violation sample is from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). Specification (2), (3), and (4) 
includes all the violations, violations before loan maturity, and the first violations, respectively. The study window is three years before 
and three years after loan violations. CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to 
the borrower’s competitors within three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. Log (Assets) is the natural logarithm value of 
firm 𝑖’s total assets at year 𝑡.MktBook is firm 𝑖’s market-to-book ratio at year 𝑡. Profitability is firm 𝑖’s profitability at year 𝑡. Leverage 
is firm 𝑖’s book leverage at year 𝑡. CorpInvest is firm 𝑖’s total investment that includes capital expenditure, research and development, 
and acquisition at year 𝑡. PPEGrowth is firm 𝑖’s growth rate of property, plant, and equipment at year 𝑡. The t-statistics in the parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  IndAdjProfit 
  All PreMature First 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Post -0.004***    
 (-2.914)    
CompetitorBankDummy*Post 0.004**    
 (2.277)    
CovVioPost  0.004** 0.003 0.010** 
  (2.029) (1.044) (2.093) 
CompetitorBankDummy*CovVioPost  0.008*** 0.008** 0.013** 
  (2.865) (2.223) (2.501) 
Log (Assets) -0.041*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.051*** 
 (-17.299) (-7.407) (-6.485) (-7.947) 







 (10.571) (3.355) (2.079) (2.956) 
Profitability 0.178*** 0.197*** 0.188*** 0.099*** 
 (17.563) (12.889) (10.780) (5.044) 
Leverage 0.019*** 0.017** 0.012 0.018 
 (2.972) (1.976) (1.131) (1.229) 
CorpInvest -0.024*** -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 
 (-4.952) (-0.696) (-0.728) (-0.851) 
PPEGrowth -0.004*** -0.005* -0.002 -0.003 
 (-2.679) (-1.745) (-0.682) (-0.874) 
Constant 0.133*** 0.089*** 0.106*** 0.247*** 
 (5.643) (3.940) (4.000) (6.251) 
     
Observations 103,712 91,116 54,143 22,795 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Facility-Violation FEs No Yes Yes No 
Facility FEs Yes No No Yes 









Table 5.9.Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank and Firm’s Competition Strategies 
 
This table shows the impact of borrowing from a competitor’s bank on firm’s competition strategies. The dependent variable is 
SaleShareGrowth, SaleGrowth, or R&D, as indicated by the title. SaleShareGrowth is the difference between firm 𝑖 ’s market share in 
year 𝑡 + 1 and that in year 𝑡. Market share is firm’s sales divided by four-digit SIC industry sales. SaleGrowth is firm 𝑖’s sales in year 
𝑡 + 1 divided by its sales in year 𝑡 minus one. R&D is firm 𝑖’s research and development expenditures scaled by total assets in year 𝑡 +
1. Panel A shows regression results using the full sample. Panel B shows regression results using sub-samples. Specifications (1), (3), 
and (5) ((2), (4), and (6)) use a sub-sample that has the value of HHI index below (above) the 33th (66th) percentile. Post is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the observation is after the loan issuance, and zero otherwise. CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors within three years before the current loan, and zero 
otherwise. BorrowerControls includes Log (Assets), MktBook, Profitability, Leverage, CorpInvest, PPEGrowth, and Constant. Please 
see Table 9 for variable definitions. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Panel A: Full Sample    
  SaleShareGrowth SaleGrowth R&D 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Post -0.001 0.005 -0.001** 
 (-1.393) (1.068) (-2.155) 
CompetitorBankDummy * Post 0.001* 0.000 0.001** 
 (1.686) (0.069) (2.364) 
Log (Assets) -0.004*** 0.102*** -0.010*** 
 (-8.073) (12.789) (-13.126) 
MktBook 0.001*** 0.034*** 0.003*** 
 (3.300) (6.834) (7.762) 
Profitability -0.001 1.009*** -0.006** 
 (-0.335) (21.423) (-2.091) 
Leverage -0.004** 0.024 -0.004** 
 (-2.459) (0.789) (-2.164) 
CorpInvest 0.009*** 0.237*** 0.006*** 







PPEGrowth 0.002*** 0.198*** -0.001*** 
 (3.818) (20.095) (-2.855) 
Constant -0.017 -0.008 0.063*** 
 (-0.903) (-0.093) (16.059) 
    
Observations 103,901 109,531 103,901 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Facility FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.070 0.456 0.892 
 
Panel B: Sub-sample tests       
  SaleShareGrowth SaleGrowth R&D 
 HHI<=P33 HHI>=P66 HHI<=P33 HHI>=P66 HHI<=P33 HHI>=P66 
  (1) (2) (5) (6) (3) (4) 
       
Post 0.001 -0.002* -0.017 0.012 -0.002* -0.001** 
 (1.532) (-1.747) (-1.155) (1.386) (-1.766) (-2.099) 
CompetitorBankDummy * Post -0.000 0.002 0.023* 0.005 0.003** 0.002 
 (-0.707) (1.432) (1.739) (0.474) (2.546) (1.417) 
BorrowerControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 23,275 27,882 24,456 29,344 23,275 27,882 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Facility FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 5.10.Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank and Other Loan Terms 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of how borrowing from a competitor’s bank 
affects other pricing terms in a loan contract. The dependent variable is Log (FacilityAmt) 
and Log (Maturity) in Specifications (1) and (2), respectively. Log (FacilityAmt) is the 
natural logarithm value of the facility amount. Log (Maturity) is the natural logarithm value 
of the loan maturity. CompetitorBankDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors within three years before the 
current loan, and zero otherwise. All the other control variables are defined as the same in 
Table 1. The regressions are at the loan facility level. The t-statistics in the parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the 
lead bank level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  Log (FacilityAmt) Log (Maturity) 
  (1) (2) 
   
CompetitorBankDummy 0.096*** 0.050** 
 (3.659) (2.498) 
Log (Sales) 0.211*** -0.032*** 
 (9.414) (-2.598) 
CashFlowVol -0.006* -0.000 
 (-1.888) (-0.097) 
Earnings 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 (4.091) (3.171) 
Leverage 0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.759) (-2.028) 
RelationAmt 0.026 -0.066*** 
 (1.206) (-3.981) 
Log (NumLenders) 0.438*** 0.177*** 
 (18.875) (11.551) 
RevolverDummy 0.373*** -0.187*** 
 (8.923) (-8.347) 
Constant 12.836*** 4.557*** 
 (22.197) (14.776) 
   
Observations 11,358 11,358 
Year FEs Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs Yes Yes 





Table 5.11.Endogeneity and 2SLS Regressions 
 
This table shows the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results. The dependent 
variable in Specifications (1) (probit model without fixed effects) and (2) (linear 
probability model with fixed effects) is CompetitorBankDummy, which is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s competitors 
within three years before the current loan, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in 
Specification (3) is Log (Spread), which is the natural logarithm value of the all-in-drawn 
loan spread over LIBOR in bps. LeadMerger is the instrumental variable in the first stage 
regressions. It equals one if the lead bank of a loan has experienced mergers or acquisitions 
in the previous five years, and zero otherwise. Instru_CompetitorBankDummy is the 
predicted value of CompetitorBankDummy from the first stage regressions. All the other 
control variables are defined as the same in Table 1. The regressions are at the loan facility 
level. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the lead bank level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  CompetitorBankDummy Log (Spread) 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 Probit Linear  
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
LeadMerger 0.547*** 0.168***  
 (9.196) (6.095)  
Instru_CompetitorBankDummy   -0.265*** 
   (-2.962) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 12,939 8,887 8,887 
Year FEs No Yes Yes 
Firm FEs No Yes Yes 
Purpose FEs No Yes Yes 
S&P Rating FEs No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.085   





Figure 5.1.Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank: Time-Series Variations. This figure 
shows the time-series variations of the number of loans, the fraction of firms that borrow 
money from their competitors’ banks, and the fraction of loans that are borrowed from 
competitors’ banks. The sample used for the plot includes syndicated loans from 1987 to 
2016 in the Dealscan database. The horizontal axis indicates years. And the vertical axis 
indicates percentages. The yellow bar indicates the number of loans in a year. The grey 
line with solid circles shows the variation of the fraction of loans that are borrowed from 
competitors’ banks across years. If the lead lender in a loan has lent to the borrower’s 
competitors within three years before the current loan, the loan is defined as borrowed from 
a competitor’s bank. Competitors are firms in the same four-digit SIC industry as the 
borrower. The blue line with squares shows the variation of the fraction of firms borrowing 
from their competitors’ banks. A firm is borrowing from its competitor’s bank in a year if 




































































































































































Figure 5.2.Borrowing from A Competitor’s Bank: Industry Distribution. This figure 
shows the variations of the fraction of loans that are borrowed from competitors’ banks 
across industries. The horizontal axis indicates Fama-French 12 industries. And the vertical 
axis indicates the number of loans for each industry. The blue vertical part in a stacked bar 
represents the fraction of loans borrowed from competitors’ banks, and the red horizontal 






























This dissertation examines how the developments in the syndicated loan market in 
the past two decades affect information production and price discovery in both the primary 
and secondary loan markets.  
CLOs make up more than 60% of the investments in syndicated loans in recent 
years. A syndicated loan is in the portfolios of dozens of CLOs and they often disagree on 
the value of the loan. I find that CLO disagreement increases the uncertainty of dealers 
about the private signals in the market and gives rise to the adverse selection concern of 
the dealers. Diversely informed CLOs trade strategically by increasing trading frequency 
and reducing trading amount per transaction, which increases loan illiquidity and leads to 
slow revelation of CLOs private information to the market. Information sharing among 
CLO investors reduces CLO disagreement but worsens the adverse selection concern of 
the dealers because the dealers are not in the sharing group. When the dealers also possess 
information about the traded loan, the adverse selection concern is alleviated. 
Lending relationships enable banks to reuse information from their interactions 
with borrowers in making future credit decisions. We find that loans experience fewer 
adjustments of interest spread, offer price, and YTM in the primary market and take less 
time to close when the lead bank has a stronger lending relationship with the borrower. We 




relationships affect syndicate structure – a stronger lending relationship between the lead 
and the borrower reduces the number of participant lenders that have relationships with the 
borrower and increases the number of participants that have relationships with the lead. 
These findings shed new lights on important nuances in how information from lending 
relationships is used in loan pricing.  
Forty percent of U.S. firms share common lenders with their industry competitors. 
Common lender banks, by accumulating lending experience with other firms in the same 
industries, possess an informational advantage relative to the borrowers and other 
stakeholders. As a result, common lender banks are more willing to monitor the borrowers 
and maintain a longer relationship, which results in a lower borrowing cost and higher 
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Variable Definitions of Chapter 3 
Table A.1.Detailed Definitions of the Variables in Chapter 3 
Variable Definition 
CLODIS The standard deviation of estimated loans prices from CLOs in a 
loan. 
PriceDispersion The standard deviation divided by the mean of the estimated 
prices*100. 
PriceRange The range of the estimated prices given by the CLO investors in a 
loan. 
LOANILLIQ Amihud illiquidity measure. 
EstSpread Estimated bid and ask spread following Corwin and Schultz 
(2012). 
QuoteSpread Quoted bid and ask spread from Thompson Reuters and the 
LSTA. 
ZeroTradeDayPort The number of zero trading days in a month divided by 22. 
NumTrades The monthly total number of trades. 
TradeAmt Monthly total trading amount. 
LargeTradePortion The portion of trades greater or equal to $1 million. 
MonthtoMature The number of months between CLO report and maturity 
months. 
TotalCLOHoldings The monthly total CLO holdings. 
SecondLienDum A dummy variable indicating whether a loan is second lien or 
not. 
TermLoanDum A dummy variable indicating whether a loan is term loan or not. 
TermLoanBDum A dummy variable indicating whether a loan is term loan B or 
not. 
TermLoanCDum A dummy variable indicating whether a loan is term loan C or 
not. 
TermLoanDDum A dummy variable indicating whether a loan is term loan D or 
not. 
TEDSpread The difference between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month treasury 
rate. 
VIX Equity volatility index from the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange. 
LoanIndexReturn The monthly return of the S&P/LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 
Index. 
PublicDum A dummy variable indicating whether a firm is in Compustat. 
184 
RatingSTD The standard deviation of the loan ratings in the CLO reports. 
DiffRate A dummy variable indicating whether a loan has different ratings. 
RelationDum Whether primary lenders have lent to the borrower in the past 5 years. 
RelationNum/ 
RelationAmt 
The number/amount of loans from a lender divided by the total 
number/amount of loans issued by the borrower in the past 5 years. 
TrusteeRel/ 
ArrangerRel 
The portion of CLOs sharing the same trustee/arranger. 
FailFundRatio The portion of CLOs that failed covenant tests.  
CovTestDist The weighted average distance between the test result and the 
threshold. 
Leverage Book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
TobinQ Market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. 
EPSSTD Standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on earnings per share. 





Variable Definitions of Chapter 4 
Table B.1.Detailed Definitions of the Variables in Chapter 4 
Variable Name Definition 
RelationAmt/ 
RelationNum 
The amount/number of loans arranged by the lead bank to the 
borrowing firm divided by the amount/number of loans issued 
by the borrower in the past five years. 
LeadPartRelation The number of loans participated in by the participate lender 
divided by the number of loans arranged by the lead bank in the 
past five years. 
LeadConnectedPart
Ratio 
The number of participants that participated in at least one loan 
arranged by the lead bank in the last five years divided by total 
number of participants in the syndicate. 
FirmPartRelation The number of loans arranged by a participant bank for the 
borrowing firm divided by the total number of loans issued by 
the borrower in the past five years. 
FirmConnectedPart
Ratio 
The number of participants that have been the lead bank for at 
least one loan of the borrower in the past five years divided by 




The absolute value of the change from initially proposed interest 








The value of interest spread/price adjustment if it is negative and 
zero otherwise. 
UnderpricingOP The change from offer price to secondary break price in bps. 
UnderpricingYTM The change from primary YTM to secondary YTM in bps. 
DaysOnMarket The number of days from the launch to the completion dates. 
LeadMkshare The total amount of loans arranged by the lead arranger divided 
by the total amount of loans issued in a year. 
TotalSales The total sales of the borrower when the loan is issued. 
LoanAmt The facility amount in million dollars. 
Maturity The facility maturity in years. 
PublicDum Whether a firm can be matched with Compustat. 
SponsorDum Whether a loan has a sponsor. 
PrepayDum Whether a loan has a prepayment fee. 




RefinancingDum Whether a loan is for refinancing. 
SecuredDum Whether a loan is secured. 
CovLiteDum Whether a loan is cov-lite. 
BankCMDummy Whether the lead bank of the borrower’s previous loan has a 
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